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ABSTRACT

Reyes Yanira. Ph.D., Purdue University, December, 2002. Law, Media and Political
Dissent: The Case of the FALN. Major Professor: Robert Perrucci, Dept. of
Sociology and Anthropology.
Inspired on the works of scholars and activists that had denounced state
repression of political activists in the United States, this research explores the
theoretical proposal about the criminalization of political dissidence. The proposal of
the criminalization ofpolitical dissidence is analyzed through the study of the case of
Puerto Rican pro-independence organization Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n
Nacional, F.A.L.N.
The subjects of this research were charged with seditious conspiracy and other
charges. They claimed the status of prisoners of war and deny the jurisdiction of US
courts over them. Affirming their right to fight for the independence of Puerto Rico,
these individuals were treated by the state and the media as criminals and terrorists, as
a menace to society at large. The clash of visions and discourses inspires this
research. Moreover, the contribution and role of the media to the criminalization
process is explored.
The methodology used is Altheide's ethnographic content analysis. By this
documents are analyzed in a qualitative, deep manner, taking into consideration the
whole spectrum of social and historical factors that defines the conjuncture. Court
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decisions, trial transcripts, and other legal documents are studied in order to
understand the legal treatment of the case. Furthermore, the coverage by the New
York Time and the Chicago Tribune of the violent incidents and the arrests is also
studied to explore media's treatment to the same issue.
This research revealed that the FALN members were the subjects of a process
of criminalization. Their case further demonstrates that the criminalzaition ofpolitical
dissidence comprises three main elements. First, the characterization or stigmatization
of political dissident groups as criminals and terrorist-the law and the media present
images of the political groups and its members as criminal and terrorists. Second, the
law and the media in its treatment to the dissident groups de-politicize their activities
by negating importance or criticizing their political motivations or goals. The third
element is the use of fear to justify social control, in other words the law and the
media present images of possible danger to the public in order to justify mechanisms
of social control.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

"And we know that a country which drops an atomic bomb on Hiroshima; which finance
terrorism and supports the Contras who are trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan
government by destroying child cares centers, schools and entire villages ... will get out of
Puerto Rico only when it is forced to ... Finally, what our government attempts to label as
terrorism is really resistance. Our prisoners are subjected to psychological and physical
torture. If they didn't resist they would die. Ifwe don't resist U.S. military and corporate
plans for our nation, we will die. Resistance is our means of survival."
Alejandrina Torres
Puerto Rican Political Prisoner

The history of Puerto Rico has been the history of colonial domination. Four
hundred years under the domination of Spain ended with the Spanish-American War.
After four centuries of military domination, the Spanish Empire began to crack. The
Cuban independence movement and the Puerto Rican autonomist movement obligated
Spain to confer Autonomic Statutes to both islands on 1897 (Scarano, 1993). Soon
afterwards, in 1898, Spain lost the Spanish-American War, losing in this way its colonies.
The United States acquired Puerto Rico as a part of the war resolution treaty.
From the first moment, the United States imposed its interests on the island. A military
regime was installed immediately. Two years later, in 1900, the United States established
a civil government, with a governor that was appointed directly by the President of the
United States. The Puerto Rican people could not elect their own government until 1947
(Scarano, 1993).
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After the 1940's decade the ''New Deal" was brought to Puerto Rico. This ''new"
project attempted to develop the economy after the Great Depression of the '30s. The
development strategy was based on the implantation of diverse mechanisms of social aid,
including unemployment benefits, social security, food stamps, and other forms of
welfare (Dietz, 1989). In addition, an industrialization project directed toward foreign
companies was imposed. This project required the Puerto Rican Government to offer tax
exemption as incentive to encourage investments on the island. All these programs
caused a growing dependence on federal funds and foreign investment.
The Congress of the United States approved in 1948 the 600 Statute, which
allowed Puerto Rico to create its own Constitution. However, Congress kept the authority
to ratify and modify all sections that it considered necessary. Congress exercised its
power when it eliminated section 20, which established basic human rights under the
Constitution (Geigel, 1972). This Constitution established a "new" political regime in
Puerto Rico, which was called "Estado Libre Asociado" or Commonwealth.
Initially, the United Nations, allowing Puerto Rico to be removed from the list of
colonial territories accepted this ''new" political status of Puerto Rico 1, but this
convenient situation lasted only a short time. The United Nations took back the Puerto
Rican case during the 1960 to 1980 decades (Scarano, 1993). In fact, over that time
period the colonial status of Puerto Rico has been increasingly recognized by
international organizations (U.N., 1972, 1973, 1989).

1 Beginning in 1946 Puerto Rico was on this list which obligated the United States to provide annual
reports of the steps to decolonize Puerto Rico.
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Many different strategies have been used to solve the colonial situation of the
island, from official avenues -like raising the case to international forums or proposing
referendums of status-to illegal tactics. One of the most high profile uses of resistance
to colonial status involved fifteen Puerto Ricans who call themselves political prisoners
and prisoners of war and who were imprisoned for joining that struggle against
colonialism.
Ten men and five women Puerto Ricans workers, professionals, college students,
teachers, and community organizers, involved in independence movements spent
approximately two decades in federal prisons. "During the 1970's and the beginning of
the '80s, the prisoners were involved in community, union, student and political struggles
in Puerto Rico and one in the United States. They fought for the people's right to high
quality and free education. They worked to create community institutions such as
alternative education programs, child-care centers, health centers, housing cooperatives,
recreational facilities and political organizations ... ln summary they challenged the U.S.
political system in many ways" (Arm the Spirit, 1995).
These political activists stated that they have as their major goal the independence
of Puerto Rico from the colonial domination of the United States. Their struggle is not a
new one. Five hundred years of colonialism have been accompanied by five hundred
years of resistance by Puerto Ricans, and efforts by the state, from surveillance to
assassinations, to suppress political opposition. The case under study presents another
tactic of repression: legal persecution/prosecution or criminalization.
The Puerto Ricans subjects of this research were arrested under charges of
seditious conspiracy within others charges. This charge was first used against the
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secessionist movement of the South during the Civil War (Preston, 1994), and during this
century has almost exclusively been used against Puerto Ricans fighters for the
independence of the island (Fernandez, 1994). The similarities between these two groups
are the aim of separation from the federal union, the interest of the state to maintain the
union at any cost, and the repression ofpolitical opposition. The differences are the
ethnic composition of the groups involved, a matter ofpower, and the history of
colonialism relevant to the case of Puerto Rico.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
The questions of the origins and nature of the law are ones largely discussed in
different areas of academic inquiry. Sociologist of law and criminologists2 have studied
the processes by which crimes arise, how laws are created in response to those crimes,
and how those laws are applied or enforced. In this research several of these old questions
are addressed. The case of the Puerto Rican political prisoners gives us the opportunity to
study the process by which political dissent becomes seen and treated as a crime and the
role of the law and the media in the process of criminalization.
These Puerto Rican political prisoners were members of a group called Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN), words that in English mean Armed Forces of
National Liberation. This group claimed to be acting in support of the independence of
Puerto Rico and it has to be understood within the history of the political status of Puerto
Rico and the independence movement in the island.

2

See Chapter IL
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1.1.1 Political Resistance in Puerto Rico
Throughout the history of Puerto Rico there have been numerous Puerto Ricans
who have resisted the colonial situation. The history of political resistance dates from the
domination by Spain, when many Puerto Ricans joining Cuban revolutionaries,
unsuccessfully declared the Republic of Puerto Rico in what has been called "Grito de
Lares." Later, in 1922 the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party was founded, which with their
leader Pedro Albizu Campos guided many political activities against the colonial
domination. In 1950, an armed uprising by the Nationalist Party, designed to call
attention to the imminent peril of assimilation and declaring the Second Republic of
Puerto Rico, was put down only by jailing over 5,000 men, women and children who
participated in or were suspected of aiding the rebellion (Nieves Falcon, 1995). In 1954,
five nationalists commanded by a woman, Lolita Lebron, attacked the Congress of the
United States wounding five Congressmen. These revolutionaries were convicted of
seditious conspiracy and became the longest held political prisoners in the W estem
Hemisphere (Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). President Jimmy Carter released these
political prisoners in September of 1979.
After the Nationalists Party's actions and imprisonment of its members, many
pro-independence groups were created. It was at this juncture that the FBI implemented a
formal COINTELPRO (counter intelligence program) with the expressed intent of
strengthening the U.S. colonial domination of Puerto Rico through the process of
destroying the entire spectrum of left opposition on the island (Churchill and Vander
Wall, 1990). The intervention and surveillance of the FBI in Puerto Rico was
characterized by the infiltration of undercover agents in political groups, the circulation
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of false statements whit the sole purpose of reducing public support for and, to destroy
any alliance between the different groups inside and outside the island. (Churchill and
Vander Wall, 1990)
The intervention of the FBI with political movements in Puerto Rico was
evidenced in the case of Cerro Maravilla. On July 25, 1978, two young activist students
were assassinated by the Puerto Rican Police Corp. A police officer, later revealed that
this murder was planned from high offices of the Puerto Rican government and in
collaboration with the FBI (Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). The same year (1978) the
FBI held an international conference on counter-terrorism on San Juan, Puerto Rico. One
result of the conference was the designation of a mainland formation of the independence
movement, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN), along with three other
national liberation organizations as the most significant internal security threat to the
United States (Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990).

1.1.2 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN)
After being designated the most significant threat to the U.S. national security,
between 1980 and 1985 around 30 people were accused of conspiring against the
authority of the U.S. government and being members of the FALN. At the time of their
arrests the accused declared themselves combatants in an anti-colonial conflict to free the
island from U.S. domination, and thus asked to be treated as Prisoners of War. The
FALN members refused to recognize the jurisdiction ofU.S. courts, arguing that their
accusations could only be resolved before an international forum (Cramer, 1993).
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These FALN members were accused of conspiring to overthrow the government
of the United States. They were charged with seditious conspiracy, a charge that has only
been applied to Puerto Ricans in most of the twentieth century. Seditious conspiracy is
defined as the crime by which "two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States to conspire to overthrow or destroy by force the Government of the United
States...An indictment charging seditious conspiracy must allege that the purpose of the
conspiracy was the exertion of force against those charged with the duty of executing the
laws of the United States ... When a seditious conspiracy is shown, the act of one
conspirator in furtherance of a common purpose is admissible evidence against all, even
though the conspirator committing the act is not being tried" (American Jurisprudence
70: Sec. 6).
Over the years, FALN members and supporters have argued that seditious
conspiracy in the context of the political situation of Puerto Rico is an impossible crime.
The argument is that because Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States, the authority
of the United States over Puerto Rico is illegal, and therefore the seditious conspiracy
charge cannot be used against Puerto Ricans activists. Puerto Rican poet, Juan Antonio
Corretjer, first developed this argument. This Puerto Rican poet, fighter for the
independence of Puerto Rico, and once himself charged with conspiring against the
United States, depicted this as the "imposible crime." His rationale was that Puerto
Ricans cannot commit this crime because we are not part of the United States, because
Puerto Rico is a Latin American nation militarily occupied by the United States
(Corretjer, 1983). Basically the main argument has been that since Puerto Rico is a
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colony of the United States, pro-independence groups are entitled by International Law to
fight against the colonial domination.
Most recently, an activist and scholar has proposed that the United States, in their
interest of maintaining its power over Puerto Rico has engaged in a process of
criminalization of the independent movements. Richard Dello Buono in his article
entitled "State Repression and Popular Resistance: The Criminalization of Puerto Rican

lndependentistas" argues that the United States has criminalized the Puerto Rican
independence movement in order to maintain the colonial domination of Puerto Rico.
Dello Buono argues that because of the importance of the colonial domination of Puerto
Rico, the US has repressed independence movements since the beginning of its
domination of the island, including the criminalization of the FALN and Macheteros
during the 1980's. Criminalization is presented by the author as one of the tools used by
the state to repress political movements, in this case the Puerto Rican independence
movement. In his own words: "The process of criminalization is an effective tool
employed by the state to repress popular social movements. In general terms,
criminalization can be defined as the process by which behaviors and individuals are
respectively transformed into crimes and criminals" (Dello Buono, 1991, p. 116).
Dello Buono argues that the United States in its purpose of maintaining control
over Puerto Rico repressed independence groups by using processes of criminalization,
manifested in this case with charging independence activists with seditious conspiracy
and other criminal charges. He explains this process as one in which several branches of
the government participated, including the courts and law enforcement agencies. Dello
Buono in addition suggests that the media participates or cooperates in that process of
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criminalization: "Clearly, the state was engaged in a larger struggle for popular
perception of the independence movement, taking political aim at independence politics
in the media while orchestrating legal maneuvering in the courts" (Dello Buono, 1991, p.
119).
This research explores this process of criminalization as proposed by Dello
Buono. The law and the media are studied in order to understand the way in which the
FALN and their activities became treated and seen as criminal and terrorist. Through the
analysis of the content oflegal documents and media articles this work studies the way in
which the actors are characterized and labeled as criminal instead of freedom fighters,
like the FALN call themselves. Second, this research explores how different actors (law
and the media) approach FALN's political goals. Finally, the way in which the law and
the media utilized elements of fear in order to support their intentions of prosecution and
by which it justified the criminalization ofpolitical actions is also analyzed.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACH

In this chapter we examine literature on the main topic of this research -the
criminalization of Puerto Rican political dissidents-and topics related to the area.
Included in these are the history of the independence movements in Puerto Rico and the
repression that these groups have experienced over the years.
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to a survey of those theoretical
propositions that have informed the theoretical approach for this study and for use in
understanding the criminalization of political movements.

2.1 Criminalization of Political Dissent in the United States
The World War I was the stage for the creation of statutes criminalizing political
dissent in the United States3• Alarmed with the strong anti-war movement the Congress

3

In Stephen Kohn words: "At the time the United States entered World War I, there was a very large
American peace movement. Congress, aware of this movement, passed two laws [Espionage and Seditious
Act] intended to suppress disloyal or anti-war activities" (Kohn, 1994)
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of the United States passed the Espionage and Seditious Act on June 15, 1917. Stephen
Kohn describes this law: "This law, which had nothing whatever to do with espionage,
made it a felony to make 'false statements' or statements that might cause
'insubordination' or 'disloyalty' in the armed services or statements that could 'obstruct'
enlistment into the armed services. A 'conspiracy' to cause such 'disloyalty',
'insubordination' or 'obstruction' was likely criminalized. Anyone found guilty under the
law was subject to heavy fines and imprisonment ofup to twenty years." (Kohn, 1994).
Under this law hundreds of citizens were arrest and imprisoned. In 1940, Congress
passed an anti-seditious act to permit criminal charges against dissidents in peacetime
(Kohn, 1994).
But political repression4 by the U.S. government has not been restricted to war
periods or to the enforcement of those statutes. Rather, it has been present in almost all
the history of the United States and has been the way in which the U.S. government deals
with the domestic opposition. Schultz and Schultz say: ''we believe that repression in
America is a pervasive phenomenon that transcends specific persons and specific
periods" (Schultz and Schultz, 1989). Political repression in the U.S. not only has been
present in different historical moments, but also has acquired different forms. The
repression was and is not limited to enforcement against political dissidents. Instead,
"each branch of the government, the judicial, the legislative, and the executive, has
contributed to the selective denial of rights to persons it considers a threat" (Schultz and

4

Robert Goldstein defined political repression in this way: "Political Repression consists of government
action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental
challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political
beliefs", cited in Schultz and Schultz, 1989.
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Schultz, 1989). The participation ofvarious federal agencies (CIA, FBI, IRS, U.S. Army)
in the persecution, repression and surveillance of citizens has been demonstrated
(Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). Historically, the consistent presence and harassment
by the FBI and the use of grand juries' subpoenas have been a nightmare for social and
independence movements in the US and Puerto Rico.
In an article that is constructed around the authors' political convictions, entitled:

"Political Prisoners as an Emergent Contradiction of State Repression: An Introductory
Essay," the authors begin by stating that the topic ofpolitical prisoners in the United
States is a key theme that needs to be studied by all scholars committed to issues of social
justice. "As academics and political activists, we find that focusing on the issues of
political prisoners/prisoners ofwar is a means for developing discussions and activities
designed to protect the memory ofpast struggles, to call attention to the urgency of
current movements issues, and to shape the strategies of future battles for human rights in
the U.S." (Stout and Buono, 1991, p. 338).
The sixties and seventies were decades of profound political conflict in the United
States. These social movements included the opposition to the Vietnam war, civil rights
movements of Blacks, Chicanos, Native-American and feminist movements. The state
responded by repressing these movements. The authors argue: "Behind the tranquility
depicted in the corporate storybooks, radical opposition continued and was subjected to a
concerted strategy of repression directed from the highest levels of the U.S. government.
This state repression was designed to annihilate all of its most radical political opponents,
an approach best symbolized by the COINTELPRO campaign (Stout and Dello Buono,
1991, p. 340). COINTELPRO was the FBI's system directed toward the elimination of
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those movements considered more threatening to U.S. national security. In the next
section we discuss how COINTELPRO was used against the Puerto Rican independence
movement.
Stout and Dello Buono argue that state repression has evolved from traditional
approaches to more elaborate forms of repression. One of the new forms that state
repression is acquiring is the criminalization of political opposition. The authors describe
this process as follows: "The strategy of criminalization is an effective way of preserving
the 'neutral' image of the state which seeks to manage and contain the contradictions of
its domination and the organized resistance it breeds ...Criminalization attempts to
accomplish this by labeling longstanding, organized and legitimate political opposition as
'ordinary crime,' the activities of 'fanatic terrorists,' or 'unjust' threats to public order"
(Stout and Dello Buono, 1991, p. 343).

2.2 Puerto Rican Political Prisoners
Repression has been a constant in our history, because it is impossible to maintain
colonialism by consent, no matter how attractive the prize for the privileged few.
In Puerto Rico, this repression has served three complementary functions: first, to
protect the enormous U.S. economic interests and infrastructure in Puerto Rico;
second, to protect the symbols of U.S. executive and military power; and finally,
to control the levels of rebellion and protest endemic to the deprivation of liberty
and the economic hardship that are visited upon colonized peoples (Nieves
Falcon, 1995, pp. 5).

There are basically four main sources of information available on this topic. First,
a book entitled: Prisoners of Colonialism: The Struggle for justice in Puerto Rico, by
Ronald Fernandez. Second, an article published in the Cardozo Journal oflntemational
and Comparative Law in 1996 by Lisa Napoli, titled, "The Puerto Rican
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lndependentistas: Combatants in the Fight for Self-determination and the Right to
Prisoner of War Status." Third an article published on 1991 in the Journal Humanity &
Society: "State Repression and Popular Resistance: The Criminalization of Puerto Rican
Independentistas" by Richard Dello Buono. Finally, several articles and booklets

prepared by groups supporting the freedom of these prisoners. This section will discuss
this literature.
Fernandez (1994) undertakes the task of telling the story of these prisoners by
adopting a personal and historical approach. In his words: "This is a story which spans
one hundred years. To fairly understand the prisoners, Prisoners ofColonialism begins in
the year that, as Senator Millard Tydings acknowledge, 'we acquired Puerto Rico by
conquest"' (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 16). Thus, he presents the story by interchanging the
history of the colonial status of Puerto Rico, and the personal experiences of the prisoners
themselves.
The author starts with the person he calls "Political Prisoner #0001" don Pedro
Albizu Campos, the Nationalist leader who was the first Puerto Rican to be prosecuted
under seditious conspiracy charges. Fernandez introduces Albizu's story by narrating the
political conditions in which he grew up: "In the cultural capital of Puerto Rico, students
like Albizu began the day with the Pledge of Allegiance to a foreign flag; they also sang
the Star Spangled Banner'' (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 28). With this interaction of historical
and personal data, the author presents the life of Albizu in an attempt to make this
particular historical figure -and later he does the same with all the prisoners-a human
being that committed justifiable acts.
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With a clear romanticist approach, this author exposes Albizu and the
Nationalists' ideas: "Do you have a political platform?-Albizu responded-Yes, sir. Our
program, its general thesis, is to restore to the Puerto Rican people the moral intensity
which they expressed in 1868 ...then they preached the revolutionary creed. We seek to
translate that moral indignation into all the forms of resistance that will enable us to
dispose of American colonialism" (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 37). Fernandez continues to
introduce the three groups ofpolitical prisoners that followed Albizu, the four
Nationalists who attacked the Congress of the United States, the members of the FALN
arrested between 1980 and 1983, and the Macheteros arrested for robbery in 1985. The
same issues were presented for each group, who are they personally, their motives, and
their conditions of incarceration. These topics are also common in the literature
assembled by the groups fighting for the freedom of Puerto Rican political prisoners.
Lisa Napoli (1996) presents a study of the prisoners of war status that these
prisoners are requesting. She studies this status according to International Law, and
writes: "This Note will examine the right of members of clandestine armed organizations
such as el Ejercito Popular Boricua ("Los Macheteros '') and las Fuerzas Armadas de

Liberaci6n Nacional ("FALN''), to prisoner of War ("POW") status when captured"
(Napoli, 1996, pp. 132). She divides the article into two parts. The first part presents the
independence movements in Puerto Rico, and their rationale for action. The second part
is a detailed examination of the Geneva Convention and other International Law sources
and its application to the request for POW status for the Puerto Ricans. In this section I
will review the first part of the article, since the issues of International Law are beyond
the breadth of this research.
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Section A of the first part, titled "Puerto Rico is under colonial domination"
(Napoli, 1996, pp. 133) presents a brief historical account of the colonial situation of
Puerto Rico since the US invasion of Puerto Rico in 1898. Napoli presents some
conclusions:
a) there has been no free and genuine expression of the will of the Puerto Rican
people;
b) the ELA5 does not meet the criteria for Free Association under International
Law;
c) Puerto Rico's domination by a colonial power invokes the right to self
determination;
d) the right to self-determination includes the right to use arms;
e) there has been political resistance to the colonial power of Spain and the US
since the first years of the domination;
f) therefore, groups such as FALN and Los Macheteros are engaged in
legitimate resistance to colonial domination under International Law and are
entitled to prisoner ofwar status (Napoli, 1996).
In a very organized and eloquent manner, Napoli is able to make a good case for
the prisoner's request to being treated as prisoners of war. The importance ofthis
argument is that the Puerto Ricans will not be under the jurisdiction of the US and will
have to be prosecuted by International Courts. Another important consequence of this
argument is that there will be international recognition of the colonial domination of
Puerto Rico and the right of Puerto Rican independentistas to use arms against the
colonial power. However, the question ofwhy the Puerto Ricans become the "seditious
conspirators" of this century and how they became that remains unanswered.
Richard Dello Buono (1991) in his article entitled "State Repression and Popular
Resistance: The Criminalization of Puerto Rican Independentistas" argues that the United
States has criminalized the Puerto Rican independence movement in order to maintain the

5 ELA

or "Estado Libre Asociado" is the official name in Spanish for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
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colonial domination of Puerto Rico. Starting by acknowledging his political standpoint as
a ''North American activ[ist] in the anti-intervention movement" and sociologist, Dello
Buono states that the colonial domination of Puerto Rico has economic and military
importance for the US. For this reason, the US has repressed independence movements
since the beginning of its domination of the island, including the criminalzaition of the
FALN and Macheteros during the 1980's.
In this article Dello Buono offers a comprehensive and detailed account of the
history of colonial domination and independence struggles in Puerto Rico. Over that
history of colonialism and independence struggles he argues that the US has repressed
independence movements to maintain its control over the island. "Repression in the form
ofpoitical persecution, reactionary legal changes, and campaigns of political hysteria
orchestrated by Federal agencies and propagated by the corporate press have in unison
provided critical pillars of support for U.S. imperial designs in Puerto Rico" (Dello
buono, 1991, p. 116).
Criminalization is presented by the author as one of the tools used by the state to
repress political movements, in this case the Puerto Rican independence movement: "The
process of criminalization is an effective tool employed by the state to repress popular
social movements. In general terms, criminalization can be defined as the process by
which behaviors and individuals are respectively transformed into crimes and criminals"
(Dello Buono, 1991, p. 116). He further argues that the United States in its effort to
maintain control over Puerto Rico repressed independence groups by using processes of
criminalization, manifested in this case with charging independence activists with
seditious conspiracy and other criminal charges. He suggests that this process engage the
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assistance of several branches of the government, including the courts and law
enforcement agencies. Dello Buono also identifies the participation or cooperation of the
media in the process of criminalization: "Clearly, the state was engaged in a larger
struggle for popular perception of the independence movement, taking political aim at
independence politics in the media while orchestrating legal maneuvering in the courts"
(Dello Buono, 1991, p. 119).
Several organizations are working for the liberation of Puerto Rican political
prisoners. These organizations, led by Ofensiva '92 in Puerto Rico, have published
several articles and booklets denouncing the incarceration of these Puerto Ricans and
exposing their conditions of incarceration. In an article published on the Internet a US
organization committed to the liberation of all political prisoners, Arm the Spirit, exposes
the unjust character of their sentences. According to them, the Puerto Rican political
prisoners are facing sentences between 55 and 90 years6, sentences reported as nineteen
times longer than the average sentences during the year of their conviction. They
compared the sentneces of the Puerto Ricans to other federal sentences for ordinary
crimes and to sentences for political right-wing crimes. They found that from 1966 to
1985 the average sentence for murder was 22. 7 years, for rape, 12.5 years and for
violation of arms law, 12 years. In addition, they found that the longest time served by
any federal prisoner is for kidnapping, and the time served is 5.3 years. In contrast,
fourteen of the Puerto Rican political prisoners spent between 11 and 16 years in prison7

6

It is important to mention that none of the Puerto Ricans Political Prisoners had a prior criminal record at
the time of their arrest.
7 By the time they received Clinton's condition pardon, most of these prisoners had spent approximately 18
years in prison.
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(Arm the Spirit, 1995). In terms of the political right-wing criminals, the Puerto Rican
political prisoners' sentences have been compared with the sentence received for a Ku
Klux Klan member who ''was captured in a boat with an arsenal of arms and explosives
while attempting to invade a Caribbean island with the goal of establishing a white
supremacist state." This man received a three year sentence. Another KKK member
received a three-year sentence after been convicted for "attempted murder and racial
harassment after shooting at two black men" (Arm the Spirit, 1995).
Jan Sussler, the defense lawyer of some of the Puerto Rican independentistas, in a
booklet titled "Conditions of Incarceration" (Sussler, 1992), exposes these conditions.
According to her, not only are these prisoners facing longer sentences, but the political
character of their offenses has condemned them to inhuman conditions of incarceration:
"The U.S. government denies that it has political prisoners. The myth of democracy
requires this denial. Yet the denial is contradicted by prison conditions which target the
political prisoners for special punitive treatment" (Sussler, 1992, pp. 21). Despite having
a federal prison in Puerto Rico, they are imprisoned far away from their families and
from each other. The visiting privileges for them are extremely restricted. The Bureau of
Prisons has consistently denied furloughs to visit their dying family members (Sussler,
1992).
They are subjected to physical assaults and sexual abuse. Alejandrina Torres has
been attacked several times in different prisons. In one of these assaults she lost
the use of an arm for two years, "when a male lieutenant wrenched her arm
behind her back. ..and then forecely held her head between his knees, watching as
female guards tore off her clothes and exposed her naked body to him" (Sussler,
1992, pp. 30-31).
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The consequences ofbeing labeled as "political activists", "subversives", ''reds",
"terrorists" extend to the denial of medical treatment and political harassment inside
prison. They have faced denial of medical treatment because the health care providers
considered them as "security cases" not ''medical cases."8 Although, the U.S. has not
recognized them as political prisoners officially, the prison file oflda Luz Rodriguez was
recently employed to train prison staff to manage "terrorists," and Alejandrina Torres was
referred to psychological treatment to "help her in overcoming her intransigent position
against the U.S. government, insinuating that her political resistance was a form of
mental illness" (Sussler, 1992, pp. 32).
This literature provides important information for the political denunciation of the
incarceration of the Puerto Rican independentistas, and for the historical justification of
their acts, as in the personal stories provided by Ronald Fernandez (1994). Their
eligibility as prisoners of war according to the international is well discussed and proved
by Lisa Napoli (1996). The injustices associated with the prosecution, sentencing, and
incarceration of the Puerto Rican prisoners are exposed and revealed by the above
literature, produced mainly by political and civic groups that are calling for amnesty.
Richard Dello Buono presents the argument that inspires this research. Dello
Buono argues that Puerto Rican independentistas have been criminalized. He argues that
the United States has criminalized the independence movement in Puerto Rico in order to

8

"Haydee Beltran Torres is sterile today after prison officials refused for five years to treat her pelvic
inflammatory disease, ignoring her episodes of drastic weight loss and pelvic pain so severe she could not
stand up. Oscar Lopez Rivera's rectal bleeding was aggravated by an intrusive examination and then
ignored. Alejandrina Torres was made to wait over six months for repair of a frozen shoulder so painful she
could not move her arm, and she was then operated on without her informed consent. Instead of providing
meaningful dental care to Elizam Escobar, the 'professionals' have pulled several teeth, and more await the
same fate" (Sussler, 1992, pp. 32-33).
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maintain the colonial domination of Puerto Rico. This compelling argument is presented
and supported by Dello Buono with historical evidence that points to that conclusion.
What is missing from this work is a deep analysis of the process by which Puerto Rican
independence activists became criminalized in practice. In other words, how did this
happen? This is a question that this research intends to answer.

2.3 Theory Revisited: Searching for a Theoretical Understanding of the Criminalization
of Political Dissent
We now explore different theoretical approaches to the problem of crime
formation, law and the media in its relation to the criminalization ofpolitical dissent.
Several theoretical approaches to crime formation, law and the media are explored and
presented as the foundation to what is introduced as a theoretical approach to the
criminalization of political dissent.

2.3 .1 Political Crimes
The focus of this topic is the treatment given to political crimes and political
criminals in the criminological literature. This line of research is presented in this section
to expand our understanding of this particular crime, and the explanations of how
political activities are criminalized.
Although political crimes are perhaps the oldest crimes in history, little
criminological research exists about the topic (Schafer, 1974). Some criminologists and
sociologists have argued that because crime is defined by the state to protect the given
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ideological and economic system, all crimes are political (Schafer, 1974). Not only the
process of crime definition, but punishment is a political act: "It is the state, through
public policy decisions, that defines what actions are considered criminal and determines
which types of crimes will be targeted for prosecution at a given point in time and the
forms that punishment will take. The punishment is also a political act. .." (Diaz-Cotto,
1996, pp. 1).
Although any crime can be understood as a political act because it challenges an
imposed norm, I will discuss crimes committed because of a political conviction to
change the political system. Schafer (1974) treats this dilemma by differentiating between
a "common or ordinary offense," which he calls the "relative political crime" versus the
"absolute political crime where the target of the lawbreaking is the ruling power's value
system as a whole." He defines political criminals as those who define their acts as
necessary to attain their major objective--social change (Schafer, 1974). On the other
hand, Roebuck and Weeber (1978) define political crimes in terms of their social
reaction. They define political criminals as individuals who are committed to social
change and who are the targets ofpolitical policing whose objective is "to neutralize or
destroy intolerable opposition, and thereby to prevent any radical transformation of the
structure ofpower" (Roebuck and Weeber, 1978, pp. 2).
In an attempt to create a clear definition of political crime, William Minor
develops a definition of it in relation to definitions of political prisoners and political
justice. Following the definitions described above, Minor places the political crime
definition in the motivational arena:
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Political crime is defined as legally proscribed acts or omission of legally
proscribed acts which are motivated by the desire to influence public policy or
power relations through the commission of the crime, and which are characterized
by concern for group and societal welfare over considerations of personal gain.
Both crimes by government and crimes against government may be forms of
political crime. A political criminal is, simply, one who commits a political crime.
Political justice is the discriminatory application of the machinery of criminal
justice to the disadvantage of specific individuals or groups because they
perceived as threatening to the power of the established regime. A political
prisoner is one who is imprisoned as a result ofpolitical crime, political justice, or
both (Minor, 1975, pp. 386).

The definitions given by the literature are largely based on the motivations of the
"criminals" to change the social system. Little is said about the process by which political
activities become crimes. This criminological literature, although suggesting the
unfairness of these crimes in opposition to others, does not explain the process of
criminalization. Moreover, it is suggested that all crimes are political because they are
defined by the state, but there is no critique of that definition. In other words, the
definition of crime is uncontested.

2.3.2 Crime Construction Theories: the Labeling Perspective
Crime construction theories focus on the process by which certain types of
behavior become criminalized. In general, these theories propose that crime is a human
construct. In 1963 Howard Becker was proposing that deviance was not in the act, nor the
person, but a result of the interaction between the actor and the social environment.
Labeling theory proposes three main questions:

"1. What forms ofbehavior are defined as deviance in society?
2. Who, among the many who deviate, becomes defined as deviant?
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3. What are the consequences of stigmatizing certain individuals or activities with
a deviant label?" {Traub and Little, 1994, pp. 289).

Richard Quinney, in his book, "The Social Reality ofCrime", presents several
propositions to explain labeling theory. The first question cited above coincides with
Quinney's first proposition: "Crime is a definition of human conduct that is created by
authorized agents in a politically organized society... Thus, crime is created'' (Quinney,
1994, pp. 363). In other words, the existence of crime depends on the definition that
powerful sectors create to protect their special interest.
Steven Spitzer, on the other hand, proposes that the analysis of the definition of
crime must be accomplished by the analysis of historical, economic and political context
in which the particular crime definition is located. "In other words, the form and content
of deviance definition must be assessed in terms of its relationship to both structural and
ideological change" (Spitzer, 1994, pp. 398).
Quinney's second, third and fourth propositions are closely related. In the second
proposition, Quinney states that crime is determined by the conflict of some behavior
with the interests of the social groups in power. The third proposition declares that
powerful sectors or dominant groups are responsible for the application, enforcement and
administration of criminal law. He proposes that enforcement will depend on how the
dominant interests are "threatened by the opposition's behavior" (Quinney, 1994, pp.
365). The fourth states that "persons in the segments of society whose behavior patterns
are not represented in formulating and applying criminal definitions are more likely to act
in ways that will be defined as criminal than those in the segment that formulate and
apply criminal definitions" (Quinney, 1994, pp. 366). In this sense, segments of the
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population without power, who are not represented in the law making or crime definition
process, are more vulnerable to a crime label because their behavior can be inadequate in
terms of the dominant values.
These propositions are essential tools in order to answer the second question (who
gets defined as deviant?). Spitzer asserts " ... that deviants are culled from groups who
create specific problems for those who rule ... their problematic quality ultimately resides
in their challenge to the basis and form of class rule" (Spitzer, 1994, pp. 398).
Furthermore, Spitzer suggests that the severity of punishment will depend on the level of
threat that the "problematic population" presents against the State. "The larger and more
threatening the problem population, the greater the likelihood that this population will
have to be controlled through deviance processing rather than other methods" (Spitzer,
1994, pp. 403).
To manage the "problematic populations" the state designs and defines laws and
norms, which differ in terms of the population to which they are directed. Spitzer names
those sectors of the population that are extremely problematic to the political system,
sectors with potentiality to challenge the imposed order, as "social dynamite". "Social
dynamite is normally processed through the legal system with its capacity for active
intervention" (Spitzer, 1994, pp. 405).
From this discussion we are left with two main propositions. First, crime is
created/constructed by human action. Even considering Quinney's assertion that power
relations dominate the process, the factors or elements that make this process possible are
not clear. According to what criteria do powerful groups define crime? Who are the
powerful groups? Are their interests homogenous? Do powerless groups have anything to
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contribute in that process of crime making? These are questions that remain unanswered
by this theory.
Second, only that behavior that contradicts the system is defined as criminal and,
moreover, only those people that oppose the system are defined as criminals. Underlying
this proposition is an uncontested assumption about the nature of that system. What
system are we dealing with? An economic system divided into classes as proposed by
Marx? Is it an ideological system with nonnative consensus? What makes that system?
The answer to these questions is an important analytical element needed to identify not
only the "target populations," but also the rationale behind the crime definition.
Schervish (1984) states that since the 1970s the concern of deviance research has
changed from a question of "how individuals or groups become defined as deviant" to the
more political question of ''how deviance is created, maintained, and changed through
political processes" (Schervish, 1984, pp. 195). He maintains that this shift in focus on
the power relations not only in the process of labeling, but also on the formation and
maintenance of the very system of control. In other words, the theory will now include a
more political discussion about the nature of the very system in which the processes of
crime definition and application take place.

2.3.3 Radical Criminology
Radical criminology originated as part of the academic rupture of the 1960's and
70's (Cardarelli and Hicks, 1993). A product of the civil rights movement of the decade,
radical scholars began to question the "mainstream or traditional criminological
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emphases on the nature and etiology of criminal behavior" (Inciardi, 1980, pp. 7). One of
the foci of this tradition is the motivation of criminal behavior. In spite of the importance
of this issue, the responsibility of crime is placed on the individual, and a broader
explanation of crime is obscured. This academic movement departed from the traditional
criminological consensus approach rooted in the Durkheimian tradition, which contended
that crime exists in all societies, and it is defined as "an action which offends certain
collective feelings which are especially strong and clear-cut" (Durkheim, 1982, pp. 99).
Following this argument, traditional criminologists did not question the definition of
crime. Rather, they assume that crimes were defined according to some consensual
notions of wrong and right. The result was a line of research based on that same
positivist-consensual approach, in which the focus was to explain why people would
break those consensual agreements ofproper behavior.
Radical or critical criminologists started to question those assumptions and posed
new lines of inquiry. Beginning with a rupture with the consensual approach, this "new"
criminology stated that society has contradictions between groups or classes. Thomas
Bernard (1981) summarizes the basic principles of radical criminology. I will reproduce
some of those:
1) No consensus exists in society on the basic values and interests of individuals,
and on the contrary, society is characterized by conflict on these issues.
2) Society in general is divided into classes whose members have similar values
and interests, the principal classes ...the ruling class and ...the working class.
3) Crimes are defined as socially harmful actions that violate basic human
rights ...Because the law is a tool of the ruling class in its conflict with
working class, the socially harmful actions of the ruling class are generally not
defined as crimes by the official criminal justice. (Bernard, 1981, pp. 369370).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
It is necessary to discuss the relevant points of these principles. Radical
criminology begins with the assertion that there is no consensus in society. Class
divisions produce contradictions between the ideas and basic values of the main groups in
society. The powerful group, the ruling class, controls the state and consequently the
power of crime definition. The result is that the state, to protect the interests of the ruling
class, defines crimes according to the interests of that class. The actions of the working
class are defined as criminal, and those of the ruling class are not.
In this model, law is the means by which the state exercises its power and secures
the protection of capitalist class interests. This view of the law has been criticized for its
simplistic presentation of a monolithic ruling class (Greenberg, 1981 ). Greenberg points
out some of these critiques: "[This view] seems to exaggerate the unity of the capitalist
class and its ability to act cohesively. If capitalists are as unconstrained as the
instrumental theory suggests, why do they sometimes fail to achieve their goals? Have
the 'common people' really no influence on public policy?" (Greenberg, 1981, pp. 191).
Spitzer (1980) argues that instrumentalist notions of the state produce
oversimplified analysis of the problem of crime in society. This analysis obscures
multiple possibilities of arrangements of social and political factors that interplay in the
creation and enforcement of crime. Instrumentalism, has been generally criticized within
the discipline of sociology. In that process, alternative explanations have been developed.
Gold, Lo, and Olin Wright (1975) disclose the problems with this approach to the state:
(1) There is no systematic analysis of how strategies and actions of ruling-class
groups are limited by impersonal structural causes. (2) It fails to take into
account the significance of class struggle and conflicts of interests both within
the state itself and between the state and the class that it ostensibly represents.
(3) There are important realms of state-related activity which are clearly not
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manipulated by specific capitalists or coalitions, such as culture, ideology and
legitimacy (Gold et al., 1975, pp. 35).
These problems point to the direction of the new developments in state theory. Briefly,
the new theories consider the effects of class struggles in the formation and policing
power of the state, they do not view classes as homogeneous, and the ideological
purposes of state actions are considered, etc (Gold et al, 1975, pp. 46-50). In conclusion,
we can say that new theories are bringing dialectics back into the analysis.

2.3.4 New Approaches in Criminological Theory
Alternative models have been proposed. Beginning with William Chambliss,
there have been attempts to close the gap between radical criminology and other theories
of the state. Chambliss (1993) proposed a dialectical approach to law creation in which
the broader context around the creation of laws is considered and class struggles are
included in the analysis. In his words: "Our theory stresses the importance of
fundamental contradictions in political, economic, and social relations as the starting
point for a sociological understanding of law creation. In our theory people struggle to
resolve the contradictions by fighting against existing laws (laws supporting colonialism,
wage discrimination, or racism, for example), while other people fight to maintain the
status quo through the enforcement of existing laws and the creation of new ones. In the
process, ideological justifications develop, shift, and change; these ideologies, in tum,
become a force of their own, influencing the development of legal institutions which
reflect the interplay between material conditions and ideology'' (Chambliss, 1993, pp.
61).
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Thus, Chambliss introduces the interaction of classes to the analysis of criminal
law creation. In his view, the final form oflaw and its enforcement is the product of the
struggle between classes. Although this certainly opens up the discussion, it still portrays
a monolithic state and control by a dominant class. On the other hand, Chambliss offers
the element of ideology as antecedent and subsequent factor. Other scholars have
developed these two elements -the effects of class struggle and ideology more
thoroughly.
Steven Spitzer (1980) proposes a model oflaw creation in which law is seen as
the result of the dialectic relationship between classes and internal contradictions of a
class society. "A dialectical analysis of crime and its control focuses on the internal
contradictions of class society which give rise to the 'crime problem,' societal reactions
to crime, and the interaction between the two. The major advantage of the dialectical
perspective over other approaches to crime and social change is that it encourages us to
understand crime as growing out of the simultaneous operation of stabilizing and
destabilizing elements at a specific historical juncture" (Spitzer, 1980, pp. 184).
With this approach, crime creation and social reaction to it is not seen as the
action of the ruling class through the state to protect its interests, but as the result of the
interaction of several factors. This new set of factors included in the analysis expands the
discussion of crime and places it in a particular historical and political context. Now the
model provides not only for the examination of the factors leading to the creation of
crime in a specific moment in time, but to consider how changing conditions result in the
enforcement of specific laws for specific groups or specific activities.
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Humphries and Greenberg (1981) develop the role of ideology in the analysis of
crime. They propose that ''many ideas about crime and its control have been
ideological. . .Ideology consists of ideas that originate in social experience-particularly
the experience of class relations-without the originator ofthe ideas being aware of it. In
short, it is not bourgeois interests but bourgeois society that is the source of bourgeois
ideas" (Humphries and Greenberg, 1981, pp. 217). Thus, it is not that class society
permits the control of a state apparatus by one class in opposition to the other, or that the
ruling class imposes laws to control ideologically the working class. Rather, what is
proposed is that capitalism frames social relations according to specific ideologies that
come out of the material conditions in which life is organized.
McGarrell and Castellano (1993) present a model of crime formation that includes
the structural factors propose by Chambliss and ideological/cultural factors proposed by
Humphries and Greenberg. This model consists of three levels: first level includes the
structural foundations, second level deals with crime and criminal justice, and the third
level that treats triggering events. The first level, which is the one of interest here,
includes structural variables such as "economic, racial, gender, and religious
composition" (McGarrell and Castellano, 1993, pp. 349). It also includes "cultural
factors, and related ideological assumptions, [that] are viewed as having primary
importance in how criminal behavior is perceived and reacted to by citizens and criminal
justice functionaries" (McGarrell and Castellano, 1993, pp. 350).
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2.3.5 Law and Criminalization

2.3.5.1 Marxists Approaches to the Law
Marxist theories9 suggest that the state and the law are strongly related to the
economic interests of the capitalist class. Marx himself understood the law as part of the
superstructure, which "is determined" by the material conditions: "The sum total of these
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society--the real foundation,
on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which corresponds definite forms
of social consciousness" (Marx, 1978).
Following this base-superstructure metaphor by which Marx explained the
relationship between the material conditions of life (base), and the state and the law
(superstructure), the state and the law have been portrayed as the tool of the dominant
class to protect its interests. By this, many Marxists have argued that the dominant class
uses the state and its institutions to produce and reproduce the necessary conditions for its
dominance and exploitation. Richard Quinney asserts: "Viewed historically, the capitalist
state is the natural product of a society divided by economic classes. Only with the
emergence of a division of labor based on the exploitation of one class by another, and
with the breakup of communal society, was there a need for the state. The new ruling
class created the state as a mean for coercing the rest of the population into economic and
political submission" (Quinney, 1973). In this model, the law is the mean by which the
state exercises its power and secures the protection of the capitalist class' interests.

9

It is necessary to mention that there are diverse conceptualizations of the law within Marxist theories; see
Caudill and Gold. 1995. Radical Philosophy of Law. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
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Structuralist Marxism divides society into two separate but related spheres: the
infrastructure and the superstructure. The infrastructure or economic base is constituted
by the productive forces and production relationships. The superstructure is divided into
two instances: the political and legal institutions and, on the other hand, the ideology that
legitimates it (Althusser, 1977). According to Therbom, "Marx was above all interested
in how wealth and poverty, domination and subjugation are being (re)produced and how
this can be changed" (Therbom, 1982). One of the most important mechanisms of
reproduction is repression. "The development or maintenance of certain modes of
production can be repressed by the army, the police, prisons, or the
executioner... Individuals who refuse to accept any of the given positions can be taken
care of, for instance in prison or in mental hospitals" (Therbom, 1982). In other words,
the state, through the "repressive apparatus", protect its interests by creating laws and
norms that help to develop them or repress all activities or individuals that threaten them.
But, which are the interests of the state? There is no agreement in this respect
between Marxist theorists. For example, Althusser asserts that the state is a repressive
instrument through which the dominant classes insure its dominance over the proletariat
and in this way guarantee the extraction of surplus value (Althusser, 1977). Contrary,
Offe and Ronge argue that the state is not identified with one class, but with all members
in a capitalist society, but "since the state depends on a process of accumulation, every
occupant of the state power is basically interested...in guaranteeing and safeguarding a
'healthy' accumulation process upon which it depends" (Offe and Ronge, 1982). The state
is directly identified with the capitalist class to protect the interest of the capitalist society
and to protect its own interests. Thus, the state is presented as an institution that in one
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way or another ends up protecting the interests of the dominant class over the dominated
one.

An alternative analrsis emphasizes the role of law as an ideological institution of
the state in its support of the interests of the dominant class. "Law plays the fundamental
role of preserving the status quo" (Belliotti, 1995). According to this view, the law
accomplishes these ideological tasks by its appearance of neutrality and fairness: "behind
the rule of law's mask of formal neutrality lies a conglomeration of processes, doctrines
and structures that serves generally to advance certain class interests and to defeat or
marginalize other class interests" (Belliotti, 1995).
This ideological role is important to deal with the problem oflegitimization of the
system; in order to maintain the status quo, the state and its institutions have to give the
impression ofjustice. To the extent that the law can control oppressed groups it
diminishes the possibilities of social conflict. This approach acknowledges the existence
of contradictory regulations, since the law has to portray an image of neutrality and
fairness, conceding some rights or benefits to the powerless groups.

2.3.5.2 Critical Legal Studies
Critical Legal Studies is not a homogeneous theory, but rather a movement.
Although there is not a shared theory, there are some main concerns that link its
adherents. Fitzpatrick and Hunt cite the formative statement of the Critical Legal
Conference in 1984 in Britain:
The central focus of the critical legal approach is to explore the manner in which
legal doctrine and legal education and the practices oflegal institutions work to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

buttress a pervasive system of oppressive, inegalitarian relations. Critical theory
works to develop radical alternatives, and to explore and debate the role of law in
the creation of social, economic and political relations that will advance human
emancipation (Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1987, pp. 2).

In a clear commitment to denounce inequality in society, Critical Legal Scholars

have exposed the law as an institution that reproduces existing social relations and helps
in the maintenance of the status quo (Tushnet, 1986; Trubek, 1984; Freeman, 1982;
Gabel and Feinman, 1982). Belliotti identifies three main topics within the critical legal
studies tradition. The first one is the "radical indeterminacy of law" (Belliotti, 1995, pp.
27), which Trubek (1984) sees as the basis for the critique oflegal order. "The critique of
legal order challenges the idea that a legal order exists in society. The critique is based on
four principles: indeterminacy, antiformalism, contradiction and marginality" (Trubek,
1984, pp. 576). In summary, this argument attacks the neutrality of the law. By pointing
to the absence of constant norms the law becomes what the legal officials Gudges,
lawyers, policemen) make of it, in that sense the law is subject to political and ideological
bias.
The second common theme is ''the use of law in political legitimization"
(Belliotti, 1995, pp. 27). Basically, what is argued here is that the law serves to legitimate
the social order. The law presents the existing social order as neutral and fair, by giving
the impression of neutrality and fairness. In a study about the Antidiscrimination Law,
Freeman concludes that the perspective used in the law "has effectively served to
legitimize, legally and morally, major institutions and a social structure that maintain a
disproportionate number of black and other minority people as underclass" (Freeman,
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1982, pp. 107). This is a good example of Critical Legal Studies, with an emphasis on
inequality and denouncing the law's role in the maintenance of that inequality.
Finally, the third common theme in Critical Legal Studies according to Belliotti is
"law as ideology'' (Belliotti, 1995, pp. 27). Here the argument is that the law reproduces a
basic system of ideas that ultimately are the basis of the capitalist system. The law then,
by its language and practice perpetuates those ideas on which the social order is built
(Gabel and Feinman, 1982). Trubek explains this point: "Critical legal scholars see social
order as maintained by a system ofbeliefs. The belief systems that structure action and
maintain order in capitalist societies present as eternal and necessary what is only the
transitory and arbitrary interest of a dominant elite. This commonly accepted body of
ideas justifies the unequal and unjust power of the dominant group" (Trubek, 1984, pp.
606). Thus, the law acts in a manner that reifies that system of beliefs, making it
hegemonic.

2.3.5.3 Critical Race Theories
Critical race scholars claim that the law has worked to support and maintain racial
inequality (Haywood Bums, 1982). This academic movement is critical of the law
support of oppression of specific sectors of the population, and shares with Critical Legal
Studies the commitment to critique the whole legal system. Calmore asserts that "Critical
Race Theory challenges the dominant discourses on race and racism as they relate to law.
The task is to identify values and norms that have been disguised and subordinated in the
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law. As critical race scholars, we thus seek to demonstrate that our experiences as people
of color are legitimate, appropriate, an effective bases for analyzing the legal system and
racial subordination" (Calmore, 1995, pp. 318). This statement is illustrative of what
critical race theory is all about, anmely deconstructing and critiquing the legal system, its
language, and practices. Moreover, it is about giving voice to people of color as
oppressed and silenced groups.
The use of the phrase "people of color" instead of Blacks (although this
movement is mainly of Black scholars) is not accidental. Critical race theorists have
consistently situated racism within a broader context of oppression: ''many adherents of
Critical Race Theory see an interlocking set of oppressions that extend beyond the
singular base of race and include the bases of gender, economic class, and sexual
orientation" (Calmore, 1995, pp. 320). Furthermore, the use of the phrase "people of
color" allows for the theoretical inclusion of other non-white populations.
As a movement built up upon a commitment to critique and denounce all forms of
oppression related to the experience of racism and the history of slavery, Critical Race
Theory moves away from mere arguments of ideological domination, to contain elements
of direct forms of domination. This awareness is so important to this academic movement
that it has become a strong line of criticism against Critical Legal Studies. Crenshaw
explains this point:
However, this version of domination by consent does not present a realistic
picture of racial domination. Coercion explains much more about racial
domination than does ideologically induced consent. Black people do not create
their oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in
worlds created and maintained by others; moreover, the ideological source of
coercion is not liberal legal consciousness but racism. If racism is just as
important as (if not more important than) liberal legal ideology in explaining the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38
persistence of white supremacy, then the CLS scholars' singleminded effort to
deconstruct liberal legal ideology will be futile" (Crenshaw, 1995, pp. 110).
Perhaps because of the links of ethnic and racial discrimination, or maybe because
of the experience of slavery and colonialism, this emphasis on coercion is important in
my view of the law in the process of criminalization of Puerto Rican freedom fighters.

2.3.6 Media and Criminalization
DeFleur (1966) says that the main concern in media research has been the effect
of mass media on the public, describing this line of research as the study of how the
media influence people's opinion of different topics ranging from political positions to
cultural tastes. This was in 1966, and since that time media research has moved to other
realms without overlooking the importance of media effects.
This area ofresearch is large and includes organizational study of new media and
the subjectivity ofjournalists. Gitlin (1980) uses Gans' list of theories in an attempt to
summarize current theories. The first group of theories is ''journalist-centered" theories.
This group of theories deals with the news as the product of professional decisions. The
second group studies news media as an organization. Some of these studies focus on the
internal analysis of the media as institution, and others focus the economic constraints on
the news enterprise. A third group of theories is "event-centered," which argues that news
reflects the social context. Finally, there are theories that study news as the product of
outside forces (economics, audience, dominant groups and others) (Gitlin, 1980).

In this section I am going to discuss some theories that influence my view of the
media in general and with respect to the criminalization ofpolitical dissent. I present
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these theories grouped by topics related to my theoretical position: media constructing
reality, media as an economic corporation (media for profit), and media, ideology and
legitimization.

2.3.6.1 Media Constructing Reality
Constructionists argue that all knowledge we have and, furthermore, the
understandings we have of our surroundings are social constructions. Berger and
Luckman (1966) argue that our conceptions of reality are socially constructed, organized
and presented in specific social contexts. "The reality of everyday life appears already
objectified, that is, constituted by an order of objects before my appearance on the scene.
The language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the necessary
objectifications and posits order within which these make sense and within which
everyday life has meaning for me" (Berger and Luckman, 1966, pp. 21 ).
Hence, the way in which we interpret our life and the events that we experience is
guided by a set of symbols and meaning that are pre-given. Reality is pre-organized.
Moreover, it is maintained that this process is molded in specific social contexts "and
insofar as all human 'knowledge' is developed, transmitted and maintained in social
situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which
this is done in such a way that a taken-for-granted 'reality' congeals for the man on the
street" (Berger and Luckman, 1966, pp. 3).
When we analyze the criminalization of political dissent as defined earlier -- the
"attempt to 'depoliticize' the conflict, portraying the actions of paramilitary organizations
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as ordinary crime rather than a part of a politically motivated struggle" (Mulcahy, 1995,
pp. 3)-the construction of notions of crime and the interpretation we give to political
actions is important. Several media researchers have argued that the media provide
symbols, meaning and interpretations of events that people acquire and with which
interpret and understand reality (Gitlin, 1980; Gitlin, 1977; Snow, 1983; Mulcany, 1995;
Comstock, 1981; Fowler, 1991). "We rely on media for concepts, for information, for
values and emotional frames; for images, for symbols in general, even for language"
(Gitlin, 1977, pp. 789). Thus, the power of the media in the creation and diffusion of
specific ways of thinking about the world is enormous.
Alexander (1981) argues that "the mass media produces symbolic patterns that
create the invisible tissues of society on the cultural level just as the legal system creates
the community on a more concrete and 'real' one" (Alexander, 1981, pp. 18). Thus, the
media contributes to the creation of cultural notions of order and crime. Media then,
shapes the form in which the public will respond to specific types of behavior and it
could also influence the way in which certain acts are treated by other social control
institutions.
Gitlin argues that the media has the power of constructing symbols and meanings
that people use in their interpretation oflife and politics. "From within their private
crevices, people find themselves relying on the media, for concepts, for images of their
heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a recognition ofpublic values,
for symbols in general" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 1). In other words, the media influences
people's opinion and interpretations of events and their actors. Perception of issues as
problematic or actors as fearful are linked to how the media portray them. Altheide
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reports that "numerous studies suggest that public perceptions of problems and issues (the
text they construct from experience) incorporate definitions, scenarios and language from
news reports" (Altheide, 1997, pp. 649). This is very important when analyzing social
construction ofpolitical activists as common criminals.
Thus, media provides people with the ways of thinking about reality. In addition,
the media present an uncontested reality. Not only do we think about events in the way
media guides us, but the media construct the story under the rubric of objectivity and in
that way presenting reality in a believable way: "by showing you what seem to be 'real
events', and speaking of them in human voices, television presents a world that seems
incontrovertible" (Gitlin, 1977, pp. 793).

2.3.6.2 Media for Profit
The media is understood as a capitalist institution, as a business that works for
profit and is subjected to market conditions (Paletz and Entman, 1981). This basic
statement contains the main points of this theoretical approach to media. Media is a
commercial organization. The principal goal is profit. The news business depends on
markets conditions. These elements are going to be explained in more detail.
The media as a commercial institution is organized in a capitalist manner. The
basic idea is to get a "product" that will be offer into the market. "The product of mass
media is our attention, and the market to which is sold is advertisers ... " (emphasis in
original) (Gitlin, 1977, pp. 790). The news are constructed or selected as to attract
audience. The selection of the news, then, is a product of organizational decisions that
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have the goal ofprofit (Schlesinger, 1992). "The 'targets' are selected by the news
organization on the calculus ofprofitability; the space is allocated to the scores for which
audiences will presumably pay the most money -or which will attract the greatest number
ofreaders" (Epstein, 1981, pp. 121).
Thus, news are selected under the criteria of attracting the public. It is the
organization that decides what information the public will receive, basing this decision on
market demand. This view of the media confers a space for journalist discretion.
According to Epstein (1981), the organization selects the target or the newsworthy topic,
then the journalist has the task of interpreting, organizing, and presenting the information.

In this process, his/her own biases or worldview will guide the journalist. Nevertheless, it
is argued that this process is ultimately constrained by organizational criteria.
Even in analyzing events, however, journalists must conform to the rules and
values of the news organization that employs them. They can, of course, assert an
idiosyncratic opinion or version of reality in an isolated news report; but if they
are to succeed, the analysis they provide must, over the long run, reflect the
organization's view ofreality (Epstein, 1981, pp. 123).
Besides profitability, there are some related criteria that guide the news
organization in their decision-making process. Within these requirements are the pressure
of time and the maintenance of an audience. The market makes demands of fast flow of
information. Competition requires the news corporations to offer the news report fast.
This pressure of time affects the form and content of the news. The focus is on what is
happening, the event, and not the causes or history behind the event (Epstein, 1981 ). This
has a strong impact on the coverage and legitimization of political movements.
To maintain an audience is essential for the economic survival of the news
business. This affects news selection, content, and presentation as well. The organization
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has to present attractive news in order to hold public attention with big audiences and sell
space for advertisement. This affects news selection and presentation since it is assumed
that the public wants conflictive, dramatic, short, simple news (Epstein, 1981). Moreover,
it makes the news media institution subject to forces others than a commitment to inform
the public with objectivity. In this model, the media is subject to pressures from dominant
classes and economic interests.
There are many important arguments developed within this approach to the
media, and a full discussion is not possible. However, Herman and Chomsky have
concisely summarized the main points of this model:

(1 )the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the
dominant mass media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the
mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by
government, business and experts funded and approved by these primary sources
and agents of power; (4) 'flak' as a means of disciplining the media; and (5)
'anticommunism' as a national religion and control mechanism (Herman and
Chomsky, cited in Schlesinger, 1992, pp. 307).

2.3.6.3 Media, Ideology and Legitimization
Within the social sciences objectivity has been criticized as a way of knowing. It
has been argued that no "objective" research is possible. The researcher cannot separate
him/herself from their particular point of view. The way in which he/she sees reality will
affect the process of research from the selection of the problem to the interpretation of it:
"because we must see from some perspective, immaculate perception, objectivity, and
pure science are impossible." (Jansen, 1990)
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The effect of the ideological perspective of the researcher not only can be
understood as an individual effect on the particular researcher, but as an ideological
agenda of a particular group. Beneath the shield of neutrality they hide their particular
perspectives, making their way of knowing universal and in this way restricting others:
Feminists and others have pointed out that social researchers are predominantly
white and upper middle class, and mostly male, and many of them have close ties
to managers, business, and government agencies. Thus their concepts and findings
often represent the perspectives of these elite groups, but their claim to being
detached and value free enables them to present their views as universal truths
and to discredit the views of explicitly political groups as biased and unobjective
(Cancian, 1992).
The critique to objectivity has been a topic of media studies as well. Like the
researcher, the journalist is supposed to be guided by strict objectivity in the process of
reporting events. There are two important points about objectivity in the presentation of
news made by media studies that need to be considered.
First, some media researchers argue that the code of objectivity is a ritual that
protects them from outside critiques and challenges, a protection that furthers the content
of the news as reality and the journalists as the reporter of reality. Citing Weaver, Rachlin
(1988) asserts that ''those in media defend their legitimacy by claiming fairness, by which
they mean lack ofbias" (Rachlin, 1988, pp. 10). The content of what a neutral
commentator reports would have to be true.
The second point is related to the claim of truthfulness from the news business. It
has been argued (similar to the critique of science) that objectivity is neither a feasible
nor a desirable requirement. The journalist as the researcher is submerged in a social
context that shapes his/her worldview, and 'journalists, rather than being detached, are,
like readers immersed in the social sea of our culture. The work ofjournalists is shaped

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45
and defined by the currents and tides of our culture" (Rachlin, 1988, pp. 11).
Consequently, journalists as regular people will understand life according to specific
ideas. These ideas are thought to be influenced by existing social arrangements (Rachlin,
1988).
Furthermore, the set of ideas that molds the reporter's way of seeing the world or
understanding reality are thought to be the dominant ideas in a particular society. ''News
is ideology to the extent that it provides an integrated picture ofreality. But an ideology
is more than this; it is also the world view ofparticular social groups, and especially of
social classes. The claim that news is ideology implies that it provides a world view both
consistent in itself, and supportive of the interests of powerful social groupings"
(Golding, 1981, pp. 79). The news are not only thought to be biased, but biased according
the ideas of dominant groups (for some) or dominant ideology (for others).
"News, then, presents a politically legitimated reality" (Tuchman, 1981, pp. 90).
Behind an armor of objectivity and neutrality the media present a reality that seems to be
fair. Since the reality presented by the media is shaped by dominant values, the public
receives a reality that appears to be legitimate. In this process power, domination,
inequality, oppression, are presented as legitimate social relations. Gitlin describes the
how the media reproduces existing social relations and what is being legitimated:
By socialization, by the bonds of experience and relationships -in other words, by
direct corporate and class interest-the owners and managers of the major media
are committed to the maintenance of the going system in its main outlines:
committed, that is to say, to private property relations which honor the
prerogatives of capital; committed to a national security State; committed to
reform of selected violations of the moral code through selective action by State
agencies; and committed to approving individual success within corporate and
bureaucratic structures ....The media elite want to honor the political-economic
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system as a whole; their very power and prestige deeply presuppose that system
(Gitlin, 1980, pp. 258).

2.3.6.4 Media and Political Movements
"There is no such thing as political murder, political bombing or political
violence...There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing, and criminal
violence"(Margaret Thatcher, cited in Mulcahy, 1995, pp. 2).

Political movements are often portrayed in the media as communists, insane,
merciless, terrorists. The media can influence the characterization of these groups by
negating the group's motivations or legitimacy in the claims-making process, which in

turn creates feelings of fear and anger amongst the public. Gerbner describes this process
as follows: "Typically isolated from their historical and social context, denied legitimacy
of conditions or cause, and portrayed as unpredictable and irrational, if not insane, those
labeled terrorists symbolize a menace that rational and humane means cannot control"
(Gerbner, 1992, pp. 96).
According to Altheide (1997) the media define events or situations as problematic
or not. The power of media to define and interpret reality (as discussed earlier) has a
particular effect on the criminalization ofpolitical activists. The media has the power to
construct notions of crime and criminal behavior. Media's treatment of opposition groups
can make the public evaluate such groups as legitimate social groups or terrorists.
"Whether the media portray the practitioners of violence as terrorists or freedom fighters
may make the difference to public feelings or affects" (Weimann and Winn, 1994, pp.
175).
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These characterizations have important effects on how the public is going to react
to such groups and their activities. Altheide argues that the media has the power to define
what and ''who to is to be feared", but also that these are elements that could make people
to react with fear, and pressure agents of social control for strong reactions (Altheide,
1997, pp. 665).
Thus, media's characterization of political groups as criminals has not only the
effect of generating meanings of legitimacy and feelings of admiration or fear toward the
respective groups, but has impact on the social reaction to it. The way in which groups
are defined and interpreted determines the way in which they are going to be treated.
While freedom fighters are seen with respect and approval, terrorists are feared and
condemned. This is turn justifies harsh treatment:
Stigma is a mark of disgrace that evokes disgraceful behavior. Labeling some
people barbarians makes it easier to treat them as barbarians would. Calling them
aggressors justifies aggression against them, presumably to uphold the dictum that
'aggression must not pay'. Classifying some people as criminals permits dealing
with them in ways otherwise considered criminal. Proclaiming them enemies
makes it legitimate to attack and kill them. Naming some people crazy or insane
makes it possible to suspend rules of rationality and decency towards them.
Labeling a person or group as terrorists seems to justify terrorizing them
(Gerbner, 1992, pp. 96-97).

Hence, the media has the power to define the ways in which political movements
are going to be interpreted and treated. Since most of the time people depend on the
media to learn about a movement they have to rely on what the media covers and presents
to make an evaluation (Gitlin, 1977). This portrayal is often negative and
delegitimizating, especially when the movement goes against the basic values of a society
(Gitlin, 1980). Several researchers have reached this conclusion. Mulcahy in a study
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about media coverage of an IRA hunger strike concluded that "despite the often
significant differences among the papers, politically violent groups can expect
condemnation rather than legitimization from the media" (Mulcahy, 1995, pp. 16).

In a study about media coverage of the Student for a Democratic Society (SDS)
and the anti-war movement on the '60s, Gitlin concludes that media coverage ofpolitical
movements is negative and prejudicial. About this he says: "Political news is treated as if
it were crime news -what went wrong today, not what goes wrong every day. A
demonstration is treated as a potential or actual disruption of legitimate order, not as a
statement about the world" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 271).
A final example is the study by Paletz and Entman describing media coverage of
the Winston-Salem riot on 1967. They expose the relationship between law enforcers and
the media, suggesting a somewhat direct influence of law enforcement agencies and the
form and content of media coverage. Besides this issue, they argue that the media
neglected to cover the motives of the rioters, the underlying conditions that led to the riot,
and the protestors' version of the events, resulting in the media supporting the criminal
justice system and the unjust social conditions that motivated the protests (Paletz and
Entman, 1981 ).
This has also been the case with the political organization being studied in this
research, the FALN. Paletz, Ayanian and Fozzard (1982) studied television coverage of
three political organizations that they call ''terrorists" organizations: the IRA, the Red
Brigades and the FALN. The study is about coverage between July 1977 through June
1979.
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Although, as the authors say, the objectives of the FALN were very clear (to get
the independence of Puerto Rico) most of the TV coverage overlooked an explanation of
it or the historical conditions of the island. Interestingly, the authors mention that ABC
called a well-known Puerto Rican, Geraldo Rivera, to explain to viewers who the FALN
were and what did they want. His explanation is exemplary of the way in which this issue
is treated by the media: "No more than a dozen fanatics based here in the United States
and committed murder and mayhem they say will somehow make Puerto Rico
independent whether Puerto Rico like it or not" (cited in Paletz, Ayanian and Fozzard,
1982, pp. 153). They conclude then, that terrorist groups will get coverage in the media,
but this coverage will deny legitimization.
In this way media creates meanings that influence action and reactions. The law
and the media are therefore related in the production and reproduction of social meanings
and social reactions.

2.4 An Ideological-Historical Approach to Understanding the Criminalization of
Politically Dissident Groups
The survey of literature that precedes this section provides a basis for
understanding the role of the law and the media in the process of criminalizing political
dissidents. We now present a theoretical frame for understanding the process by which
Puerto Rican political activists became treated and processed by the state as terrorists
deserving extremely long sentences. In general it is proposed here that the law and the
media both contributed to the generation of notions and images of deviant-criminal-
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terrorist-fearful-alien actors in opposition to the images that the actors themselves (the
FALN) were divulging -as freedom fighters.
To say that the law serves an ideological role is to say that the law is in part an
ideological or cultural agent. Merry (1992) maintains that "law is no longer only a mode
of social control; it is also a constitutive system that creates conceptions of order and
enforces them" (Merry, 1992, pp. 360). In other words, the law is producing and
reproducing sets of values that will be adopted by and imposed upon society. But how
does law produces these cultural conceptions? Is it an exclusive creation of the law?
Antonio Gramsci (1971) introduced a conception of cultural or ideological
systems based on what he called cultural hegemony. Gitlin (1980) defines this concept as
follows: ''Hegemony is a ruling class's (or alliance's) domination of subordinate classes
and groups through the elaboration and penetration of ideology (ideas and assumptions)
into their common sense and everyday practice; engineering of mass consent to the
established order" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 253). Contrary to consensus theories, as Durkheim's
normative consensus, cultural hegemony "depends on a combination of force and
consent. But -Gramsci argues-in the liberal-capitalist state, consent is normally in the
lead, operating behind 'the armour of coercion"' (Hall cited in Gitlin, 1980, pp. 253). It is
not that everybody agrees in notions of right and wrong, but that an ideological basis is
imposed to society.
The latter point deserves more explanation. Gramsci' s concept of cultural
hegemony is often understood as a pure ideological domination that does not contains
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any consideration of force and coercion. Hoare and Smith (1971) in their introduction to
Gramsci' s "State and Civil Society'' explain this point:
The fact that, more than any other great revolutionary Marxist thinker, he
concerned himself with the sphere of"civil society'' and of 'hegemony'', in his
prison writings, cannot be taken to indicate neglect of the moment of political
society, of force, of domination. On the contrary, his entire record shows that this
was not the case, and that his constant preoccupation was to avoid any
undialectical separation of the 'ethical-political aspects of politics or theory of
hegemony and consent" from ''the aspect of force and economics" (Hoare and
Smith, 1971, pp. 207).
Hence, the conceptualization of hegemony that I will use as a theoretical approach
to the study of criminalization of political dissent is one that includes both elements
ideological domination and coercive domination. In this scheme the "Law is the
repressive and negative aspect" (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 247) of the state. It is coercive and
ideological. The way in which this cultural hegemony is created is through the agency of

organic intellectuals. These intellectuals are the ones with the responsibility of creating
and organizing the new cultural system. The maintenance and dissemination of the new
cultural system is a function ofa group of institutions. In Gramsci's words: "If every
State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen (and hence
of collective life and of individual relations), and to eliminate certain customs and
attitudes and to disseminate others, the Law will be its instrument for this purpose
(together with the school system, and other institutions and activities)" (Gramsci, 1971,
pp. 246).
Thus, the law is a cultural agent. It participates in the maintenance and
dissemination of society's cultural/ideological foundation. But the law is not the only
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institution with this responsibility. Gitlin (1980) argues that "in capitalist societies, no
institution is devoid of hegemonic functions, and none does hegemonic work only. But it
is the cultural industry as a whole, along with the educational system, that most
coherently specializes in the production, relaying, and re gearing of hegemonic ideology"
(Gitlin, 1980, pp. 254). Two parts of that cultural industry are of special concern for the
analysis of criminalization proposed here: the law as discussed before, and the media.
Alexander (1981) argues that "the mass media produces symbolic patterns that
create the invisible tissues of society on the cultural level just as the legal system creates
the community on a more concrete and 'real' one" (Alexander, 1981, pp. 18). Thus, the
media contributes to the creation of cultural notions of order and crime. It does this by
modeling public opinion according to particular cultural values. As Tuchman puts it
"news, then, presents a politically legitimated reality'' (Tuchman, 1981, pp. 90). Media
then, shapes the form in which the public will respond to specific types of behavior and it
could also influence the way in which certain acts are treated by other social control
institutions.
Gitlin argues that the media has the power of constructing symbols and meanings
that people use in their interpretation of life and politics. "From within their private
crevices, people find themselves relying on the media, for concepts, for images of their
heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a recognition ofpublic values,
for symbols in general" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 1). In other words, the media influences
people's opinion and interpretations of events and their actors. Perception of issues as
problematic or actors as fearful are linked to how the media portray them. Altheide
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reports that "numerous studies suggest that public perceptions ofproblems and issues (the
text they construct from experience) incorporate definitions, scenarios and language from
news reports" (Altheide, 1997, pp. 649). This is very important when analyzing social
construction ofpolitical activists as common criminals and terrorists.
The criminalization of political dissidents or the "attempt to 'depoliticize' the
conflict, portraying the actions of paramilitary organizations as ordinary crime rather than
a part of a politically motivated struggle" (Mulcahy, 1995, pp. 3) is a process in which
the media plays a significant role. Political movements are usually portrayed in the media
as communists, insane, merciless, terrorists. The media can influence the characterization
of these groups by negating the group's motivations or legitimacy in the claims-making
process, which in turn creates feelings of fear and anger amongst the public. Gerbner
describes this process as follows: "Typically isolated from their historical and social
context, denied legitimacy of conditions or cause, and portrayed as unpredictable and
irrational, if not insane, those labeled terrorists symbolize a menace that rational and
humane means cannot control" (Gerbner, 1992, pp. 96).
Going back to the discussion of the cultural foundation of society for a moment,
there is an element that has not being discussed: is the cultural foundation of a society
stagnant? A fast reading ofGramsci's work would suggest that the cultural composition
of any new society is built at the moment of the creation ofthat new order, without
posterior changes. Nevertheless, considering Gramsci's historical approach to social
analysis we will be held to the conclusion that a stagnant cultural foundation is
contradictory with Gramsci's cultural theory.
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Consistent with Chambliss and Spitzer's ideas (see previous section: "New
Approaches in Criminological Theory'') about the importance of including dialectics to
the analysis of crime formation, it is necessary to understand a society's cultural
foundation as a result of the conflict of different classes in society. A comprehensive
analysis of the cultural foundation of a particular society must consider not only the
economic system in which is embedded, but it would have to be situated in a particular
social, political, and historical moment. Class and social contradictions need to be
included in the analysis. Moreover, such social analysis has to be placed in a particular
historical moment.

In sum, the theoretical approach to crime formation proposed here points to the
understanding of the law and media as cultural agents. These institutions produce and
reproduce social notions of what are accepted and criminal activities. This process is not
tied to any particular class, as instrumentalist analysis will suggest, but is a response to a
cultural/ideological foundation. The cultural foundation of a society is not stagnant, but
constantly changing as a result of political processes in particular historical moments.
The argument here is that both institutions participate in the process of
criminalizing political dissident groups. It is not intended in this work to prove causal
relations thus, it does not try to prove which institution influences the other. This could
be an impossible task, and probably inappropriate. The relationship I am proposing here
is one that takes place in a process. As many social processes, the law and the media
work both, independently and separately in this process. Both contribute to this process
by reproducing existing ideas of acceptable and unacceptable political activists. They
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influence and are influenced by each other and the social context. Following the approach
suggested by Rachlin for the study of media which we extend to the study of the law and
their inter-relationship:
To understand the relative position or influence of the media at any particular
time we must examine the society and the media of that time. As in the previous
divisions and separations, this is one artificial. Understanding requires that we
recognize the parts of the social order in the interpenetrated context within which
we find them. In this manner, all study of a social order, of society, must be
ecological. Such study does not suggest ''the substitution of multiple, interactive
isolatable causes (as in regression analysis) for cause"; instead it is being
suggested that elements, as aspects of society, "have no identity or effectivity
outside of their interrelationship. The causal determinant is itself determined by
the character of the interrelationship, not the sum of the individual elements"
(Rachlin, 1988, pp. 29).

The elements of the theoretical approach to the criminalization of Puerto Rican
activists are summarized as follows:
•

The law and the media are both institutions that have to be analyzed in their
social, historical, economic and political context, because both are products of
that context.

•

The law and the media (re)produce and diffuse particular ideas, including notions
of legitimate political activity and crime.

•

The law and the media, reproduce the dominant ideas of a particular society in a
particular historical moment.

•

The law and the media, protected with an appearance of fairness, neutrality, and
objectivity, present a reality that appears to be just.

•

The law and the media contribute in the process of criminalizing dissent.
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•

The law has a twofold role in that process: it represses political movements by
persecuting and prosecuting leaders and organizations, treating them as criminals;
and it disperses characterizations ofpolitical activists as terrorists and criminals.
Thus it is in practice coercive and ideological.

•

The media gives a negative coverage to political movements, delegitimizing
motives, and presenting an image of those involved in political movements as
criminals and terrorists. In this way, the media contributes to the criminalization
of those groups.

•

Both, the law and the media use images and constructions of fear to justify or
propose specific methods of social control.
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CHAPTER3:METHODOLOGY

The principal question of this research is how political activists become defined
and treated as criminals. This research studies the process of criminalization ofpolitical
dissent. It focuses on the case of a group of Puerto Rican fighters for the independence of
Puerto Rico that became the targets of the seditious conspiracy charge, and were
prosecuted and convicted for conspiring to overthrow the government of the United
States. Treated as criminals and terrorists, these Puerto Ricans were sentenced to terms
ranging from 55 to 90 years.
The theoretical approach used for this research (see Chapter 11) focuses on the
character of the law and the media as cultural agents. These institutions act as producers
and reproducers of cultural meanings/definitions of crime and order. Hence, the research
design will focus on how legal institutions and the media constructed political actors as
criminals and terrorists.
The study of this process will rely on the thorough analysis ofrelevant
documents. Altheide ( 1996) describes the study of documents as the study of cultural
production: "Documents are studied to understand culture -or the process and the array
of objects, symbols, and meanings that make up social reality shared by members of a
society" (Altheide, 1996: 2). Thus, documents are studied to discover the (re)production
of meanings. In this research, documents will be studied to understand the (re)production
of ideas about crime.
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Document analysis is "an integrated and conceptually informed method,
procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents
for their relevance, significance, and meaning" (Altheide, 1996, pp. 2). This method (also
called content analysis) can use a quantitative or qualitative approach, the final decision
between one or the other must rest on how well the chosen approach fits the research
question and perspective of the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
Quantitative document/content analysis is based on pre-established categories or
variables that will be collected and counted according to pre-made codes. The emphasis
is on hypothesis testing methods, and measurable variables that are analyzed in terms of
frequency and causal relations (Altheide, 1996). Qualitative document/content analysis,
on the contrary, emphasizes rich description and concept development. Altheide (1996)
proposes a method that he calls "ethnographic content analysis" that he describes as a
method in which "categories and variables initially guide the study, but others are
allowed and expected to emerge throughout the study, including an orientation toward

constant discovery and constant comparison of relevant situations, settings, images,
meanings and nuances" (emphasis provided) (Altheide, 1996:16).
The importance of studying the context in which the document is produced is also
stressed by ethnographic content analysis (Altheide, 1996). If the document is the product
or reflection of the social context, then the understanding of that context is essential for
the research process. The latter points to the fitness of this method to the theoretical
approach selected for this research. As discussed before, the theoretical approach that will
be used in the research approach stresses the necessity of understanding the production of
cultural meanings in particular historical and political moments. Therefore, ethnographic
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content analysis is the best method to study the criminalization process by the analysis of
relevant documents.
The documents selected for this research are primary documents reflecting the
criminalizing process by legal institutions and the media:
1) Legal documents
a. State trial transcript: This was the trial where most ofFALN members
were prosecuted.
b. Federal decisions: Several decisions in appellate courts regarding FALN
members and FALN supporters. These are studied to see the way in which
courts treat and conceptualize the actors and their activities. Moreover,
with these decisions we can evaluate the words of yet another actor judges.
c.

Motions and other preliminary documents: Several motions, applications
to the court and affidavits are studied to evaluate the prosecutors and law
enforcement agents in their role in the criminalization process. An
important aspect that this type of document brings to the analysis is the
time frame. Since these documents are presented to the court prior to the
trial, we can observe the early stages of the process of criminalization.

2) Media: Due to the vast amount of media sources available, a purposive
decision was made in order to decide what documents were going to be used.
Considering that the organization studied in this research-F.A.L.N.-was
based in Chicago and their activities were mainly held in Chicago and New
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York, then two newspapers are selected: The New York Times, and The

Chicago Tribune. The articles were selected in the following manner.
a. Major events were selected within specific actions, arrests, trial, and
sentencing10• The two newspapers were studied for a week following each
date. For example, the first action for which FALN took responsibility
occurred in October 27, 1974 thus, both newspapers were studied starting on
the 28 th through November 2, 1974. Every single story appearing with that
time frame regarding FALN was selected for the study.
The analysis of these documents will be guided with the following questions:
1. Characterization of the acts -how are the acts committed by the accused
depicted in the documents?
2. Characterization of the actors-how are the actors portrayed?
3. Is ethnicity mentioned? Is it important or not that these people are Puerto
Ricans?
4. Are motives mentioned?
5. Does the law or the media use elements of fear to advance their positions?
Based on these guiding questions I created a protocol to be used in the process of
analyzing the documents. The goal was to create an instrument with which to approach
these documents and extract the important information in an organized and systematic
manner, without sacrificing the opportunity for new discoveries.
The unit of analysis for the media section is each newspaper article. On the law
section, since some documents are very long the unit of analysis will be sections to be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
created and explained with each document. For example, with a trial transcript some
sections might be opening statements, witnesses, closing statements, etc.

3.1 Protocol
1. Unit (i.e. news paper article, or a description of the unit in the case oflegal
documents): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
2. Date: (month/day/year) _ _/_ _/_ _
3. Page and section: - - - ~ _ _ _ _ __
4. If newspaper, length of article: _ _ _ _ _ __

If legal document, length of section: (measured in pages) _ _ __
5. Subject matter of article or section: (Describe) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

6. Headline or title:

------------------------

7. Who is talking? (Circle one, describe if needed)
a. Government Officials: (police, district attorney, judge, governor, etc.)
b. Defense Lawyers
C.

FALN members

d. Victims or victim's families
e. Supporters (who?)
f.

Detractors (who?)

g. Other
8. Source of information: (Circle one, describe if needed)
10

See the Chronology on this chapter and the table of all documents studied in Appendix I.
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a. government sources: police, justice department, district attorney, other
b. victim or victim's families
c. F ALN Press Release
d. Other: (specify)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
9. Is there a specific activity (i.e. bombing) mentioned? Date and brief description of the
activity? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

10. Characterization of activity: (Circle one, describe if needed)
a. terrorist attack
b. protest act
C.

bombing

d. cnme

e. other (specify)
11. Characterization of actors: (Circle one, describe if needed)

a.

freedom fighters

b. independence activists
C.

dissenters

d. communists/reds

e. extremists
f.

maniacs/lunatics

g. terrorists
h. other (specify)

12. Is the ethnic or national origin of the FALN activists mentioned?
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a. Yes / No
b. How many times? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
13. ls the ethnic or national origin of the victims mentioned?

a. Yes / No
b. How many times? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
14. Is the situation of Puerto Rico mentioned? (Circle one, describe if needed)

a. political status
b. history of independence movements
c. emigration to the United States
d. poverty
e. No mention
f.

other (specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

15. Are there any mentions of relationship or comparison with other groups or political
movements?

b. No, - - - - - - - -

16. Is there a mention of any danger for the public?
a. Yes
b. Describe: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - c. No

d. Describe:

----------------------------

17. Arc there any policy or handling suggestions?
a. Jail time
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b. Psychological treatment
c. Death penalty
d. Strict surveillance to other groups or individuals. Specify:--------~

e. Strict immigration laws
f.

Others:

---------------------------

18. Is there any mention ofFALN political motives or goals?
a. No.
b. Yes.

19. Miscellaneous (Include important or interesting quotes).

After the document or media article was selected and read, a protocol form was
filled. The first six questions were designed to keep record of the document-date, length,
subject matter and headline or title.
Question number seven (7) was designed in order to know the speaker. For this
research is important to know the context, for that reason it is important to include in the
analysis the person doing the expressions. Six categories of possible speakers were
created. If a speaker did not fit in any of the categories it was rcp01ied as other.
Question number eight (8) is related to number seven (7) in that both are designed
to know the origin of the content analyzed. The distinction is that number seven is
designed for those occasions in which there specific quotes form individuals and number
eight (8) is for those times when the article makes reference to a general source, like the
police or a FALN communique and no specific person is quoted.
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Questions nine (9) and ten (10) are designed to study the activities. Question nine
is created to keep record of what activities the documents in making reference to.
Question 1O goes to answer of one the guiding questions: characterizations of the activity.
This question is designed in order to understand the way in which the law and the media
define F ALN's activities. Each document is scrutinized to discover the categories used to
describe the activities thus, there could be as many answers as categories used in each
document.

In the same way, question number eleven (11) goes to the way in which the law
and the media label, treat or characterize the actors. As for question ten, here what is
counted is the categories used in each document and not the times each category is used.
Questions twelve (12) and thirteen (13) are created to explore if the media and the
law use ethnicity or national origin as an element in their approach to the FALN or the
victims.
Questions fourteen (14), fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) are designed to understand
the way in which the law and the media deal with FALN political motivations. These
three questions attend three different ways in which the law and the media could have
treated this topic. Question eighteen is the most direct, asking about direct references to
FALN's political motivation. Question fourteen breaks down several aspects of what
FALN identifies in their communications as their main political motivations -the
political, historical, and economic situation of Puerto Rico. With this question it is
intended to learn if the law and the media covered this topic in a more indirect manner.
Question fifteen, on the other hand, is designed in order to uncover associations with
other political groups.
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Finally, questions sixteen (16) and seventeen (17) go to the third aspect in this
study-the use of fear. Question sixteen attends the issue in a direct manner, while
question seventeen go to explore the theoretical proposition of influence on special
treatment. The phrase "handling suggestions" is used here to include any type of state's
actions toward the FALN. Included in these could be surveillance, repression,
prosecutions, arrests, institutionalization, etc.

3.2 Chronology
There are several dates important for understanding the topics covered in this
research. What follows is a chronology ofkey dates, including historical moments and
FALN events 11 • This chronology is in part based on a chronology published in a booklet
distributed at the Symposium on 100 Years ofUnited States Colonialism in Puerto Rico
held at DePaul University on April 4, 1998. Several items are included and updated.
1922

The Nationalist Party is organized, Pedro Albizu Campos is elected Vice
president of the organization in 1924.

1930-40

The economic situation is precarious, 80% of the population is in poverty.
There are several strikes. In 1935 Puerto Rico lived a tragic moment in its
political struggle. In what was called the Massacre at Rio Piedras four
Nationalists were killed after an encounter with the police at the
University of Puerto Rico. At their funeral Albizu swears that ''this
assassination shall not go unpunished in Puerto Rico" (Symposium, 1998,
p. 5). After this event, Albizu is charged with seditious conpiracy. At the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
first trial, with a jury that included seven Puerto Ricans Albizu was
acquitted. "The United States manages, in a second trial, to preselect a
jury of twelve North Americans, and gets its guilty verdict and maximum
sentence often years, to be served in the United States" (Symposium,
1998, p. 5). In 1937 another massacre occurs during a demonstration
convoked by the Nationalist Party, the Ponce Massacre. On this occasion
twenty protestors died and more than two hundred were injured after a
confrontation with the police.
1947

Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico after a completing his sentence.

1948

The "Gag Law" is approved. By this law the state could arrest any
individual suspected of conspiring against public security. Historians
concur in arguing that this law was adopted to be specifically used against
the Communist and the Nationalist Party (Scarano, 1993).

1950

On October 28th, 1950, the Nationalist Party starts a coordinated effort to
attack the government and police in Puerto Rico, ending in the
proclamation of the Republic of Puerto Rico in Jayuya. Several days after
the incidents in Puerto Rico, the insurgency efforts moved to the United
States when on Novemeber 1, 1950, nationalists Oscar Collazo and
Griselio Torresola attack the temporary presidential house -Blair House
killing a guard and wounding two more. Torresola dies in the attack and
Collazo is sentenced to death. These events provoked the arrest and

11

For a more complete account of the history of Puerto Rico see Chapter I.
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imprisonment of more than a thousand Puerto Ricans suspected of being
nationalists or communists under the Gag Law (Sacarano, 1993).
1954

A group ofNationalists directed by Lolita Lebron attack the Congress of
the United States wounding five persons. The four nationalists were
charged with seditious conspiracy.

1974

On October 26, 1974, a group identified as Fuerzas Armadas de

Liberacion Nacional (FALN) took credit of a series of bombings in New
York City.
1975

On January, 24, 1975 FALN takes credit for an action at a public place in
New York City, called Fraunces Tavern. As a result of this action five
people died and many were injured. Several months later, on October 27,
1975, FALN takes responsibility for another action on several locations in
New York, Chicago and Washington.

1977

On August 3, 1977, FALN assumes credit for an action at the Mobil Oil

Company employment office in New York City.
1978

Two young independence activists were killed by the police in Cerro
Maravilla. As a result of investigations in the late 1980's it was learned
that these killings were planned by police agencies and high officers of the
Government of Carlos Romero Barcelo of the New Progressive Party
(political party endorsing statehood for Puerto Rico).

1980-81

Members of FALN are arrested in Chicago. They were prosecuted in state
courts charged with possession of arms and other related charges. They
declared themselves prisoners of war and refused to present a defense.
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They were found guilty and were sentenced. Shortly after the state trial,
they were prosecuted in federal courts charged with seditious conspiracy.
On February of 1981 the FALN members who declaring themselves
prisoners of war did not present any defense, were sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 55 to 90 years.
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CHAPTER 4: "WHAT'S IN A NAME"; CHARACTERIZATION OF ACTORS AND
ACTNITIES

This chapter examines the manner in which the actors, i.e. the Puerto Rican
political prisoners, and their activities are named, characterized or labeled. "Who are
they?" That is the question that is going to be explored through the words ofthe three
main speakers, three voices, three versions; the prisoners themselves 12, the law (through
their institutional instruments and actors), and the media.
In order to understand who the political prisoners are, various issues need to be
explored. First, how are they called or described? What words are used to name these
people? The labeling or words used in the characterization of groups is essentialin the
process of giving meaning, understanding, and processing people.

12

As it was explained in the methodology chapter, the prisoner's version is not analyzed with he same
methodological rigorousness as the other two. The prisoner's voice is presented as an introduction to the
each chapter in order to provide a different perspective and to further present the clash of ideologies.
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Another aspect that comprises the answer to the question ''who are they?", is what
they did to bring them to their current situation. In this section, it is important to address
the issue of how did the three sectors (the prisoners, the law and the media) construct the
activities that are being criminalized or processed by the legal system as crimes? As we
will see, the constructions of these activities from the different groups are antithetically
different. For the prisoners, these activities were political moves to further their political
goals, war tactics if you wish. For the others, the activities were abominable acts of
terrorism.
The third aspect to be explored in this chapter attempts to further answer the first
question, ''who are they?" The ethnic background of the actors is explored here as a
possible important element in the characterization and identification of the actors. At
least it was very important, essential indeed, for the prisoners, who made it an issue in
their motions to the court and for whom their loyalty to the motherland was a main
motive.
This chapter will be organized in the following manner. First, the prisoner's voice
is presented as a way to introduce the topic. This will serve the purpose of offering the
reader a background and a different perspective that could be useful in the process of
identifying trends and modes of characterization by the other groups. The law and the
media will be studied separately, and for each one there will be a section explaining the
documents used and the applicable questions in the protocol_(the methodology chapter
explains the way in which the documents were studied). Then, a discussion of the
findings including analysis of quotes that demonstrate the way in which each group
approached the issue in discussion.
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4.1 Who is FALN? How do they see themselves?
The sources for this section and for the FALN' s versions on other chapters are
limited given the nature of the organization. Their clandestine work makes almost
impossible to find firsthand materials of their position. In spite of that, there are a limited
amount of documents where the FALN's members and their representatives (i.e. lawyers)
state their view of themselves and their activities.
The FALN describe themselves mainly as a group of Puerto Ricans committed to
community work in favor of the Latino community in the United States. They present
themselves as normal people, with normal jobs that are identified with their Puerto Rican
ancestry in spite of having lived most of their lives in the United States. Their defense
lawyer, Jan Susler, in one of the many writings in support of their freedom, describes
them as follows:
The prisoners are mothers and fathers who have spent over a decade behind bars
while their children have grown up without them. They are workers and
professionals, secretaries and artists, teachers and students, community
organizers, lawyers and activists. Most of them grew up in the United States, their
families forced by the colonial economy to migrate in hopes of a better life for
their children, but finding instead poverty and discrimination. Yet they learned
their culture and history and decided to act before the culture, economy,
environment, and fabric of Puerto Rican society was irreversibly devastated
(Susler, 1995, p. 21).

The previous quote represents the main elements ofFALN's presentation of their
members and their motives. First, they are productive members of their community. They
are committed to the advancement of the Puerto Rican community and they are very
much identified with their culture. These elements are constantly presented by their
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supporters as the way to identify them: "During the 1970's and the beginning of the '80s,
the prisoners were involved in community, union, student and political struggles in
Puerto Rico and one in the United States 13 • They fought for the people's right to high
quality and free education. They worked to create community institutions such as
alternative education programs, child-care centers, health centers, housing cooperatives,
recreational facilities and political organizations ... In summary they challenged the U.S.
political system in many ways" (Arm the Spirit, 1995).
Their Puerto Rican identity is one of the main forces moving them and one of the
main elements of identification. What means for a person with Puerto Rican background
to live in the United States? How does he/she come to the identification with the Puerto
Rican culture? The United States is a conglomerate of numerous ethnicities. In that sense,
the Puerto Rican background becomes an identity, moreover it becomes a salient identity
because it is that identity what defines Puerto Ricans. The Puerto Rican culture is
maintained and highly precious within Puerto Ricans families in the US, Ronald
Fernandez tell about Alicia Rodriguez's (former Puerto Rican Political Prisoner and
FALN member) family:
In Chicago, Alicia only heard about the island. She also heard she was 'ugly'
because her features were Latin and stupid because her English was imperfect. At
home Alicia grew up in a family which matter-of-factly celebrated its ancestry.
Her parents always spoke Spanish in the house; they ate Puerto Rican food; and
despite a shortage of money, they maintained an atmosphere of so much love that
Alicia believes she uses the world created by her mother and father as a model for
the larger extended family she calls Puerto Rico" (Fernandez, 1994).

13

All except one, Elizam Escobar, of these prisoners were born in the United States. Most of them were
raised in the Chicago area (Femandez,1994).
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Their Puerto Rican background becomes the most important element of identity and
description. In an application for release presented by their defense lawyer, Jan Susler, to
the United State Pardon Attorney on November 9, 1993, the presentation of the
organization focuses on their ethnicity as the force that moves them.
The men and women on whose behalf this application is submitted are Puerto
Ricans who witnessed and lived the conditions wrought by U.S. colonial control,
who love their people, their culture, their nation, and who, like the founding
mothers and fathers of the thirteen colonies and of so many other countries in the
world, were moved by this love and burning desire for freedom to seek and end
colonialism, to seek self-determination and independence (Susler, 1993, p. 2).

In terms of their arrest and prosecution, the FALN members declared themselves
prisoners of war and requested being tried under the specifications of the international
treaty regarding prisoners of war. Their argument was that they were engaged in a
struggle for self-determination against the illegal colonial domination of the United States
over Puerto Rico and for that reason they were to be considered freedom fighters and
prisoners of war. Susler best elaborates the argument in the letter applying for their
release previously mentioned:
When the first fourteen of the Puerto Rican political prisoners listed below
proceeded to trial, they claimed to be members of the anti-colonial clandestine
movement which sought to exercise the legitimate right of Puerto Rican people to
self-determination, and invoked international law which applies to the United
States and which provides that a colonial government may not criminalize anti
colonial conduct and that captured anti-colonial combatants are entitled to
prisoners ofwar status. They therefore did not recognize the jurisdiction of the
courts of Illinois or the United States to prosecute them and elected not to defend
themselves at trial ... (Susler, 1993, p. 4).
Not only is their argument that they are prisoners of war and legitimate freedom
fighters, combatants in an anti-colonial war, but their actions are not terrorist actions but
valid acts of self-determination. In an unpublished statement issued by the FALN entitled
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"Statement from the Puerto Rican Political Prisoners" 14, the FALN members explain the
difference between their actions and other considered terrorist actions, like the Oklahoma
City attack.
Although it is obvious that there is a world of distance between acts like the
assaults on innocent civilians in Oklahoma City...and our own struggle for
independence, we want to intentionally express that distance between acts of
hatred and acts of self-determination. Invoking the right under international law to
use all means available does not mean we used them with no respect for human
life .. .It has always been the practice and purpose of groups participating in the
independence struggle to rake all possible measures to endure that innocent
people are not harmed. Our actions, for the most part symbolic, have had the
objective of focusing the attention of the U.S. government on the colonial
conditions of Puerto Rico, and not causing terror to the citizens of the U.S. or
Puerto Rico (Torres, 1996, p. 2).

This was their perspective about themselves. The law and the media treated and
presented them in a very different way.

4.2 The Law: the Legal System at Work
As discussed in the methodology chapter, 36 units oflegal documents were
analyzed. These units include motions from the state attorneys, affidavits in support from
police officers and FBI agents, court orders, a state trial transcript, and various court
decisions. All documents are strictly related to the process by which the subjects of this
research were criminally processed and the obtaining of evidence for these legal
processes.

This is an unpublished statement that was used in support of a petition and the author, Carlos Alberto
Torres, sent it to me.
14
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The protocol contained one question that directly addresses the issue of the
characterization of the actors, question number 11 reads:

11. Characterization ofActors:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f
g.
h.
i.

freedom fighters
independence activists
dissenters
communists/reds
extremists
mentally disturbed
terrorists
criminals
others (specify)

It is important to mention that for every unit, there could be as many responses as there
were in the document. This is because I was not trying to summarize or force categories
but to capture what the document contained. In addition, it is necessary to clarify that
these are broad categories, thus in some occasions these were the exact terms found in the
documents, but in other occasions the term was implied.
Out of 37 units analyzed, the responses (a)freedomfighters, (c) dissenters, (d)

communists/reds, (g) criminals, and (e) extremists resulted empty categories. In other
words, no document reflected those categories as names or labels for the subjects. On the
other hand, the category (b) independence activists, was found in two occasions and also
the category (f) mentally disturbed. With one occurrence the (i) category other, with the
specific word ofrecalcitrant. Finally, the category (g) terrorists, was found 14 times in
the documents analyzed.
At a first glance, it appears that the law (represented by the legal documents
studied) mostly names these subjects as terrorists and on second place, and in equal
proportion, it names or treats them as independence activists or mentally disturbed. Since
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the category independence activists contradicts the category terrorists, and seems to
legitimate in a way their activities, I will discuss these results first and later the main
finding.

4.2.1 FALN as Independence Activists
Words are powerful, especially when we are dealing with the way in which a
group and their activities are going to be treated and seen by a judge or a jury. In the
game of good and evil played by the prosecution in the adversarial system of law that we
have, the prosecution has the role ofpresenting an image of evil subjects so the legal
audience (i.e. judge, jury) treats and prosecutes the subject accordingly.
Thus, it makes perfect sense that the law, as represented here, portrays these .
subjects as terrorists or maniacs. That is not necessarily the case with the phrase
"independence activists." In these cases, the context, the audience and the speaker
acquires relevance.
The two units that reflected the category "independence activists" were court
decisions. Unit number 033 is United States v. Julio Rosado, 728 F. 2d 89 (1984), and it
is an appeal about the right of defendants to present evidence beyond what is thought to
be relevant. Unit number 034, Matter of Archuleta, 561 F. 2d 1059 (1977), is an appeal
from an order :finding Pedro Archuleta in civil contempt for refusing to testify before a
grand jury about the activities and members ofFALN. In both cases, these are legal
proceedings promoted by the defense. In both cases, the speaker is a judge that
summarizes the facts to present the issue in a written decision.
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Furthermore, what is interesting is that in both cases the mention of their
independence goals and work is accompanied and modified by the label of terrorism. In
Unit #033 Circuit Judge Newman says in paragraph 16 of the decision:
This litigation is the latest chapter in the Government's persistent efforts to obtain
grand jury testimony from recalcitrant witnesses regarding the activities of the
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquefia, a terrorist group that
seeks independence for Puerto Rico.

Thus, the judge acknowledges in a restricted way the motivation of the
organization, but only after characterizing the group as a terrorist group. This is also the
case of the mention in Unit #034, in which the judge begins his decision by stating:

On January 24, 1975, bomb exploded in Fraunces Tavern, a restaurant in New
York City. Four people were killed, and fifty-three were injured. A group known
as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Puertorriquefia, or FALN, which
seeks independence for Puerto Rico, claimed responsibility for this act of
terrorism.

Again, the reference to the group's motivation is obscured by the overriding
references to their terrorist nature and terrorist activities. Furthermore, in both cases the
phrase "seeks independence for Puerto Rico" is used as an addendum of the group's
name. In other situations, as we will see when discussing the terrorist category, the name
of the group in Spanish is followed by the translation of the organization's name, in a
way explaining it to the English speaking audience. It could be argued that in this case
the use of the phrase regarding their political agenda, is not intended to recognize their
motives or political goals but to try to explain the Spanish name.
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4.2.2 FALN as Terrorists
Most of the documents analyzed revealed that the law actors were using the
category "terrorist" as the word to name the Puerto Rican prisoners. As it was mentioned
before, the word terrorist was used as an adjective that defines the subject group. The
following sentence was found in several of the documents analyzed, being the most
common manner in which these documents refer to FALN.
. . .the criminal activities of a violent terrorist group calling itself the Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquefi.a, F ALN, (Armed Forces of
Puerto Rican National Liberation) ... (Unit# 001, Application for an order
authorizing the continued interception of oral communications)

The phrase "a violent terrorist group calling itself..." acts as an adjective that defines the
organization.
This sentence is important because it was used by the state attorneys in the first
documents of this case (as unit #001 quoted before), and previously by the FBI agents
reporting to the state attorneys. This initial calling was used in almost all the later legal
documents, in that sense shaping the labeling of the FALN. The construction of the
sentence is very interesting. It begins with the description of the activities, defined as
criminal, later it describes the group by calling it violent and terrorist and then it goes to
naming it. In this way, when the reader gets to the name of the group he/she already has
information that shapes the definition of the group. He/she already knows that the group
commits criminal activities and that is violent and terrorist.
The demonization of the subjects is further elaborated and exemplified in the
remarks by state attorney, Michael Ficaro in his Opening Statement of the state trial
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against Carlos Torres, Freddie Mendez, Adolfo Matos, and others. These are the first
words that Mr. Ficaro said to the jury:
Our Honor, Judge Mahon, Mr. Shabat, ladies and gentlemen. FALN, Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Puertorriquefia, The Armed Forces for the
National Liberation of Puerto Rico. Whether you use the anachronism (sic),
Spanish, English, it means the same thing. Terrorist and terrorism. It means
people who will do anything, including the spilling of blood, for the cause they
want (Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June
29, 1980).

The initial words of an Opening Statement in a trial are the foundation of a case.
Generally, it is the first opportunity of the prosecutor and defense lawyers to address the
jurors. And most of the times it is the first time that the jury will hear something about
the case they have in hand. As in any social interaction, first impressions are utterly
determining of the latter perceptions of the actors and matter.
Thus, F ALN is introduced to the jury as an organization whose name is not more
than an acronym meaning terrorism. And the concept -terrorism-is further defined as
"people who will do anything, including the spilling of blood for the cause they want." In
this way, the organization, which was not on trial, appears in the scenario as the link that
united the defendants for a hateful mission. Two interesting elements emerge from this.
On the one hand, the presentation of the defendants as an organization, and on the other

hand, their characterization as cold-blooded terrorists.
The state attorney in the previous quote establishes the foundation of the case
nicely. He introduces the defendants by defining their culpability in terms of their
character. He defines them as terrorists. An interesting point that is present throughout
the whole case and in most of the other legal documents studied, is that the defendants
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are prosecuted as an organization. The introduction of the defendants is as FALN and it is
acknowledged that they have a "cause", although that cause is never disclosed. Their
motives and the reluctance of the state and the media to present those motives, is a topic
that will be discussed in a later chapter. Notwithstanding, it is related to the issue of the
presentation as an organization.
This criminal case, as most criminal cases, except for exceptional ones such as the
RICO cases, was against several individuals. The organization, FALN, was not charged,
furthermore, it was not supposed to be on trial. The political character of this prosecution
is exposed by the fact that it was almost impossible for the prosecution to make its case
against these defendants without linking them to this obviously political organization.
The differentiation of the two, the organization-defendants dyad and their motives was so
problematic for the prosecution, that their intent to separate the two failed in several
occasions. For example, in his closing statement, Mr. Shabat, Assistant State Attorney
stated:
They are guilty because of the acts which they committed, not because of the
beliefs that they share in common, but these people are members of an
organization called the F.A.L.N. The evidence has proved that they are members
of the FALN. And it has proved the common ideology and belief which they
share as members of that group, that group which has conspired in this case to
commit armed robbery and brought with them an arsenal of death to Evaston,
Illinois, on April 4th, 1980. And if this kind of conduct is the character of the
FALN membership, then justice cries out "Down with the F.A.L.N." (emphasis
added) (Unit# 030, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June
29, 1980).

In other words, they are not being tried because of what they believe, but what they
believe makes them organized and their membership makes them criminals. It is a long
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stretch, but since the defendants did not present any defense whatsoever, much
objectionable evidence and statements were admitted.
Statements about ''their cold-blooded", "cruel", "dispassionate" nature
accompanied the labeling of these Puerto Ricans as terrorists. Perhaps the passage that
best shows the intention of creating this image is the following:
Among the items discovered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin was a page from a book.
The book is called the Anarchist Cook Book. It is a book which contains recipes
for making a bomb, incinerary devices for altering weapons. It is a book designed
to tell people how to kill. And from this book was found among other papers of
the FALN this last page. It is this last page, ladies and gentlemen, that best
describes the people that are here on trial.
The page reads: Allow the fear and loneliness and hatred to build inside
you, rather than diminish in time. Allow your patience to torture material file the
seeds of constructive revolution (sic). Allow your love of freedom to overcome
the false values placed on human life, for the only method to communicate with
the enemy is to speak on his own level, using his own terms. Freedom is based on
respect, and respect must be earned by the spilling ofblood (Unit #006, State of
Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June 29, 1980).

These lines are strong and troubling, but a book written by a third party cannot be
used to demonstrate the beliefs or state of mind of anyone but the author. Furthermore,
this case was about a conspiracy to commit an armed robbery. Thus, it was irrelevant the
nature of the accused, in other words it was irrelevant for the purpose ofproving beyond
reasonable doubt that they conspired to commit a robbery that the defendants were
immersed in "hatred." The latter goes to the point of the necessity of criminalizing
political actors that were not thought of as common criminals. After all, this was not a
difficult criminal case, the police found the accused in a bus and many weapons were
found. Moreover, the defendants were not presenting any defense. Why the urge to create
this awful image? Why did the prosecution feel the necessity to convince the jury/ the
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public of their criminal mind setting? What was really on trial here? These are questions
of interest throughout this research.
A perfect image of cold-blooded-criminals/terrorists is not complete without the
counterpart, as in all antagonistic relationship there has to be the good and the evil. The
evil has been presented by the prosecution and law enforcement agents as a group called
FALN that came together to conspire. The puzzle is completed with the creation of the
victim. And who is the victim here? According to the prosecution, the victims are the
good people of this country:
Now, the afternoon of April 4th was Good Friday. It was also part of the Passover.
And at that time Christians and Jews throughout the world were together in
worship and to reflect upon the values oflife, morality, and the respect for and
general laws. At this time, and I say by the very nature of its time and indeed
occurrences, these eleven terrorists came together and demonstrated to you and to
the people of this state, country and world their respect for life, morality and the
laws of this country...(Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et.al., Trial
Transcript, June 29, 1980).

Generating a dichotomous relationship between the defendants and all the good
people in the world, the prosecution furthers the image of criminals and eliminates the
possibilities for the jury to consider the defendants as political actors, which is their
position. In the last passage, the prosecution describes what the "good people of this
country'' is, in opposition to what the "evil" defendants are.
The religious references are very interesting, since it suggests that the
"terrorists"-as they are called here-do not share or even disregard Christian customs.
This is very interesting since, Puerto Ricans in general are of strong religious beliefs and
loyal followers of religious customs, specially those sponsored by the Catholic Church.
Although we do not know the religious convictions of the defendants, it is not difficult to
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infer that they at least will share a respect for the customs of their culture. Moreover,
Puerto Rican nationalism has been traditionally very supportive of Catholicism, and
strengthens religiosity among its supporters. In spite of whatever religious conviction the
defendants may have, it does not make any difference to the case in hand, other than to
present the worst image possible to the audience. An image of people who are the enemy
of every good citizen, a person who deserves the worst punishment:
Although you sit here today, you must know that the "enemy'' is not in this
courtroom, but they are in the backroom, and they have declared war on the law
abiding God-fearing citizens of this country and state. They have spilled blood,
but they can gain no respect (Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et.al.,
Trial Transcript, June 29, 1980).

Interesting last words, ''but they can gain no respect." Why would the prosecutor think
that evil terrorists, cold-blooded killers, could gain respect? This suggests that the
prosecution was aware of the political character of these prisoners, or at least that they
were not dealing with common criminals.

4.2.3 FALN as the Other: Ethnicity
An important element of the answer to the question, who are they?, that was
posed at the beginning of this chapter, is the ethnic background of the actors. It has been
proposed by theorists, that race and ethnic background modifies or shapes the way in
which individuals conceptualize law and norms and on the other hand, the way in which
the Other think of them, and in that sense shaping social reaction and social control.
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Therefore, ethnic background is an important theoretical variable that needed to
be included in the study. The protocol contains two questions that directly address this
issue. The two questions are:

12. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe FALN activists mentioned?
a. Yes
b. No
c. How many times?
13. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe victims mentioned?
a. Yes

b. No
c. How many times?
In order to quantify the answers to these questions for this initial discussion each
time there was a mention of their national or ethnic background it was counted, and for
that reason there could be more Yes answers than number of units. Another point that
needs to be clarified, is the way in which these answers were collected. Any mention to
their nationality was counted as a yes, including indirect remarks as reference to their
language (Spanish).
Out of37 documents analyzed, 23 documents (62%) contained no mention
whatsoever of the ethnic or national origin of the FALN members. On the rest of the
documents, there were 17 mentions of their ethnicity. For question number 13, there were
no references to the national or ethnic background of the victims.
At this point of the research, the identity of the victims is not clear. The legal
documents analyzed do not make references to the victims, besides the abstract
identification with United States citizenry, as it was implied by the statements of the state
attorneys in the state trial.
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Turning to the results for question number 12, the ethnicity ofFALN members, it
is important to underline that most of the documents contained no mention of the ethnic
or national identity of FALN members. The majority of the mentions were interestingly
concentrated in the testimonies of police officers during the state trial, whose testimonies
were mainly for identification purposes. Phrases like "Latino woman" or "Spanish
descent man" were used by these witnesses in order to make their identifications. For
example, Sergeant Gerald Brandt from Evanston Police Department, in his testimony
made six mentions of their ethnicity, identifying them as "female Latino" and "male
Latino".
If ethnicity was so important for the identification of subjects, why is it not
important in other areas? Ethnicity was not mentioned in the description of the
organization, their motives, or to explain their arguments for denying the jurisdiction of
the United States. Ethnicity was not considered an important element by the court in the
jury composition, and it was dismissed by the court when the defendants raised the issue.
Ethnicity was neither considered to be an element of selective prosecution, and it was
also dismissed by the court.

4.3 Media: On Naming and Judging
The media coverage selected for this study is divided into three main moments or
periods -the events, the arrests, trial and sentencing.· The coverage of the events goes
from the first public appearance ofFALN and includes three of the most covered events
or bombings. The second period includes the arrests in 1980 and the third involves the
trial and sentencing of the FALN members who were charged with seditious
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conspiracy15 • The different periods were selected for the purpose of comparing and
contrasting the media coverage over time. Moreover, the analysis of media coverage
through time could permit the analysis of trends and patterns and determine if those
changed through time.
There are two main topics in the analysis of the coverage by the media. First, the
media acts as a producer of images and meanings, in this sense it is essential to see how
the media treats, names and defines the actors. From their first public appearance, how
did the media name, describe or define FALN? Did that definition stayed unchanged
through time? If it changed, how? Besides the actors, how did the media describe their
activities, as political events or terrorist acts? This naming process is going to be studied
through different periods of time.
The second aspect of this analysis is intrinsically related to the first, and this is the
way in which FALN members are identified, not just in terms of their actions or beliefs
but in terms of their ethnic identity. ls ethnicity important for the definition ofFALN? If
so, is it accompanied with a similar identification of the victim? Iftheir ethnic
background mainly identifies FALN members, are all other actors (police, victims, etc.)
equally identified in terms of their ethnicity?

15

See Chapter III for a detailed explanation ofthe media documents studied.
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4.3.1 Characterization of Activities and Actors

4.3.1.1 The Activities
Two questions were included in the protocol that specifically addressed the first
topic --characterization of actors and activities. Question number 10 reads:

10. Characterization ofActivity
a.
terrorist attack
b.
protest or political act
c.
bombing
d.
crime
e.
other
Each of the 59 media units was scrutinized in order to identify the ways in which the
specific activity was named. Each article could name an activity in many different ways.
For that reason, each way, not each time was recorded. Thus, ifin an article the reporter
describes an event as a bombing and as a terrorist act, both alternatives were marked.
This is important because there are more results than documents analyzed, and the
intention was not to force one solely category into each document but to report the ways
in which the media described the activity. In other words, what is reported is which
categories are used and in what frequency.
On the 59 media documents analyzed the category ''terrorist attack" was used in
34 of the documents. The category "bombing" was used to name the specific activity on
37 documents. The category "crime" was used on three of the documents and the
category "protest or political act" was not used on any of the documents analyzed. In
sum, the media named or defined FALN activities as terrorist acts or as bombings, and
never as a political act.
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FALN members defined their actions in terms of their political motivations. They
maintained that their actions were designed and planned with specific purposes in mind.
These purposes or motivations were usually exposed in their communiques, in which
they usually described their actions as political in nature. The media, on the contrary
rarely presented their contentions, but utilized concepts and words with very strong and
negative implications. The use ofwords like ''terrorist attack" and ''bombing" places the
event in the illegal arena and definitely focuses on the effect rather than on the cause.
FALN appeared into the public arena on October of 1974, after claiming
responsibility for a series of actions in Manhattan. The next day The Chicago Tribune
had in its cover page as the main headline: "5 Bombings in NY." The news article begins
as follows:
Five bombs exploded minutes apart across midtown and lower Manhattan early
Saturday, shattering windows and damaging buildings facades ofbanks and large
corporations (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974; p. 1).

Notice how after using the term ''bomb" the focus shifts immediately to the damages. In
contrast, the F ALN communique quoted on the same article, used the term "actions" and
moves directly to declare the motivations:
These actions have been taken in memory of the October 30, 1950, actions in
Puerto Rico against Yanqui (sic) colonial domination (The Chicago Tribune,
10/27/1974, p.14).

Reporting on the same event, The New York Times has two headlines with
completely different focuses. For one headline the focus is on the damages and the other
on motives. The first headline, which is the main one with large size fonts, reads:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90
''Terrorists here set off 5 bombs at business sites." The message is directed toward the
damaging impact rather than on the nature of the event. The second smaller headline, in
contrast, presents the act as politically motivated, although the effect on the reader is
already affected by the main headline. This second one reads: "Puerto Rican Group
Attacks 'Imperialist Banks' in Bid to Obtain Release of 5."
The reader gets the message that a bomb was planted and its explosion had
damaging effects and that the "alien"/Puerto Rican group 16 that planted the bomb did so
to obtain the release of others. The use of certain words to name and describe the acts sets
the stage to evaluate those actions in terms of the effects or in terms of the motivations.
This effect is dramatically accentuated when the term used is terrorism.
Mayor Beame denounced the bombings as "outrageous acts of terrorism. Our city
cannot and will not tolerate such acts of violence by any group," he said (The New
York Times, 10/27/1974).

The use of these terms was constant throughout the coverage of all FALN actions
until their arrests on 1980. On August 4, 1977 The Chicago Tribune reports on its cover
page: "Bombs rip Manhattan." This time the focus on the damages and the intent to shock
the audience is clearer. The story opens as follows:
Terrorist bombs exploded in two midtown Manhattan office buildings
Wednesday, killing one man and injuring at least six others, while dozens of
bomb threats forced more than 100,000 people to vacate their offices (The
Chicago Tribune, 8/4/1977, p. 1).

Notice how the report starts off by setting the stage, by naming the event "terrorist
bombs", after that frightening initiation, the report moves to describe the effects and
consequences of the actions. This structure-categorizing the event with a negative term
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and then reporting damages is seen in the following quote. This quote comes from an
article appearing on The Chicago Tribune on November 2, 1975. In this article the author
is theorizing about the ''terrorist mind", which follows from the title of the article which
is "Inside the terrorist mind." Reflecting on the emergence of many terrorist
organizations and terrorist attacks, he starts his story like this: "Last Monday, terrorist
bombs shattered the early morning calm at three downtown buildings."
This structure of naming the event as terrorist and then moving to inform readers
of the damages was a consistent practice, and it was used to summarize F ALN actions. At
the later period of coverage, during the arrests and trials, after nearly two years of
inactivity of the FALN, the usual presentation of the organization was as follows:
FALN has claimed responsibility for more than 100 bombings or attempted
bombings in the US and PR since 1974. Those attacks have resulted in five deaths
and more than seventy injuries (The Chicago Tribune, 4/5/1980, p.l).

The political motivations of their organization or their public statements were never
presented at this point. The only information the reader is given is the name of the
organization and that it had planted bombs and caused damages. The impact on the reader
of this story construction is very negative. The media creates an image of an organization
that plants bombs and kills people, as The New York Times reports by quoting a police
officer: "They seem to want to kill people" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p.10).

16

The focus on ethnicity will be discussed later in this chapter.
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4.3.1.2 The Actors
Question number 11 on the protocol deals with the issue of how the media
describes, identifies and names the actors.

11. Characterization ofActors
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f
g.
h.

freedom fighters
independence activists or nationalists
dissenters
communists or reds
extremists
maniacs or lunatics
terrorists
other

As for the previous question, the way in which this question was quantified was
not in terms of use frequency but in terms ofwhat categories were used to identify the
actors. For that reason, the categories used in each document were recorded not in terms
of how many times the actors were named but in what way were they named. For
example, in one single article the FALN members could have been called terrorists in
four different times and independence activists one time. In that case, two categories are
recorded for this article -terrorists and independence activists.
The categories "freedom fighters", "dissenters" and "communists or reds" were
each used in one document to name FALN members. F ALN members were referred to as
"maniacs or lunatics" in two of the documents. Five of the documents used the category
"extremists" to described F ALN members. Fifteen of the documents used the terms
"independence activists or nationalists" to refer to F ALN members. And finally, 45 of the
documents used the term ''terrorists" to label the members of the FALN.
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The phrase "freedom fighters" is the way in which FALN members describe
themselves in several of their public statements. Likewise, many of their support
organizations name them freedom fighters, fighters for the independence of Puerto Rico.
For that reason, it could be expected from the media to use this category when restating
FALN's "side of the story." In fact, the only time that this phrase was used was not in the
words of the reporter, but in a quote from the declarations of Rev.. Jose Torres, father of
Carlos Alberto Torres, after his son was arrested. The Chicago Tribune reports how the
prisoners see themselves by quoting Rev. Torres who was as well quoting prisoner Carlos
Alberto Torres: "The Rev. Mr. Torres quoted his son as saying FALN members are 'not
terrorists but freedom fighters"' (The Chicago Tribune, 4/6/1980, p. 11). It is noteworthy
that the reporter separates him/herself from the quote by specifying the source of the
words.
Although the phrase "freedom fighters" was used, it is important to indicate that it
was used just once in a period of over six years of coverage. It could be argued that the
second category, "independence activists or nationalists", also reflects their version or
FALN's own definition because it reflects their political motivations and standpoint. In
that sense the fact that this was the second most used category could be interpreted as an
indicator of equal or balanced coverage. Nevertheless, the phrase "freedom fighters" has
positive and noble connotations. Freedom fighters are admirable and altruistic people.
"Independence activists or nationalists," although recognizes a political standpoint, is
neutral and purely informative. This category does presents their work as political in
nature, but without granting any positive evaluation.
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The categories "dissenters", "communists or reds", and "extremists", also reflect
political definitions, but absolutely different in nature. FALN's own definition is given by
their political goals, and for that reason political categories are very important. It was
discussed earlier that the use of categories such as "freedom fighters" and "independence
activists" are political in nature, but with very different connotations.
The term "dissenter" denotes a political standpoint in opposition to the current
political system. In our tradition of republicanism, dissent is legally admissible and
publicly acceptable. Although communism is generally criticized in the United States,
especially after the Cold War, and in that sense it could carry negative responses, it is
also a term that reflects a political standpoint, and it could be limited to that meaning. The
term "extremists", on the other hand, is a negative adjective that could only suggest
reproachable character and fanaticism.
The term "dissenter'' was used in an article about an initiative by Mayor Daley
(Chicago's Mayor at the time). Mayor Daley had been promulgating the need to infiltrate
opposing organizations in order to stop F ALN' s bombings. The Federal Bureau of
Investigations supported this initiative, and responded criticism as follows:
"People have to decide what they want", one agent said. "If people don't want
dissident groups infiltrated, then they have to realize it will be tougher to catch the
bombers" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 11).

Thus, they refer to F ALN as part of those "dissident groups" that needed to be
infiltrated in order for them to "catch the bombers." The term "dissidents" was used in
this context to denote the nature of a group being treated as criminals or at least outlaws
in need of being closely monitored and controlled. In this sense, although dissidence is
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politically acceptable, in this statement dissidents are treated as the responsible parties for
the bombings. This is the only occasion in which this term was used to refer to FALN in
all the 59 media documents analyzed. And, as it was shown, it did not help the actors to
be presented as bombers.
The term "communist" was found one time in the media documents included in
this study. It appears in the words of Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo, the governor of
Puerto Rico at the time. Governor Romero was the candidate of the Partido Nuevo
Progresista, the political party that favors the statehood for Puerto Rico, and who was
considered by many as the author of Cerro Maravilla killings 17 • Reacting to the bombings
of October 1974 in an article entitled "Blame Bombing on Reds", Gov. Romero was
quoted as saying:
Carlos Romero Barcelo said that the bombings "may have been the work of a
Communist front organization trying to discredit the people of Puerto Rico" ...said
he does not believe any legitimate Puerto Rican nationalists were responsible for
the bombings that extensively damaged windows and buildings in Manhattan (The
Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5).

Therefore, the use of the term "communist" was not used as a way of identifying
political standpoints or even agendas. The term was used by a known rightwing
conservative as a way of placing accusations and demonizing the group. He describes
them as part of a "communist front" that wants to discredit the good people of Puerto
Rico, and moreover he distinguishes them from any "legitimate nationalist" organization.
Thus, they are not only blamed for being communists but they are also illegitimate and
secluded from the independence movement in Puerto Rico.

17

See the history section on Chapter I.
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The term "extremist" is also used as to reflect excesses. In fact, the MerrianW ebster dictionary defines extremist as one who upholds extreme views, and defines
extreme as exceeding the ordinary, usual, or expected. So an extremist is the one who
upholds views that exceeds the ordinary, the usual, the expected, and we can say the
normal. To use this term to refer to a dissident political organization is to call them
abnormal or unacceptable. Thus, when this words is used as an adjective that modifies the
noun -FALN-then, the purpose is to place their political standpoints outside the socially
accepted ones. Phrases like: "The extremist group has claimed responsibility for a series
of explosions..." (The Chicago Tribune, 1/25/1975, p. 3) and "an extremist Puerto Rican
organization believed responsible for bombing three downtown buildings early Monday",
do no more than to demonize the actors. This fact is corroborated in the following
example coming from an Editorial of The New York Times. In this article the editor is
making the point that groups like the FALN are just frustrated people who turn to violent
tactics because they are not able to convince Puerto Ricans of the benefits of
independence. So they deviate from the norms and turn to the unaccepted.
Indeed, it is doubtless frustration at their inability to persuade fellow Puerto
Ricans in open debate at home that provokes extremist groups to resort to such
tactics as bombings and carefully-stacked independence rallies 18 in New York
(The New York Times, 10/28/1974, p. 30).
Far more damaging than the use of terms like "communists" or "extremists" is the
use of the term "terrorist", which could only mean danger for everyone's safety and life.
As it was reported above, the vast majority of the categories used to describe the FALN
were ''terrorist". In fact, 69% of the categories observed were "terrorists". The second

18

Here the editor is referring to an independence rally that took place in New York just after the first series
of bombings in Manhattan on 1974. This rally was very well attended and counted with the participation of
notorious personalities as Angela Davis and Jane Fonda.
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most found category was "independence activists or nationalists", being the 23% of the
categories observed.
The use of the term "independence activists or nationalists" was very common at
the outset of this process. The very first event, the acts on October 1974, were described
as being claimed by a "nationalist group" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, p. 1). At
these first stages when F ALN was just appearing in the public scene, and when
judgements were not yet made, the most common way of referring to the group was as
follows:
An hour after the blast, callers identifying themselves as members ofFuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (F.A.L.N.), a Puerto Rican nationalist
organization that has been linked to previous acts of terrorism here, claimed
responsibility for the explosion (The New York Times, 1/25/1975, p.l).

Statements like this characterized the way in which the organization and their acts
were presented at the beginning ofthis process. The organization is described as a
nationalist group, with a political standpoint, and their acts are described as political from
the start. In spite of the naming of the act as a terrorist action, the characterization of the
actors as "a nationalist group" definitely sets the image of a political rather than a
criminal organization.
Even in cases when the reporter is informing the gathering of law enforcement
agents to study the case of FALN and their acts, referring to the organization as a
"nationalist" group gives the reader the message that the group is organized with a
common political agenda, even if that agenda is not accepted:
Bomb experts from all over the country met with Chicago police to piece together
evidence "and to exchange information on the little known Puerto Rican
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nationalist group, which began its terror bombings in this country just one year
ago" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p. 23).

However, as time passed and the unknown Puerto Rican group surfaced more and
more, the naming of it moved from a rather neutral and informing way to a more
judgmental and accusing one. The once ''nationalist group" became the Puerto Rican
terrorist organization. This shift started sporadically and then became the way in which
FALN was defined. The following quotes show how the term ''terrorists" became the first
name ofFALN.
The attack on Fraunces Tavern on 1975 was possibly the most covered and tragic
ofFALN actions. This attack on the heart of Manhattan caused many injuries and four
deaths. In this circumstance the term terrorism started to be unanimous. The New York

Times issued a report trying to identify or offer a profile of the FALN after the Fraunces
Tavern incident. Under the headlines "Bombers Called Intent on Killing. Police say New
Terrorism of Puerto Rican Separatists Represent Perilous Shift", the news article
establishes the nature of the organization as terrorist and dangerous.
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, or F.A.L.N., the latest terrorist group
arising from Puerto Rican independence liberation movement, departs from the
style of earlier Puerto Rican political organizations in a macabre way, according
to police. As one official said yesterday: 'They seem to want to kill people' (The
New York Times, 1/25/1975, p. 10).

In this article, the clear purpose was to identify the organization and the reporter
defines the organization first of all as a terrorist group. This characteristic is what,
according to the article, separates them from the regular and traditional independence
organizations, but also that the FALN deviates from those traditional organizations "in a
macabre way''. Hence, the organization is presented as a violent unscrupulous group. The
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terrifying image set by these sentences are reaffirmed with 'the words of the police officer
quoted here saying that what differentiates the F ALN to other groups is their wish "to kill
people". Needless to say that the political character of the organization is obscured and
invalidated by the image of violence and danger.
The intention of invalidating the legitimacy of the F ALN as a political group
struggling for the independence of Puerto Rico by establishing an image of terror, is
taken forward by the editorial panel of The New York Times. In a short piece entitled
"Terror in Manhattan", the editors engage in a political attack on the FALN by accusing
them of not representing the will of the Puerto Ricans and on the contrary violating their
will.
Responsibility for Friday's brutal lunch-hour bombing on historic Fraunces
Tavern, which left four dead and scores injured, is asserted by a group that claims
to represent the desire of 2.5 million Puerto Ricans for "immediate
independence." They represent no such thing. In free elections, Puerto Ricans
have voted overwhelmingly to retain the self-governing commonwealth status
they now enjoy. If they should ever change their minds, the islanders know they
do not have to stoop to terror and bloodshed to dissolve what is widely regarded
as an arrangement of mutual benefit.
Those who planted the Wall Street bomb are not patriots. They are first
and foremost enemies of their own people, both here and in Puerto Rico. They
must be speedily brought to justice as the murderers they are (The New York
Times, 1/26/1975, p. 16).

The editors engage in an attack on FALN tactics and political motivations. They
are called terrorists, but more than that, they are called terrorist without a legitimate
cause. It has been discussed before that what gives meaning to the FALN is precisely
their political goals, and this is commonly what defines political groups. So this attack on
the political motivations and political agenda harms their identity and their support. Also
interesting is how the editors assume the Puerto Ricans voice is opposed to that of the
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FALN, which is taken to the extreme when it is stated that the FALN is the enemy "of
their own people." It is arguable to say that this article is actually directed toward the
Puerto Rican community that had supported independence of the island. It attacks the
FALN's support by accusing them ofbetraying their cause.
This style of naming and defining the FALN as terrorists became a pattern and
almost the standard way of referring to the organization in most news stories. The term
"terrorist" was followed by different ways of calling the group, but the prefix was
constant. The New York Times called them "the terrorist band, calling itselfFuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional" (The New York Times, 10/28/1975, p.l).
Yet, the most common way of identifying the organization was to state the name
and then describe them as terrorists, as if to explain the nature of the organization. The
following sentence became a typical way in which FALN was referred to: "The Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (F.A.L.N.) a Puerto Rican terrorist group, claimed
responsibility for the explosion in the restaurant" (The New York Times, 1/28/1975, p.20).
So the group's name is FALN and they are a "Puerto Rican terrorist group", the phrase
that actually defined the nature of the group was the one accusing them as being
terrorists.
Sometimes the name was not even important, to name the organization the only
thing that was needed was the ethnic referent and the adjective. As in the report in The

Chicago Tribune, where it was stated that the New York police had found and defused a
bomb and "said it was the work of the Puerto Rican terrorist group that claimed
responsibility for the last week's Manhattan bombings" (The Chicago Tribune, 8/9/1977,

p. 5). The focus on the ethnicity as a way of identifying the group will be the topic of a
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discussion later in this chapter. At this point, though, it is important to report how the
naming of the group could change in terms of mentioning the name of the group or not,
but what was constant was the ethnicity and the terrorist label.
There are many examples to demonstrate this point; here two of those are
presented. The New York Times refers to them as ''the Puerto Rican terrorists who took
responsibility for yesterday's blasts" (The New York Times, 8/4/1977, p. B6). And it also
calls them "the Puerto Rican terrorist group known as the FALN" (The New York Times,
8/9/1977). In this context, the matter ofpolitical standpoints or agenda, nor the support or
even the name that much, was as important as the ethnic background of the group and
their terrorist nature. The image that the media wanted to present was complete with this
information, the separation from the common citizen-aliens--, and the de-legitimization
of their actions.
To say that the media wanted to present a specific image could be a pretentious
and, some could say, unsubstantiated statement, because there is no way of proving
media's intentions or even there is no way of knowing that there even was a single
intention. However, after careful examination of media arguments, especially those
presented in editorials, patterns of coverage could be identified. Up to this point there
have been several strong indicators of at least an anti-FALN sentiment. The astonishing
preponderance of the use of the category "terrorist" is one of those indicators. Also the
fact that this coverage did not include FALN's version but, on the contrary, excluded
their own nomenclature or even interviews with F ALN supporters. Yet, the following
exceipts of an editorial piece appearing on The Chicago Tribune on April 8, 1980 just
after the arrests may show media's position.
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The editors start by congratulating and applauding police actions that ended up
with the arrests. Under the headline "Excellent arrests in Evanston" the editors engage in
an ode to the police and a fierce and incisive attack on FALN. It is important to
remember that by the time of these arrests, the FALN was not active on the public scene
as several years have elapsed since their last action.
Those were admirable arrests in Evanston Friday, when police took custody of 11
persons suspected of involvement with the Puerto Rican terrorist group FALN
[Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional]. Included in the group was Carlos
Torres, 27, long on the list of the FBI's "most wanted" list. The arrests were
carried out without the firing of a single shot (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980,
p. 2 section 2).

Thus the editors start by congratulating the police for the arrests of the "Puerto
Rican terrorist group". Once more the naming of the group with the term ''terrorist" sets
the stage for a deep criticism ofFALN's actions and definitely exhibits a sense of
culpability, damaging enormously FALN' s presumption of innocence and even more
media's supposed neutrality. The second sentence informs the reader that one of the
arrested was one of the individuals appearing in the FBI's ''most wanted" list. Of course
this statement, which creates an image of fear and accountability, would be completely
different if it was explained that he was on that list precisely because of his alleged
involvement with FALN and not because of a criminal career. Then, the editors go on to
say with a tone ofpositive surprise, that the police did not have to fire a single shot,
implying an excellent control of police agents over very dangerous subjects.
And the attack continues on FALN's political standpoints:
...and no revolutionaries with a romantically attractive cause. Carlos Torres and
others in the group called themselves ''prisoners of war," refusing to recognize the
authority of the ordinary authorities who cope with criminal misconduct. But
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FALN is an army only in the sense that the "Symbionese Liberation Army'' of
Patty Hearst days was an army. It is a tiny group of characters with abnormal
psychologies. FALN has almost nothing in common with liberation fighters with
a constituency (id.).

As an old scene of good vs. evil, the editors engage in a negative characterization of
FALN, attacking every hint of nobility in their actions. Starting by attacking their view as
"freedom fighters", the actors are presented here as outlaws that unjustly oppose the good
cops who free society from the bad seed. The comparison with the Symbionese
Liberation Army works to demonize even more the actors, taking advantage of the
general negative view of this organization. They are not only called outlaws and
criminals, but they are shown as "abnormal" whose insanity has moved them to pursue
these equally "abnormal" goals.
The arrests in Evanston in April 1980 were the turning point in the media
characterization ofFALN. Before that, the description of the FALN, although mainly as
terrorists, was not as one-sided and biased as it appeared afterwards. The use of the
category "independence activists or nationalists" before the arrests was commonly used
as a description and adjective. After the arrests, the name was unanimous. The FALN
acquired a first name-terrorists. The organization was being mentioned like this: "New
York police officers arrived in Evanston, Illinois, today with warrants for the arrest of
two persons accused ofbeing leaders of a Puerto Rican terrorist group that is suspected in
100 bombings" (The New York Times, 04/06/1980, p.l). The examples are many; the
naming is the same:
A federal prosecutor said Thursday that federal charges are expected to be
brought against eight Puerto Rican terrorists who were convicted Wednesday
night on local charges of conspiracy armed robbery and weapon offenses (The
Chicago Tribune, 08/01/1980, p.l, section 2).
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A federal district judge today imposed prison terms of 55 to 90 years on 10
suspected members of the Puerto Rican terrorist group F.A.L.N. who were found
guilty of conspiracy, armed robbery and other crimes (The New York Times,
02/19/1981, p. A 20).

4.3.1.3 Them Puerto Ricans
The description of the FALN was mainly as terrorists and Puerto Ricans. How
important was it for the media's coverage of the situation and of the FALN to focus on
their ethnicity? Was ethnicity as a general category an important element in the
understanding of the situation? If so, then was it equally important to know the ethnicity
of the victim?
There were two questions in the protocol that directly addressed the issue of
ethnicity. Question number 12 reads:

12. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe FALN activists mentioned?
a.

Yes

b.

No

As the necessary following question, question number 13 asked about the victim's
ethnicity. Here victim refers to those affected by FALN's actions, being individuals or
corporations.

13. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe victim(s) mentioned?
a. Yes

b. No
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Question number 12 explores the frequency of the mention of ethnicity on the
media documents analyzed. Out of the 59 documents included, a mention or discussion of
FALN members' ethnicity was included in 86.4% of the documents. In contrast, just 12
(20%) mentioned the victim's ethnicity.
The use of the ethnic referent was mainly for identification purposes. That is, the
organization was identified as being Puerto Rican, and their being Puerto Rican was
essential in the interpretation and understanding of the group. Since their first public
appearance the FALN was identified and distinguished as being Puerto Rican. The ethnic
referent was so important that it made the headlines since the first time. The New York
Times had the following headlines in the cover page on October 10, 1974: "Terrorist here
set off 5 bombs at business sites. Puerto Rican Group Attacks 'Imperialist Banks' in Bid
to Obtain Release of 5". The way in which this newspaper identified a group that has just
attacked important business sites in Manhattan, was first as terrorists and then as Puerto
Ricans.
The news article continues to expose the information they had on the
organization. This information came mostly from police reports and the police did not
have much information on the origin of this organization, as is reflected by the words of
the Assistant Chief of Detectives when he expressed: "This is a new name ...but we feel
is affiliated with Puerto Rican independence groups ...". At this point, the first
appearances ofFALN in the public arena, one of the few sources of information is the
group's communique where they claimed responsibility for the actions. Although this
report did not include an extensive account of what was stated in the communique, it did
mention the way in which the FALN announced the existence of the communique:
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A man and a woman with Puerto Rican accents telephoned and directed reporters
to a telephone booth at Broadway and 73d Street, where the pair left a statement
from F.A.L.N. (The New York Times, 10/27/1974, p. 1).

The communique left by the F ALN expressed their ethnic identity and this was
part of what the reporter included in the article. Then, why was it relevant to mention the
"Puerto Rican accents"? Perhaps, the accents' reference put in perspective the difference
between them and us. If we understand that the use of the ethnicity was an element that
distinguished them from us, then it is easier to understand the extensive presence of
ethnic referents in the documents analyzed. On the other hand, an alternative
interpretation of this fact is that reporters use this type of referents for authentication
purposes. This is, in order for the caller to be validly identified as member of this Puerto
Rican organization, is important for the reporter to mention the accents.
The ethnic referent was used in the same way in which the "terrorist organization"
was described. As it was discussed before, terrorist became the first name of the FALN
and the main description was as Puerto Ricans. The following quotes demonstrate how
the ethnic referent was used to describe the organization and it was the main
identification.
In 1977 The Chicago Tribune reports on a defused bomb believed to be related to
FALN's actions, and the name of the organization was not even necessary to name it,
they just used the two labels: ''New York police found and defused a bomb and 'said it
was the work of the Puerto Rican terrorist group that claimed responsibility for last
week's Manhattan bombings"' (The New York Times, 08/09/1977, p. 5).
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The same newspaper five days earlier reports the progress of the investigation of
F ALN acts and intent to offer a profile on the organization. The article attacks the
organization as being a small group with deadly intentions, not before letting everyone
know that these individuals were Puerto Ricans.
The Puerto Rican terrorists who took responsibility for yesterday's blasts are an
elusive band who have bombed scores ofbuildings in four American cities,
killing five persons in recent years in the name of independence for their
Caribbean homeland (The New York Times, 08/04/1977, p. B6).

They were called terrorist or nationalists or "elusive band" but always preceded by the
ethnic referent. As is evident in the following quote, the ethnic referent was not just a
meaningless addendum to the name of the organization, but it was purposely utilized in
contrast or opposition to the others US citizens.
An all-white jury of seven women and five men was selected in Criminal Court
on Monday as the trial began for eight suspected Puerto Rican terrorists on
conspiracy and weapons charges (The Chicago Tribune, 07/29/1980, p. 3).

For the F ALN their Puerto Rican background was a very important element in
their political agenda and their work. Thus, it could be argued that the fact that the media
uses their ethnicity as a way of identifying the organization is a legitimate way of
reporting the facts. However, the only part of FALN's own definition of their
organization or political motivations that is so extensively used by the media to identify
the F ALN is their ethnicity. Moreover, the ethnic referent is accompanied by the terrorist
label, which makes the identification prejudicial and discriminatory as it makes
accusations and imparts negative association for the people of the same ethnic
background. The rationale behind the selection of ethnicity as the main form of
identification is beyond the scope of this r~search. In turn, what is presented here is the
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fact that ethnicity and the terrorist label were found to be the most common way of
referring to this organization and the effects that this could have had.
The focus on their ethnic background may have had an effect on the way the
investigation was conducted. At the very least, the information provided by the media
identifies members of the Puerto Rican community as possible suspects. The emphasis on
the Puerto Rican identity was also seen in the investigative efforts that were directed
toward people sharing the same ethnic background. In the following quote it is noticeable
how the national identity of the person arrested was an important factor: "Police raided a
Bronx apartment on a tip from an informant and arrested David Peres, 27, a Puerto
Rican" (The Chicago Tribune, 8/5/1977, p. 8).
The Puerto Rican community as a whole was affected since police efforts, as
reported by the media, were directed their way.
Chicago police seeking leads to the persons who bombed three downtown
buildings were attempting Tuesday to trace the movements of a dozen Puerto
Rican activists here who have made a series of trips to Cuba in recent months
(The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p.23).

This focus on ethnicity could have created an anti-Puerto Rican sentiment in the
community, especially since the newspapers studied circulated in cities with a large
concentration of Puerto Ricans. The anti-FALN sentiment caused by the strong coverage
in the media and the events themselves could have being translated into an anti-Puerto
Rican sentiment since most ofFALN's identification was based upon their ethnic
identity. The following quote, covering the reaction of a female employee that had to be
evacuated because of a bomb threat, illustrates how this could in effect be a consequence
of the ethnic emphasis.
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The occupants of the buildings left silently and smoothly obeying the orders of
their wardens, supervisors and security personnel. Then they huddled outside in
the rain -accountants trying to do their work under umbrellas, drenched
secretaries calling home from street phones, bookkeepers whispering in
doorways ..."It's a damned nuisance," a woman snarled outside the Empire, State
Building. "The Spanish language is not going to be welcome in New York if they
keep on threatening and bombing people" (The Chicago Tribune, 08/04/1977, p.
2).

The article connected with the above quote presented the situation of "good hard
working Americans", sacrificed people who continued working under terrible
circumstances-"under umbrellas"-who are law-abiding citizens-"silently...obeying
orders"-are so disturbed with these actions. These good Americans contend that the
"Spanish language" will not be welcome in New York. The Spanish language is used as a
phrase that implies every one who speaks that language, every Latino, every Puerto
Rican. Thus, the "bombers" are identified and equated to Puerto Ricans. Since the main
description ofFALN in the media is based on their ethnic background, their ethnicity is
held accountable.
This attack on the Puerto Rican nationality can be observed in the reaction of
Puerto Rican personalities and groups that felt the need to defend themselves and
separate themselves from the FALN. The Governor of Puerto Rico at the time, Gov.
Carlos Romero Barcelo, made strong statements censuring FALN activities and calling
for the de-legitimatization of their cause 19 • Another politician of Puerto Rican descent,
Congressman Badillo, not only criticized FALN and their actions but also invited the
Puerto Rican community to cooperate with the police in their investigation.
Calling the bombing "an outrageous act," Representative Badillo of the Bronx, a
leading spokesman for the Puerto Rican community, urged "anyone in the city,
19

See quote earlier on this chapter, Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5.
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and especially in the Puerto Rican community, having information to immediately
contact the proper authorities" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 10).

Here, this "Puerto Rican leader" is making clear to the public that he does not support
FALN's actions by two different strategies. In the first place he censures the actions of
the F ALN, and then he calls up the whole Puerto Rican community to oppose them. By
this strategy, the Puerto Rican representative is giving the message that he and his
community are not to be blamed for these acts, and moreover we are willing to cooperate
in the capture of them bombers.
Not just politicians felt the necessity to protect themselves against blame or to
make clear the difference between F ALN and the rest of the Puerto Rican community.
Other groups associated with the Latino community reacted at the time to send the
message of disassociation and cooperation in the criminal process. For example, a
workers organization mainly composed by Puerto Ricans in New York made the
following public statement:
A Puerto Rican labor union headquartered in Brooklyn said, last night that it was
offering a $2,000 reward to anyone who could provide information leading to the
arrests and conviction of those responsible for last Friday's bombings (The New
York Times, 0/28/1975, p. 20).

In other words the attack on the Puerto Rican origin of FALN members in the media, was
so overwhelming that people sharing the national origin, or even the ethnic background
were faced with the need of disassociating themselves from FALN and their actions, and
even publicize their status as good law-abiding citizens by participating in the criminal
investigation.
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4.4 Some Concluding Remarks
The FALN considered themselves to be freedom fighters and combatants in an
anti-colonial war. Their Puerto Rican identity was the major force moving them towards
the organized struggle to free Puerto Rico from what they considered to be an illegal
colonial domination. Consequently, when on their trials they declared themselves
prisoners of war and did not recognize the jurisdiction of the US courts over them.
The treatment received by the legal system and the media was completely
different from what they were stating. The law and its actors -law enforcement agents,
prosecutors and judges-treated the FALN as a criminal and terrorist organization. The
political character of their actions was obscured in order to present an image of illegality
and deviance. The subjects were treated as criminals and terrorist that did not care for
"good American values", deserving to be punished with all the severity of the law.
The media presented FALN's actions as acts of terrorism and FALN members as
alien terrorist. The most salient image in the media was that of the Puerto Rican terrorist
that needed to be persecuted and prosecuted for being a menace to society. Although the
media had presented FALN's communiques and often quoted from them, the coverage
was mainly characterized by the presentation of a demonized image.
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CHAPTER 5: WHY?--A SEARCH FOR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS

The literature on political movements and terrorism suggests that most of the
times the motives, which is what in the first instance defines a political movement or
activity, are obscured by the media20 • This chapter examines the way in which the three
voices studied in this research treat, discuss, and approach the motives behind the acts
and their actors. The question to be explored in this chapter is then, Why? Why did these
people organize in a secret organization? Why did they engage in illegal acts? And
moreover, is it important?
The three voices that narrate this story have very different accounts of the
motive's importance. As it will be revealed in this chapter, the majority of the legal and
media documents studied do not make references to, or do not explain the motivation
behind the acts or the actors. When it does appear, it is as a restatement of what the
political prisoners said and it appears accompanied by belittling remarks. On the other
hand, for the political prisoners their motives are the most important aspect of their story.
This chapter will include an analysis of the responses found in the documents to
three questions included in the protocol. One of the questions goes directly to the point in

°For a thorough discussion of the literature on this topic, see Chapter II.

2
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discussion, and it is written in a very general manner. Question number 18 reads as
follows:

18. Is there any mention ofFALNpolitical motives or goali 1 ?
a.No
b. Yes

Any reference to their political standpoints or to the rationale behind their organization or
any act was counted as a Yes in this question.
The category political motives or goals could be interpreted in many different
ways and a reference in any form to the rationale behind the organization or acts could
include mentions ofmany aspects of the prisoners' political agenda or political
background. For that reason, question number 14 is more specific in its possible answers,
and it implicates a broader aspect of the prisoner's political motives or goals-the
political situation of Puerto Rico:

14. Is the situation ofPuerto Rico mentioned?
a. Puerto Rico 's political status
b. History ofindependence movements
c. Emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States
d. Poverty or economic situation ofPuerto Rico
e. No mention
f Other
This question encompasses the whole spectrum of political issues surrounding the
prisoner's motives. Any reference to the issues included in the possible answers would
constitute an acknowledgment of the political character of the prosecuted acts and actors.
Finally, there is a third question included in this chapter that considers another
aspect of the political motives or political character of the organization, members and

21

The terms political motives or goals are used here interchangeably to include the political ideals and ends
of the prisoners and the FALN as an organization.
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their acts. This question seeks to expose the relationship ofFALN with other political
movements or political groups. The different speakers' versions will offer different pieces
of information. The political prisoner's own account of their relationship with other
political movements or groups will provide to the analysis the way in which the subjects
construct their own political movement in a broader social conjuncture. For the latter, is
important to consider the political effervescence of the '70s and the many political groups
that were present in the public political debate.
The law and the media versions will provide to the discussion the manner in
which others, in this case the judging ones, see the FALN and their acts. Of this, two
factors are of special significance. On the one hand, the way in which the law and the
media see the FALN in relation to other political actors or groups could facilitate the
unfolding of political and moral evaluations of the group. It would be easier to
extrapolate judgements and evaluation of the group in question if they give us a
comparison with other groups of known reputation. For example, if a judge in a decision
or a reporter in a news article compares one ofFALN acts to the activities of the IRA, it
could be argued that the same negative moral evaluation ofthe IRA's acts is equally
applied to FALN's acts.
On the other hand, a comparison of FALN with other known political movements

or actors would imply an acknowledgment of the political character of the organization.
This would be in apparent contradiction with the treatment received by the FALN and its
members, which singled them out as common criminals. Question number 19 reads as
follows:
19. Are there any connections, references, or comparisons with other political
movements or groups?
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a. Yes
b.No

5.1 The FALN's Side: Why did They Become FALN?
The members of the FALN were Puerto Ricans living in the United States that felt
close to their Puerto Rican ancestry and culture and who believed that to be Puerto
Ricans meant to defend the island at all costs. They decided that the political and
economic situation of Puerto Rico were a result of the colonial domination of the United
States and decided that it was their right and duty to act against that domination. Like
Fernandez describes in his book about Puerto Rican political prisoners:

In its 120 bombings the FALN generally focused on political targets because
gaining independence for Puerto Rico was at the center of Oscar Lopez's or
Alejandrina Torres' life; because they hated the dependence fostered by
colonialism and symbolized by food stamps; and, because they agreed with Pedro
Albizu Campos that an indispensable basis for any self-sustaining economy was
political power (Fernandez, 1994, p. 218).
The situation of Puerto Rico in general terms, including the economic, political
and cultural situation, was the main motivation for these Puerto Ricans to embrace the
struggle for the independence of the island. However, what remains to explain is why
within all the forms that political support for independence could take, they chose to
engage in a clandestine movement.
One way of explaining this is by arguing that given the colonial domination of
Puerto Rico to the United States and the ruthless repression to which independence
groups had been subjected throughout the years22 people wanting complete independence
have not other choice but to resort to clandestine movements. Susler, in a Memorandum
of Law that was never filed in court, suggest this explanation: "In the face of this

22

For a history ofpolitical repression of independence activists in Puerto Rico, see Chapter I.
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trajectory of the U.S. government's overt and covert attempts to destroy the Puerto Rican
people's efforts to obtain self-determination, it is no wonder that people who desire
freedom would develop clandestine means of seeking that freedom" (Susler, unknown
date, p. 10).
In various opportunities FALN members themselves explained that for them the
only way to fight against the United States was through armed struggle. Carmen Valentin
in response to her sentence in 1981 expressed this point of view: "Revolution doesn't get
accomplished by mere thought. Action must lead the way, and that is what the FALN is.
The FALN is action on behalf of the millions of Puerto Ricans who have been victims of
colonialism and exploitation. This action has to take place because without it our territory
will not be free. Guns and bombs, guns and bombs imply death or life imprisonment.
They also imply revolution and freedom for our country'' (cited in Fernandez, 1994, p.
224). In other words, the only way to fight against violent domination is with violent
struggles.
This view of having to fight violently and sacrifice for the motherland is
consistent and constant within the majority of the FALN's statements. By this, they
explain in a general way why to fight violently. The actual choice ofmethods is
explained by one of the FALN member, Elizam Escobar, in an interview conducted while
he was still in prison. In this opportunity, Elizam reflects on the history of the struggle for
independence in Puerto Rico, and how the clandestine work of the FALN fit into that
broader history. This interview was published in Spanish, so what follows is a translation
of the original.
I understood the importance within that specific conjuncture of the clandestine
movement as a symbolic force capable of invigorate the psychological aspect and
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the self-esteem of a country or a struggle that was diagnosed by many as a lost
cause. But also, in the concrete aspect, very concrete, of defending in practice the
right of self-determination and independence, to self-defense and to respond to the
repression existing in those years. All of that was more important and could not
be postponed" (Gil, 1995, p. 152).
The argument seems to be that within the context of the struggle for independence
of Puerto Rico, the clandestine armed struggle was a necessary step in order to invigorate
the support for independence and to surpass the repression that independence movements
had been subjected to. This aspect of self-preservation is also mentioned as the rationale
behind choosing a clandestine approach to the independence struggle on a statement
assuming credit for actions that took place on 198223 • This statement is available through
the internet in Spanish. What follows in a translation ofwhat is published on the Internet.
Ifwe want to be victorious, our struggle has to be enclosed within the strategy of
the prolonged popular war. We have to create organizations that cannot be
destroyed by the enemy because it cannot see them acting publicly. Only the
political-military organization with structures, membership and clandestine work
methods is in a position to mobilize and organize our people and at the same time
engage in an armed struggle. Those independence organizations that work within
bourgeois legality, either because they believe in that system, or because they
think that there are no conditions to create clandestine organizations, or because
they preach to have nothing to hide, only lie to themselves. When the enemy
concludes that these organizations are a menace it will annihilate them (Comando
Central FALN, 1982, p. 4).
The FALN assumed responsibility of over 120 actions in their whole public
existence. They usually took credit of an action by a communique that was made public
by the press. These communiques were published in part or referred to in the press. The
next sections will explore the way in which the law and the media approached FALN's
motivations.

Although this action is beyond the time period covered by this research, the document authored by the
FALN is valuable in terms of their statements regarding the explanation to their movement.
23
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5.2 The Law: Are the Political Motivations Relevant for the Judicial Process?
For the general question, question number 18, out of37 legal units analyzed 24
(64.9%) did not reflect any reference to FALN motives. Only 13 documents contain
mentions ofFALN motives, that is 35.13% of the documents discuss in any degree
FALN motives.
For the more specific question regarding the political issues of Puerto Rico,
question number 14, two documents made a reference to Puerto Rico's political status,
and three made references to the history ofindependence movements. No documents
made references to the emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States or to the
poverty or economic situation ofPuerto Rico. On the contrary, 32 documents made no
reference to the situation of Puerto Rico in any way, in other words 86.5% of the
documents analyzed contained no discussion or reference to the situation of Puerto Rico
or the broader political motivations of the F ALN and its members.
However, these numerical counts of the document's topical content do not present
an accurate sense of the documents. The specific speaker and the context allow for a
better understanding of how the topic is treated.
Before we undergo a deeper exploration of the legal scene, it is important to make
some operational definitions. For some criminal cases, the prosecution has to prove a
specific criminal intent or motive. For example, to prove a case of murder in the first
degree is essential to prove mens rea 24 or the intention to commit murder, contrary to
murder in the second degree, which do not require criminal motive (18 USC section

24 Mens rea is a phrase derived from the Latin used by the legal jargon to mean a guilty mind. ''The state of
mind required to constitute a particular crime; the mental element of an offence" (Butterworth Legal

Dictionary).
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1111). The subject of this chapter is not criminal motives but political motives or goals.
The purpose is to discuss the way in which the law approaches or dismisses the political
motivations of the actors. This should not be confused with the legal exercise of the
prosecution to prove criminal intent.
In the previous chapter it was shown how legal documents often accompanied the
name FALN with a short phrase explaining who the actors were. In some occasions this
was expanded in a way that included an indirect recognition of the organization's
motives. In a court decision Circuit Court Judge Posner, introduces the organization by
stating:
The FALN is a secret organization of Puerto Rican separatists that has been trying
to win independence for Puerto Rico by tactics that include bombing buildings in
New York, Chicago, and Washington ... (Unit #031, United States of America vs.
Alejandrina Torres, et. al.. 751 F.2d 875).

In this quote it is noteworthy that the judge introduces the organization by declaring not

only their motives and their history of work toward the independence of Puerto Rico, but
also introduces elements of negative evaluation when he discloses the tactics. The choice
of specific words like "secret" and "bombing" is important. Here, we are not looking at
informal or formal oral communication like testimonies, or oral statements, but to a
written and published decision, element that in this case implies careful selection of
words. Here, the judge, who is supposed to represent objectivity in the legal process,
presents the defendants as an organization with a well-defined political agenda that uses
illegal, immoral tactics to pursue their goals.
This tactic of presenting the organization's motives by stating their actions as
reproachable was used by the legal actors since the beginning of the criminal process
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against the FALN. In one of the documents that initiated the criminal prosecution, an
affidavit in support of an application for surveillance, Special FBI Agent Richard S.
Hahn, introduces F ALN as follows:
The FALN is a clandestine organization composed of individuals who have
dedicated themselves to "liberating Puerto Rico from United States control". The
group's members claim that armed struggle is the only vehicle through which
independence can be achieved. The group's members also seek the release of
convicted felons and the removal of all military installations from the island of
Puerto Rico. Unlike other independence groups that engage in violent actions on
the island of Puerto Rico itself, the FALN has elected to stage its violent actions
within continental United States. The FALN is responsible for over 130 bombings
and incendiary attacks, armed takeovers and a series of armed robberies
(quotation marks included in the text) (Unit #005, page 3).
This document is a 67-page long affidavit provided by Special FBI Agent Hahn.
Hahn is a self-proclaimed expert on FALN and other independence movements of Puerto
Rico. This affidavit is in many ways the basis of the prosecution against FALN. It is in
this document that the F ALN is first introduced as an organization with clear political
ends and with a clear modus operandi. Hahn, in this lengthy statement carefully situates
FALN within the context of a prolonged history of independence struggles from Puerto
Ricans. He situates the organization and describes their mode of work. Mainly based on
the statements of former FALN member, Freddie Mendez, who became the prosecution's
main information source, Hahn presents a complete picture ofFALN. This sworn
statement is often quoted directly and indirectly in all the later legal documents. It is this
document the ~ne that sets the base for the various ways in which the law approaches the
political motivations of the FALN and its members. These different ways or patterns are
going to be identified as they appear in the documents.
Thus, Hahn names FALN a "clandestine" organization, situating the organization
on the illegal side. Then, he continues his description with a phrase that presents the
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motives. Of particular interesting is how Hahn uses quotation marks when he states the
main motive-"liberating Puerto Rico from United States control". Since there is no
reference to any quotes source, we have to assume that the use of quotation marks is to
question, to doubt, to challenge the truth of the text inside the marks. So he questions the
veracity of the US control's over Puerto Rico. This is an essential element throughout the
whole criminal procedure, and defines the public relationship between the United States
government and Puerto Rico 25 •
After questioning the foundation of the FALN' s whole political motivation, Hahn
continues by stating the organization's tactics or modus operandi-armed struggle. He
then expands the presentation by exposing other motives. He mentions the FALN
campaign for the liberation of the nationalist Puerto Rican political prisoners. Of course,
he fails to mention the political character of their imprisonment, or the fact that this
campaign was broadly supported, he just says ''the release of convicted felons". And in
the same paragraph he continues to introduce the organization by describing the tactics
again. In sum, Hahn accompanies a statement about FALN's motives with a statement
about FALN's tactics. In this way, he vilifies the motives by emphasizing the tactics.
This is the first pattern: vilifying the motives by emphasizing tactics.
However, contrary to this affidavit most of the legal documents only contain a
very short reference to FALN motives, if at all. For example, in Unit# 032 Judge Bauer
introduces the defendant as follows: "Jose Rodriguez is a member of the F ALN, an
armed clandestine organization seeking independence for Puerto Rico" (United States v.
Jose Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318). Once again, the small recognition of the motives is

See Chapter I for a discussion of the political and historical relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico.
25

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
preceded by an adjectival phrase that decries the actors and their political goals. The
vilification in this variant is given by a short adjectival phrase that names or labels the
organization and consequently its members. This second pattern is then, vilification of

motives by stigmatizing the subjects. Phrases like "armed clandestine organization" or
"secret organization" (as the one used by Judge Posner26) create a stigma that when used
as the introduction to the organization impregnate a negative and reproachable character
not only to the subjects but to everything they stand for.
Another form in which statements about FALN motives were found, was in an
indirect manner, by relating them to other known political movements or actors. This is:

guilty by association, our third pattern. In the state trial, the first witness called by the
prosecution, FBI Agent Thomas C. Deans, while relating and describing objects found in
a search of a safe house, introduces into evidence books and booklets of known political
"nature" 27 :

Q: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of the books you
observed?
A: They are various terrorist type publications including Regions to Grasp,
Revolution to Revolution, Book on Carbines, a Military Assault, rifle and items in
the background (sic), a book on make-up, Standing Back Up.
Q: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury the nature of these books and
the contents thereof?
A: Specifically, the revolutionary books are authored by older revolutionaries,
Mary Sutton-(sic) many types where our own groups used these books to gain
tactics in strategy to carry on clandestine actions.

The evidence presented by this witness relates the defendants to ''terrorist type
publications", fact that brings up an important point. The evidence presented is books

See quote above.
Most of these statements would probably not have been admitted into evidence if there have been
objections to what constitute inadmissible evidence according to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 18 USC
App. 18, and most of the state rule of evidence.
26

27
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referred to as "terrorist type publications". What does ''terrorist type" mean? Is it a matter
of image? Do those books look "terroristish"? The purpose of presenting this evidence is
to associate the defendants with it, thus creating a picture of culpability by associating the
defendants with blameworthy objects or people. This is how this pattern, guilty by

association, works.

On the other hand, perhaps it was not a matter of image, but of content. These
books were allegedly about (and I say allegedly because there is not enough information
to know the content of these books) revolution and revolutionary tactics, about arms,
about military actions. If the intention of the prosecution with this witness was to prove
that the defendants shared the beliefs expressed in these books, then at the same time they
were exposing the political character of the actions and, in that same sense, of the
prosecution. Hence, the motivations were an important part of the prosecution, in spite of
their apparent intent to obscure those political motives.
From the standpoint of the defendants, the motivations were the most important
factor. They were moved by those political aspirations and they tried to expose those
motivations every chance they had. Some of the legal documents that contained
references to the political prisoners' motives were as a restatement of what the prisoners
said. For example, the same first witness, FBI Agent Thomas C. Deans, was asked to read
from one of FALN communiques found in the safe house seized.
A: It reads on Saturday March 15, 1980, at 9:00am, Lannus (Phonetic Spelling)
(sic) Freedom Fighters of the FALN seized the Carter and Mondale Headquarters
in Chicago, and the office of George Bush in New York City. Action was attack
of defiance against the crime areas which are being celebrated in Puerto Rico
(sic). (Unit #007, page 47).
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The intention of the prosecution with this testimony was to link the defendants
with the F ALN. The defendants were not present in the courtroom during the trial, at the
beginning of the proceedings they were placed in a restricted room after some arguments
about their conduct. The communique that this witness is referring to was found in a safe
house. The prosecution is trying to link FALN's statements to the subjects. It is important
to remember that F ALN as organization was not on trial, but individuals. For that reason,
it was essential for the prosecution to somehow make the connection between the two.
Thus, by introducing this evidence the prosecution is also introducing statements
declaring the political motivations. Therefore, it was not a conscious recognition of
political motivations, but a consequence. In other words, they were disclosing political

motivations as an unwanted aftereffect. This is the fourth pattern.
Another example of the fourth pattern or how the legal actors were disclosing the
defendants' motives as a consequence and not as a direct recognition, can be found in the
testimony of Mr. Charles Bums, law clerk at the State's Attorney Office and fourth
witness of the prosecution. This witness was brought to testify about the defendants'
conduct on various pre-trial hearings28 •
Q: Now, with regards to oral statements that have been made by various
defendants depicted in these photographs, I would like to call your attention to
court proceedings on May 19th, 1980.
Do you recall any statement that was made by the defendant Jiminez (sic)?

A: Yes, I do. The defendant Jimenez stated various slogans regarding freedom of
Puerto Rico, and after that he said there will be assignations (sic) ...She (Dylcia
Pagan) said that she was speaking on behalf of her comrads and that they are
28

As it was mentioned before, the defendants were not present in the courtroom during the trial. Therefore,
it was difficult for the prosecution to link the evidence to defendants that were absent, or to construct an
image of villains just by the use of photos. This witness• testimony was important to personify the
photographs.
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members of the armed clandestine movement. And she also stated, "Long live the
armed clandestine struggle, not with guns, not with jail, our fight will not stop
(Unit #010, page 60).

With the intention of linking the defendants to the evidence, the witness repeats
revealing statements regarding political motivations. The same type of testimony was the
one from Mr. Dennis Wolter, Assistant State Attorney, and second witness of the
prosecution, who also testified about defendants' conduct in previous hearings.
Q: Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of the things that you
heard Luis Rosa say in open court on that day?
A: First of all, I don't think he (Luis Rosa) said anything. He shouted at the top of
his voice -it was very difficult to understand-and he was shouting in Spanish
and English both. Among some of the things he said were, "Long live Puerto
Rico", "Long live an independent and socialistic (sic) Puerto Rico", and "Long
live the FALN" (Unit# 008, 54).
Again, motives are disclosed just as an indirect, probably unwanted, consequence;
thus disclosing political motivations as an unwanted aftereffect. In this specific
situation, the witness' testimony goes to the point of linking the defendants with the
evidence (identification purposes), and the goal is to connect the defendant with the
FALN. In this process, the witness repeats some of the defendants' previous statements.
It is interesting how the witness begins by saying that he doesn't believe the
defendant said "anything". Yet immediately after, he repeats very strong statements that
the prosecution uses as self-incriminatory statements29 , after all the defendant is openly
admitting that he supports the F ALN and their struggle. The witness however, says that
he thinks the defendant said nothing. Since, the witness is an Assistant State Attorney,
who knows about the case in hand, it could be argued that the initial statement ("he said

29

According to the Federal Rules of Evidence (18 USC App. 18), this type of statement would be
considered hearsay, and for that reason inadmissible if objected in a proper and timely manner. However,
the defendants presented no defense and for that reason many objectionable evidence was admitted.
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nothing") reflects the witness' evaluation of the motivations and that he evaluates these
statements as meaningless political slogans.
The political prisoners (defendants at this point) took advantage of any
opportunity they had to express their political convictions and their rejection to the whole
judicial process. On many occasions their expressions were very strong (as reflected in
the last quote) and their statements very revealing. The third witness of the prosecution,
Timothy McMahon, another Assistant State Attorney, also testifies about the defendants'
conduct in previous hearings. This testimony was also used by the prosecution to prove
the defendants' negative conduct on pre-trial hearings.

Q: Please tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of the things which she
said? (sic)
A: Well, she came before the bench and began shouting at the court and other
personnel. Among the things that she did say at that time, first of all, she declared
herself a prisoner of war, that the courtroom in which she was had no jurisdiction
over her, that they engaged in war and a war against the United States, and that
the United States system ofjustice was a lie and a farce (Unit# 009, page 57).

This statement, the proclamation of their acts as war acts and their status as
prisoners of war, is a cardinal point within FALN arguments. It was not a mere slogan, it
was their political standpoint, their only defense. It was discussed in previous chapters,
the Geneva Convention's dispositions about prisoners of war and the reluctance of the
United States to even recognize the existence of a colonial relationship between Puerto
Rico and the United States30 • This precluded, at the beginning, any claim of prisoners of
war status. The courts and the legal actors dismissed this claim, although in some
occasions it was conveniently used against the defendants, like it is shown in the previous
quote where the witness testifies about the negative conduct of the defendants by
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repeating their argument. In other words, their only defense, their claim for the prisoners
of war status was used by the prosecution to prove their negative and uncooperative
conduct.
The next quote shows how the FALN's argument about being in war with the
United States, although dismissed when argued by the defendants was used for the
prosecution against them:
Although you sit here today, you must know that the "enemy'' is not in this
courtroom, and that they have declared war on the United States of America.
They have declared war on the law-abiding God-fearing citizens of this country
and state. They have spilled blood, but they can gain no respect (Opening
Statement, Unit # 006, page 9).

Thus, it is war in the sense of being considered evil, but it is not war in the sense ofbeing
considered prisoners of war. Here the second pattern, vilification of motives by
stigmatizing the subjects, is once again present. The motivations are tainted or vilified
by the prosecution's characterization of the defendants as the "enemy''.
The legal actors dismissed the FALN arguments in many ways. At the initial
proceedings the defendants were denied their petition for prisoners ofwar status, and in
many instances they were not even allowed to present their only defense, their argument
about the absence ofjurisdiction based on the colonial relationship of Puerto Rico and the
United States. This treatment was constant and consistent throughout the whole judicial
process. This constitutes the fifth pattern: FALN's political motivations are dismissed.
A reading of some of the cases brought up to higher courts demonstrate how
FALN arguments were merely dismissed and often ridiculed. In USA v. Alejandrina

30

See chapter II.
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Torres. et. al.• 583 F. Supp. 86, 8931 , the judge makes a mockery of the defendants'
arguments:
After learning of these aural and visual interceptions, but in accordance with a
previously set schedule, defendant Torres, Cortes, and Alberto Rodriguez filed a
99 page motion to dismiss the indictment, supported by appendices totaling 65
pages in which they reviewed the history of the relation between 1898 and 1974.
This review covered what defendants described as the struggle for independence
of Puerto Rico. They argued that they are prisoners of war to whom this court
should afford P.O.W. status.

Noticeable is how the court continuously mentions the length of the motion and
appendices. The regular readers of a published decision are lawyers, law students and
legal scholars. These readers are familiar with the length ofthe documents that are
usually filed in the courts. In this context, how important it is to know the length of the
documents if not to suggest they were nonsense?
Furthermore, the court does not discuss in the decision the merits of the
arguments. The only aspect mentioned is the length of the submitted documents. To
further indicate the way in which these arguments were dismissed, the judge leaves to a
footnote the decision about their petition to dismiss the indictment. In this footnote the
judge states that this motion was denied without offering the reasoning. The footnote
reads: "The petition to dismiss was denied; and the court's reasons were stated from the
bench, an order was entered accordingly'' (Unit# 037, page 89). What was stated during
the hearing is not available to the reader. Thus, the judge considers this argument so
lacking of importance that he did not bother in explaining his decision.

31

In this case the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained by electronic surveillance.
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The denial of opportunity to present their point of view was constant32 • This was
one of the main points of the defendants in several of the cases they brought up to higher
courts. The result of these cases was the same. The decisions supported the dismissal. In
Matter of Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 407 33 , the court attends various
arguments, within which was:
Appellants allege that the district court erred in refusing to allow them to show the
"dominant purpose" of the Special grand Jury was political suppression of the
Puerto Rican Independence Movement and an attempt to locate missing witnesses
(Unit# 035, page 410).

A couple of paragraphs later, the court simply states that the district judge concluded
there was not basis for granting further hearings and they agree.
The defendants' main point, and most of the times their only point, was their
political view of the situation. This argument, in its multiple forms, was most of the times
not allowed in the judicial proceedings. Once again, denying the political prisoners the
opportunity to present their motives. In United States of America v. Jose Rodriguez, 803
F .2d 318, Unit # 032, it is clear that the court did not allow them to present their side.
Finally, Rodriguez argues that the district court improperly took judicial notice of
the authority of the United States over Puerto Rico. He contends that it was an
error to instruct the jury that the United States has authority over Puerto Rico and
exclude his evidence on the unlawfulness of that authority. We disagree. The
court properly took judicial notice ofUnited States over Puerto Rico, and this
authority is not subject to dispute.
Putting aside the legal technicalities of the case, which is beyond this project, the fact
remains that the FALN and its members are embodied by their political views of the

32

Even though the defendants did not present a defense at state trial, they presented their arguments at pre
trial hearings.
33 This an appeal of a decision fmding appellants --people called to testify before a grand jury investigation
ofFALN activities-in civil contempt for not testifying before the grand jury.
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situation of Puerto Rico, yet they were not allowed to successfully present their
arguments. Their motives were excluded.
Even when the courts showed some laxity, this was corrected. In United States v.
Julio Rosado, 728 F.2 89, the state appeals arguing that the lower court erred in admitting
irrelevant evidence. The issue was precisely that the trial court permitted the defendants
to present their side.
At trial, appellants conceded that they had willfully defied Judge Sifton's
order... In the current fashion of mounting what some have called a "political"
defense, appellants condemned United States involvement in Puerto Rico, and
invited jury nullification by questioning the Government's motives in
subpoenaing appellants and prosecuting them for contempt. One witness, a self
proclaimed expert on grand jury abuse, testified that the Government used the
grand jury to ''punish people whose political beliefs are an anathema to the
Government. .. " In addition, apparently making the erroneous assumption that
good motives for committing a crime is inconsistent with criminal intent,
appellants presented witnesses who testified that cooperation with the grand jury
investigation would compromise their effectiveness as community leaders.
Appellants also introduced testimony of their good character and devotion to
community service.
Once more it is irrelevant to this research whether or not in strict legal terms these
were correct decisions. If legally it was correct to not permit the defendants to dispute the
authority of the United States, or to present evidence about the use and abuse of the grand

jury against independence activists, or to debate about the negative effects of testifying
for these individuals, sociologically this shows a clash between relevant issues for the
state and for the citizens. Furthermore, the conclusion is obvious, political motivations
are not relevant.
One of the few opportunities that the defendants had to present their side of the
case, it was reversed by a higher court. The appellate court identified this as a serious
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hazard (United States v. Julio Rosado, 728 F.2 89). Furthermore, their attempt to present
a defense was called a ''political defense". Of course it was political. That was the only
way to go for people who decided to commit themselves to a political venture. As it has
been shown, the whole judicial process was filled with political content, but to present a
"political defense" was out of the question.
The last sentence of the above quote says that the defendants tried to present
evidence about their good character. Ironically, this evidence was also excluded (United
States v. Julio Rosado, 728 F.2 89). Ironically, because throughout the whole process
FALN members were judged by characterization as terrorists and criminals. This was
presented by the prosecution in their opening and closing statements, by the witnesses, by
the judges in appellate decisions. Yet, they were not permitted to refute these accusations.
Finally, the last aspect considered in this chapter about motives, is the
comparisons of F ALN with other political groups or movements. As it was explained at
the beginning of this chapter, the idea is to identify motives ofFALN by the association
of them with other known political actors. In other words, the third pattern identified,

guilty by association.
Question number 15 of the protocol reads:
Are there any comparisons with other political groups or movements?
a. Yes.

b. No.

Out of 37 documents analyzed, just 2 contained references or comparisons with other
groups, that is only .05%.
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However, the only two documents that contain references are very revealing.
First, Unit #005, is the affidavit in support of an application for surveillance by Special
FBI Agent Richard S. Hahn, which contains a few interesting references. Here, Hahn
insinuates FALN contacts with the Black Liberation Army and with other Puerto Rican
clandestine organizations.
On February 28 and March 1, 1982 four powerful dynamite bombs detonated in
New York City's financial district. FALN members claimed credit for these
explosions in a five page communique expresses solidarity with and support for
persons involved in a number of other violent criminal activities. Particular
attention is paid to support for the defendants charged in connection with the
Black Liberation Army armored car robbery attempt in New York, New York on
October 20, 1981, which resulted in the murders of two police officers and one
armored car guard and wounding of several other officers ...FALN bomb making
literature and bomb components were found in the subsequent search of the East
Orange, New Jersey apartment/safe house of Black Liberation Army member
Marilyn Jean Buck (Unit #005, p. 9).

Hahn is making a detailed presentation of FALN in order to support the granting
of a permission to utilize specific type of surveillance methodology. Thus, he is trying to
portray the worst possible picture of FALN. In this particular part, Hahn is presenting
FALN as related to other known political and "criminal" actors. First, he states that
FALN expresses solidarity with people convicted for "other violent criminal activities".
The association is direct and obvious, as is the one with the Black Liberation Army.
Given the reputation of the Black Liberation Army, for many considered at that time as
the major domestic threat to national security, Hahn succeeds in connecting FALN with
dangerous activities and dangerous actors. This is reinforced with the reference to the
victims resulting from Black Liberation Army's actions.
On page number 5, Hahn reports about some other FALN activities that
connected them with other Puerto Rican movements.
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In October, 1979 explosive devices detonated in New York and Chicago in
conjunction with a series of bombings on the island of Puerto Rico.
Communiques issued both in the United States and Puerto Rico claimed credit for
these incidents in the names of the FALN and other three island-based groups.
The joint communiques also informed the world that at least four Puerto Rican
independence groups were now working in cooperation with one another.

Thus, several Puerto Rican independence movements were working altogether in a
common agenda.
The other document that contains any reference or connections to other political
movements is the testimony of the first witness of the prosecution in the state trial. This
testimony, which was quoted before in this chapter, includes some interesting references
to other Puerto Rican movements and to some elements of support to the independence of
Puerto Rico as evidence against the defendants. Responding to questions of the
prosecutor, the witness is relating what he observed in the search of a safe house. At this
specific point, he is testifying about a calendar they observed in the wall. Throughout
these series of questions and answers it is noticeable how the "puertoricanness" of the
defendants and their support to the independence of Puerto Rico was an important issue
for the prosecution and its witnesses.
A: It was a calendar. The inscribing in each specific date, chronological order of
FALN activities and other terrorist group activities specifically directed to the
Puerto Rican independent movement (sic).

Q: This was an actual printed calendar?
A: Yes. It was with photographs on the top pages and actual calendar had writing
describing what significance a particular date had (sic).

Q: Showing you what has been marked as People's Exhibit No. 40-A, I ask you to
look at People's Exhibit No. 40-A. Explain it and explain its contents?
A: The first- Viva Puerto Rico Libre y Socialista34 1980 calendar. On the first
page there is a photograph, and the calendar of January 1980, reflecting that on
34

This means "live long to a free and socialist Puerto Rico".
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the 25 th of January, 197Sbombings at Anglers Club and Fraunces Tavern by
FALN in retaliation for murder of two independentistas during - (sic) 35 •
In part because of the poor communication skills ofthis witness, we have not
enough information to make an informed analysis about this excerpt. However, we are in
a good position to make inferences. First, apparently this piece of evidence is a printed
calendar that contained pictures and writings. We have to assume that what the witness is
describing is as well printed information in the calendar, because if not he would have
had to describe the way in which this was written. Following that premise, it is interesting
how it was considered negative evidence for the defendants to connect them to political
material in support of the independence of Puerto Rico.

5 .3 Media: A Search for Political Motivations
The media plays an important role in the creation and re-creation of images and
understandings of social reality or social phenomena. The way in which the media treats,
discusses or approaches the subjects of this research is essential to the way in which
others (audience) react and think of the FALN. It has been stated before that for the
FALN their political goals and motivations are the element that defines them, and this is
true for most political groups (Mulcahy, A., 1995).
The literature on media and political organizations suggests that media often
obscures or is silent in regard to the political motivations ofpolitical groups (Gitlin, T.,
1980; Mulcahy, A., 1995). In this section, the media coverage of the FALN is studied to

35

Here the defense attorney makes a request to approach the bench. According to the transcript, he requests
time to go and request the defendants if they wanted to make any objections. After a pause, the transcripts
reflect that the defense attorney, Mr. Fletcher, returns and explains to the court that he consulted the
defendants about making objections to this evidence that he thought was inadmissible, but they insisted in
not participating in the trial.
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explore this proposition, and to see how and how often political motivations are included
in media's coverage. This analysis has two emphases: first how the media acts on
political motivations as a reporter of facts, and second it acts as a judge of facts. Thus, in
this chapter we examine different ways in which the media approaches the element of
political motivations. On some occasions the political motivations are presented as part of
the introduction of the organization, in others, as re-statements of FALN' s
communications. Sometimes the media will present a little of the FALN' s support and
other times it will not only present but also assume the opposition.
The protocol included three questions regarding this topic. Question number 18
reads:

18. Is there any mention ofFALNpolitical motives or goals?
a.No.
b. Yes.
Out of 59 media documents analyzed, 34 (57.6%) of the documents contained any
mention ofFALN's motivations, and 25 (42.4%) did not mention FALN's motivations.
These results contrast what was found for the legal documents. And, as noted earlier, it
contrasts with what the literature suggests regarding the lack of coverage of political
motivations by the media. Nevertheless, the way in which these references to motivations
are included and their content should illuminate us in regards to this point. In this chapter,
excerpts and quotes are studied in order to include form and content into the analysis.
The second question concerning political motivations and goals is question
number 14. As it was explained before, this question's purpose is to specify the array of
elements related to FALN's motivations. Question number 14 reads:

14. Is the situation ofPuerto Rico mentioned?
a. Puerto Rico 's political status
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b.
c.
d.
e.
f

History ofindependence movements
Emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States
Poverty or economic situation ofPuerto Rico
No mention
Other

The results for this question in the media documents reflect the different issues regarding
political motivations that were included in each document. For that reason, there could be
more than one answer for each document, hence, more answers than total of documents.
The political status of Puerto Rico was mentioned in 6 of the 59 media documents
included in this study. The history of independence movement was included in 5 of the
59 documents. The emigration of Puerto Ricans to the United States was discussed in 2 of
the documents. Finally, 50 of the documents contained none of the categories included in
this question. In other words, 84.7% of the documents did not discuss anything related to
the political, social or historical situation of Puerto Rico.
If we take the results for both questions, we can see that although more than half

of the documents included a mention of FALN's political motivations, this did not
translate into a discussion of the general situation that promoted FALN's interests
concerning the political, historical or economic situation of Puerto Rico. If a media article
includes general phrases like "a group seeking the independence of Puerto Rico", by
which a recognition of political motivations is included, but excludes significant
information for the reader in terms of the situation that causes such a claim, then the
information is incomplete and perhaps incomprehensible. In contrast, an article
approaching the same issue by explaining to the reader even the smallest piece of
information, like "Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States", would put into
perspective the facts motivating this organization. In other words, content and form will
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modify the coverage ofFALN's political motivations. It is in this context that the
literature's proposition has to be evaluated.

5.3.1 Discussion of Motivations as Part of the Introduction
One of the ways in which media included FALN's political motivations was as
part of the introduction to the organization. That is, the media would introduce the
organization with a short report of the organization's political agenda. The reporter
mentions the name of the organization and this was followed by a description ofFALN's
motivations as if to explain to the reader the nature of that organization.
The latter was particularly important during the coverage of the initial acts, when
the FALN was completely unknown to the public. At this initial point the organization is
likely to be described in its own terms as those are expressed in their communication,
since the reporters lack alternate sources of information. In the report of FALN' s very
first action, The Chicago Tribune introduces the organization in this manner:
The group calling itself the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation,
called for unconditional independence for Puerto Rico and demanded the release
of five Puerto Ricans who they said were being held as political prisoners in
federal penitentiaries across the country (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, p. 1).
Here the organization is presented by its name and their political claims. As the literature
suggest political groups act and communicate through the media in order to gain attention
to their political claim (Mulcahy, 1995). This point is particularly important when the
coverage of political motivations in media is analyzed. The way in which the media
covers and reports the group's claims is the essence of their actions.
The last quote is an example of how to present the motivations of the group in
their own terms, and it explains to the public the origin and nature of the group using
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statements of the groups' claims. These usually short statements were similar to each
other and somehow repetitive, in the sense of using mostly the same phrases. Statements
limited to the group's actual claims are rare, and more often media coverage would
include more information on the topic. This extra information was often to present a
negative perspective. For example, the following quote shows how the reporter includes
more information, but this works toward a negative evaluation of the claim being
presented.
The group identified by telephone as the "Armed Forces of National Liberation",
called for "immediate independence" for Puerto Rico and the release of five
Puerto Rican nationalists prisoners being held by the Federal Government for the
attempted assassination of President Harry S. Truman and shooting up the House
of Representatives in 1954 (The New York Times, 10/30/1974, p. 28).
Thus, the reporter took the time of looking for additional information on the issue
he/she was reporting. Contrary to the first quote on this section from The Chicago

Tribune, the reporter this time went into more detail and explained to the reader who
those five Puerto Rican prisoners were. Interesting is how the angle chosen here is to
present the acts for which these people were imprisoned and not the reasons why FALN
was acting on their behalf. As it was noted before in this chapter, the FALN was involved
in a larger struggle for the release of these prisoners and their point was not what the
prisoners did, but the fact that they were "the longest held political prisoners in the
Western Hemisphere." The reporter chooses to present a negative angle on the claim, and
in this way it-the claim-gets de-legitimized.
The media approach ofpresenting the organization by disclosing a part of their
political motivations could work to the benefit of the organization's purposes of
promulgating their claims, but it is turned against them when the information provided is
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accompanied by negative statements that only affect negatively their position. As in the
previous quote where the information provided presents an image of the nationalist
prisoners as dangerous criminals, the claim is affected by this additional information. The
negative statements on FALN's political motivations, when these-the political
motivations-were presented as part of the introduction, included in some cases their
most important claim: the independence of Puerto Rico.
The group's name stands for Armed Forces of National Liberation. It seeks
complete independence for the island from the United States. Independence is one
of the three important political currents in Puerto Rico along with the retention of
the present commonwealth status, and statehood, following the example of Alaska
and Hawaii. In most island election, the independence candidates rarely get more
than 5 per cent of the votes cast (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 10).

The most significant political issue ofFALN's agenda was the independence of
Puerto Rico. Their struggle was aimed toward the political status of the island. Here the
reporter gives additional information to the reader that could put into perspective the
issue. It was suggested in the introduction to this section that it had less meaning to just
repeat a claim for independence than to actually explain the reader that Puerto Rico was a
territory of the United States and that independence is a goal for many Puerto Ricans in
history.
This time the reader gets that information. The reader knows by this report first
the name of the organization. Second, their political claim -independence. Then the
report adds important information, independence is not a crazy idea but actually one of
the "three important political currents in Puerto Rico." However, the reader not only
receives that significant information, but then gets that independence although valid and
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important, is not massively supported by the voters. The effect then is that their claim is
not valid because voters do not support it.
Phrases like ''terrorist organization" were often used to name the organization36 •
These introductory and descriptive phrases also modified and affected the presentation of
FALN's claims. For example, in a 1975 article published in The New York Times, the
organization is presented first as terrorist, then named, and then the political motivations
are mentioned.
The terrorist band, calling itselfFuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
Puertorriquefi.a (F.A.L.N.) said the bombings were part of a "coordinated attack
against Yanki (sic) government and monopoly capitalist institutions" (The New
York Times, 10/28/1975, p. 1).

The reporter did not include additional information, just a quote from a FALN's
communique. But, the sentence starts with the phrase ''terrorist band" which sets the
image of the organization since the beginning. An image of illegality and dangerousness
that obscures and demonizes not only the group but also everything they stand for.
Moreover, the quote used only reproduces political jargon, and does not explain the
issues or claims. The message sent is one of radical gibberish and not of serious political
issues.
In the last period of this process, at the moment of the arrests, when the
organization had been absent from the public arena for almost two years before the
arrests on 1980, the media had the task of re-introducing the organization. At this point
the most common way of presenting the group was by describing them as the "Puerto
Rican terrorist group" and to recall their actions. In Chapter IV it was shown how at this

36

See Chapter IV.
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later point the group was mainly called by its ethnic identity and by the label of terrorism.
This was usually followed, and reinforced, by summarizing all FALN acts, and as a final
touch, a short statement on their political motivations. The following quote is an example
of the common way of talking about FALN during this process of the arrests and trials.
The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, or Armed Forces ofNational
Liberation, have claimed responsibility for or have been accused ofbombings that
killed five people and injured more than 80 others. The group says its activities
are in behalf of Puerto Rican independence (The New York Times, 4/9/1980, p.
A22).

In this variation, the political motivations are not obscured by derogatory
additional information or labeling, but by the mention of all the damage that FALN has
caused. In this context, the fact that political motivation did have a space in media's
coverage did not alter the effect of silencing or diminishing the political motivations of
the group.

5.3.2 As a Re-statement ofFALN's Communications

Mostly on the initial phases of this process, approximately 1974 to 1977, when
FALN was first appearing into the public spectrum and getting more and more
recognition as their actions were occurring, the media quoted from and, in some very
limited occasions, reproduced parts of FALN communications. The typical way in which
FALN made public their position was via a communique that was left in a public place.
After an action had taken place, one or more FALN members communicated
anonymously by phone with the press and directed them to the exact location where the
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document was left. They did not identify themselves individually, but identified
themselves as members ofFALN, sometimes accompanied by a short statement.
The media then had two main sources of information regarding FALN's
authorship and identity. First, it had FALN's oral communication by phone. The media
often noted this initial and direct interaction with FALN members. This report was one
sided since the source was the person who received the call and often reflected political
and social evaluations of the FALN. The second source was obviously the actual
communique. This document was often referred to in the media. The references were in
terms of its content and its form. Although the references to the communique were
customary, the actual reproduction of the document or at least considerable sections of it
was rare. In the documents included in this study, every FALN related article from 1974
to 1981 37 , the reproduction of FALN communiques occurred only once.
The article reporting the first action included both types of communications. The
communication by phone directing the media to the communique was carefully
described, the account ofFALN's political motivations is modified by the focus on
ethnicity and an image of violence.
A woman then took the phone, identified herself as a member of the Armed
Forces of National Liberation and announced, "We have just bombed Yankee
imperialist banks. Free all Puerto Rican political prisoners."
At 9:25 a.m., a man with thick Puerto Rican accent phoned the offices of United
Press International and said: "I want to tell the people of the United States, I'm
going to blow up all of Washington and New York unless the five political
prisoners are released in 30 days" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, p. 1).

37

For a detailed explanation ofthe media documents included in this research, see Chapter III.
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In this report on the communication of the FALN, the cardinal issue should have been the
fact of the claim of credit by these individuals and their identity. At this point no one
knew the F ALN and why were they taking these actions. The reporter accomplishes the
task by reporting the actual assumption of responsibility and naming the organization.
The other two elements included are their ethnicity (given by the reference to the accent)
and the mention of the motive of the release of the Puerto Rican political prisoners. This
report is complemented by quotes from the communique.
The statement said in part:

These actions have been taken in memory of the October 30, 1950, actions in
Puerto Rico against Y anqui [Yankee] colonial domination.
These bombings are also to accentuate the seriousness of our demands to
release five political prisoners in this hemisphere and the immediate and
unconditional independence of Puerto Rico" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974,
p. 1).

Here we have an article that contains both of the forms previously identified as
the ways in which the media re-stated FALN's communications. This article reports the
first public act of the FALN, the first time that the FALN appeared publicly taking
responsibility of an action. At this point there was no information or previous knowledge
of the organization and their political motivations. Moreover, the only two sources of
information supposedly available to the media were the phone call and the communique.
In spite of an apparent effort to cover the content of the document, F ALN' s political
motivations are not clearly disclosed since the claims are not explained or at least put in
the context of the situation of Puerto Rico. As it was mentioned before in this chapter, the
situation of Puerto Rico or the existence of the Puerto Rican political prisoners was not
regularly covered by the media. It is not enough to state the claim for the independence of
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Puerto Rico, in many instances it is necessary to explain the political status of Puerto
Rico in order to understand the claim. Otherwise the information is incomplete.
The same coverage is found on the article appearing the same day on The New

York Times. Once again, the phone call when the F ALN claimed responsibility was
described and small parts of the communique are included.
A man and a woman with Puerto Rican accents telephoned and directed reporters
to a telephone booth at Broadway and 73d Street, where the pair left a statement
from F ALN...The statement demanded the release of five Puerto Rican prisoners
by the Federal Government and called for the immediate independence of Puerto
Rico (New York Times, 10/27/1974, p.l).

In this first account of an organization that is claiming responsibility for bombing several
buildings in New York City, the focus again is on ethnicity. Since the organization
identify itself as being part of the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico, and its
name was in Spanish, why is it important to mention the accents? One possible
explanation is that reporters use this type of reference in order to provide some
authenticity to the caller. Be that as it may, the effect remains the same: ethnicity
continues to be the constant modifier of characterization (Chapter V) and political
motivations.
The political claim is mentioned by a reference to the content of the communique.
The two main political issues are mentioned -the release of the political prisoners and the
independence of Puerto Rico. Although this article does include a brief account of the
identity of these prisoners, there is no mention ofthe political status ofPuerto Rico.
Moreover, the account of the identity of these prisoners does little more than to taint their
claim since the information provided is that these people attacked the House of
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Representatives and the Blair House (The New York Times, 10/27/1974, p.1). In this
manner, the political aim of the independence of Puerto Rico is covered incompletely due
to the absence of information on the situation of the island.
A couple of months later, on January, 1975, on the occasion ofFALN's second
public act3 8, The New York Times reports on the form and content ofa communique.
After being identified as a "Puerto Rican nationalist organization that has been linked to
previous acts of terrorism", the article goes on to describe the content of the document
not without making a derogatory remark as an introduction.
The message, which had some typing errors, said in part: "We did this in
retaliation for the CIA ordered bomb that murdered Angel Luis Chavonnier and
Eddie Ramos, two innocent young workers who supported Puerto Rican
independence and the conscienceless (sic) maiming often innocent persons and
one beautiful Puerto Rican child six years old in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico dinning
place on Saturday the eleventh of January of 1975" (The New York Times,
01/25/1975, p. 1).

The content of the communique is preceded by a comment on the form -the
presence of some typing errors. Here they were dealing with a major event. As their own
headline pointed out "4 killed, 44 injured in Fraunces Tavern blast", there was an
enormous effect and consequently many important angles to report. In this conjuncture,
the reporter stops to mention that the document, in which an organization assumes
responsibility of this action and states their reasons, had some typing errors. The only
logical explanation for this interest in spelling is to point out errors in the document and
thereby discredit somehow the legitimacy or seriousness of the group, or to present an
image of low education or maybe otherness by exposing a lack of fluency in the
language.
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These events to which the communique refers are not explained in this report. The
two deaths and several injuries that were caused the alleged CIA bomb are completely
unknown to the reader. The intent of reporting the political motivation by quoting the
communique is obscured by the fact that the reasons exposed in the document make no
sense if not accompanied by a minimal explanation. In a long article with several quotes
from interviews with law enforcement agents and full of detailed descriptions of the
damages and the victims, a single unexplained quote from a badly written document,
seems insignificant and contributes in no way to the disclosure of the political claims of
the group.
The same day, The New York Times published several articles about the same
event, including a complete reproduction of the communique in a small text box
surrounded by several pieces on the victims, their families, their medical condition, and
the heroes. This is the only occasion in which a communique was completely reproduced
in all the documents that were included in this research. Nevertheless, it was not until the
next day, on January 26, 1975, that the events designated in the communique as the ones
provoking this action were explained.
This article on the development of the investigation of this case and the status of
the victims explains in a sentence what they called "the retaliation motive". After
updating the condition of the victims -ten "remained hospitalized, three in critical
condition", there are quotes from the Chief ofpolice warning that ''this might happen
again", and another police officer that stated "Anybody who would put this amount of
dynamite in a place where people were dining didn't care if they killed people." In a final

38

The attack on Fraunces Tavern.
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sentence the reporter explains that the deaths mentioned in the communique occurred on
a rally celebrated in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. "A few hours before the celebration was to
start, one bomb was found and dismantled. But another went undiscovered and exploded
in the crowd, resulting in the deaths and injuries" (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p.
45). The event that provoked this action at Fraunces Tavern that was so thoroughly
covered, probably because of the extent of the damages, was remanded to a last sentence
in the next day's paper after a full coverage on the status of the investigation and the
injured. In this context, the strength and validity of their political claim is diminished.
This pattern of diminishing the validity of the political claim by either excluding
necessary information to understand it or by accompanying it with pernicious remarks is
constant and pervasive in the media presentations ofFALN's political motivations. On
October 27, 1975, there was another action in which authorship was claimed by FALN.
On this occasion there were bombings of three buildings in downtown Chicago. In an
article that starts by naming FALN "an extremist Puerto Rican organization", The

Chicago Tribune quotes from FALN' s communique:
Today Armed Units ofFALN commemorate the anniversary of the October 30
revolution in Puerto Rico against Yanqui (sic) domination. And it marks the first
anniversary of the existence of our organization by launching a simultaneously
coordinated attack against Yanqui (sic) government and monopoly capitalistic
institutions in New York City, Washington D.C., Chicago and Puerto Rico ...We
demand immediate independence of Puerto Rico and the unconditional release of
the five Puerto Rican Nationalist prisoners (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p.
11).

The October 30th ''revolution" is an event mostly celebrated by nationalist groups
in Puerto Rico. It commemorates an uprising that took place in Puerto Rico in the remote
town of Jayuya. This and other events of the history of independence movements in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

148
Puerto Rico are further discussed on Chapter I and Chapter III of this work. Here what is
important is to mention that this event -the Jayuya uprising-- and its sequel, the attack to
the House of Representatives, provoked the arrest and imprisonment of more than a
thousand people accused of being nationalists or communists (Scarano, 1993). In spite of
the repercussions of this historical event, it is not commemorated or even known by many
Puerto Ricans, since it is often omitted from the official history. If it is an event mostly
unknown to most Puerto Ricans, it is definitely going to be unknown to the average
United States citizen, not of Puerto Rican descent. If the facts presented in the
communique are not explained, then the political motivation has no meaning.

If an unknown event is presented by a political organization --referred to as a
"terrorist band"-- as their motivation behind their acts, then the claim loses validity, not
only because it has no meaning for the reader but because it cannot conceal errors and
half-truths. The presentation of the motivations, even when the media present those by re
stating FALN's own words, does not fulfill the goal of divulging a political message if it
is obscured by the presentation of damaging remarks -like naming them terrorists-or of
it is not understood by the reader. For example, in an article entitled "Puerto Rican Unit
Says It Sets Bombs. Police Believe Underground Group Claim Blasts in Washington and
Chicago", published in The New York Times, the FALN is presented as "a leftist
underground group" and as "the terrorist band." After this extremely damaging
introduction the political motivations are presented in a re-statement from one of the
FALN's communiques:
In a two-page message, headed "Communique No. 6," the FALN said uprising by
Puerto Rican nationalists on October 30, 1950. With rhetoric similar to other
FALN statements, the group praised the government of Premier Fidel Castro of
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Cuba and declared: "Only a protracted, organized armed struggle can force the
Yanqui (sic) invaders out of Puerto Rico" (10/28/1975, p. 20).

Both strategies are present here. First, they are presented as terrorists, affecting
negatively the initial perception of the organization and influencing the reader's
evaluation. These damaging remarks are complemented here by the reference to the
political tone as "rhetoric" and by the mention of Fidel Castro. By these two references
the reader gets the message that they are dealing with a communist group deserving the
same evaluation as the Cuban government and its leader. Second, the mention of the
political motivations is reserved to an allusion to the 1950's nationalist uprising. The fact
that there is no explanation of the event they were commemorating or even of the
political status of Puerto Rico leave FALN's political claims as absent and concealed as if
it was never exposed.

5.3.3 Reporting Support and Being the Opposition
Despite of the abundant information regarding the negative aspects ofFALN's
actions and its investigation, there was large support for the organization and for their
political agenda in Puerto Rico and the United States. As FALN initially worked for the
liberation of Puerto Rican political prisoners, there was support organized for FALN and
there were other political groups supporting the issue of the independence of Puerto Rico.
The media occasionally covered this support.
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In a very rare interview of one of the supporters for the independence of Puerto
Rico 39 , Juan Mari Bras-a well known in Puerto Rico politician in favor of the
independence of Puerto Rico-carefully discusses the first bombings and places this
action within the broader struggle for the independence of the island. On the occasion of
a rally40 in support of independence for Puerto Rico that took place in New York city
short after FALN's first action, Mr. Mari Bras says: "There is a diversity of forms and
means by which the Puerto Rican people struggle for independence and national
liberation. This is one of the means" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5). There is
nothing in these words that indicates reproach of the actors or the actions. The reporter
however, qualifies Mr. Mari Bras' words in their introduction:
A left-wing leader of the Puerto Rican independence movement said Sunday that
terrorist bombings like those at five locations in Manhattan were one way of
fighting for independence (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5).

Thus the reporter calls the speaker "a left-wing leader" and puts words in Mr. Mari Bras'
mouth by calling the actions ''terrorist bombings." In this way, the support shown by this
individual is lessened and tainted. It is not a valid support since it comes from a
communist and how could it be valid since he is talking about terrorism.
Reporting on the same rally The New York Times does its part under the headline
"20,000 Rally Here for Puerto Rican Independence. Speaker Tells newsmen 'I do not
Condemn' Recent Bombings." Here the article reports the ample support shown for this
activity. The focus is on the number of people present in the rally and the identity of
some well-known attendants. In spite of the generally positive coverage, one of the main
39

The word rare is used here because, as it will be shown here, the supporters although sometimes

mentioned were not commonly interviewed.
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issues exposed in the rally-support for the independence of Puerto Rico-- was presented
in this article in a considerable negative manner, as the focus of the statement shifts to the
violent action of the nationalist political prisoners.
Nearly 20,000 people crowded into Madison Square Garden yesterday for a
cheering, chanting, festive rally for Puerto Rican independence, in which the
portraits of five Puerto Ricans jailed for a 1950 attempted assassination of
President Harry S. Truman and the 1954 shooting in the House of Representatives
were draped from the arena ceiling (The New York Times, 10/28/1974, p.35).

There are two other occasions when the supporters ofFALN and/or their political
goals made an appearance in the media -when the arrests started and during the trial.
Before the wave of arrests in 1980, when most of FALN members were taken into
custody, a small group of Puerto Rican supporters of the independence of Puerto Rico,
and sometimes leaders themselves of other groups, were arrested in an attempt by the FBI
to gather information about FALN. One of the people arrested during this time was
someone identified in the media as Mr. Perez. This arrested individual expresses support
for the independence of Puerto Rico, but his support is tainted by the fact that he is
expressing it under arrest and by his description as a former leader of another
independence movement.
Mr. Perez, a former "defense minister" for a Puerto Rican militant organization
called the Young Lords, was charged with possession of weapons, which the
police said they had seized Wednesday night in the Bronx apartment where he
was arrested... Mr. Perez declared: "This is part of a Government plot to suppress
the Puerto Rican independence movement ...I'm for the independence of Puerto
Rico" (The New York Times, 8/5/1977, p. 1).

This rally was very well attended. Reports on this rally inform an approximate attendance of20,000
people. Amongst the speakers in this rally were very well known people like Jane Fonda and Angela Davis.

40
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In this context, the support is not that significant, the person expressing support in under
arrest at the time and he is himself a former leader.
During the trial on 1980, a considerable number of supporters showed up at every
hearing and during the trial stage. These supporters were sometimes mentioned in the
media, although never interviewed. On April 6, 1980, The Chicago Tribune reports:
Earlier about 70 demonstrators appeared at the Evanston police station at about
11 :30 am Saturday to protest the arrest of Torres and the 10 others. The protesters,
most of them Latinos, communicated with those arrested by shouting to them.
The demonstrators chanted, ''Not with prison, not with bullets, the struggle
won't be stopped," and held banners reading, "Independence and Socialism for
Puerto Rico" and "Support and Defend the Armed Clandestine Movement" (The
Chicago Tribune, 04/06/1980, p. 1).

This generous coverage presents a group of supporters that were present in defense of the
FALN members arrested. Their support extended beyond the individuals, and covered the
political goals of freedom for the island. All these elements were presented to the reader
in this article, and it was possible to get a message of a political group arrested for
political reasons. But, the reporter did not stop there and he added the following sentence
to the last paragraph:
Security was reported tight at the police station, with armed officers stationed on
the roof and inside the station, and watching from the outside (id.).
Thus, FALN members and their supporters were so dangerous that they deserved this
impressive display of security. This image of dangerousness reduced, once again, the
positive effect that the presentation of political support could have had on the public.
The same exhibition of support was experienced during the actual trial, when the
demonstrators showed their support outside the courtroom. A couple of articles included
coverage of the supporters (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, p. 3; The New York Times,
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04/08/1980, p. A12; The Chicago Tribune, 07/29/1980, p. 3). This coverage was mostly
short and to the point: "As the trial got under way, a group of about 35 protesters paraded
in front of the Criminal Courts building demanding freedom for the suspects" (The

ChicagoTtribune, 07/29/1980, p. 3).
FALN's detractors also made an appearance in media's coverage. The most
interesting point in this part is that many times those detractors were the reporters or
newspaper's editors themselves. It has been shown before how political and moral
evaluations ofFALN's members and activities are presented in an indirect manner, like
when FALN members are called terrorists or when their actions are described as actions
designed to kill. In this section, other approach is presented, when the media assumes a
position in direct opposition to the FALN and breaks their neutral appearance.
Right after FALN's first action, the editors of The New York Times took it upon
themselves to explain the broader situation of Puerto Rico and the context ofFALN's
actions, and they did so while expressing their very particular position on the issue. In the
first paragraph the editors explain to the general population how damaging for the
independence movement FALN's actions are.
The five bombs exploded in Manhattan over the weekend will damage the cause
of independence for Puerto Rico far more that they damaged the banks and other
properties in the target areas. It is worth nothing that the official Independence
party of Puerto Rico, which polled only 4 per cent in the last elections, promptly
dissociated itself from the bombings and also disavowed the Puerto Rican
independence rally in Madison Square Garden yesterday (The New York Times,
10/28/1974, p. 30, section L+).
Thus the editors made an effort to gather information on the political status of Puerto
Rico and offered a very particular and not so neutral political analysis. Arguing that
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FALN' s actions do not represent the political preference of Puerto Rican voters and that
in contrast their actions will damage the struggle for the independence of the island, the
editors attack FALN's political motivations. Hence, FALN is not only pursuing a non
supported cause but it also harms the ones that do support it. FALN' s actions and their
political motivations are not valid or legitimate.
The Times editors went on to diminish the continuous support for the
independence of the island by the United Nations, by disregarding it as the actions of
communist countries. The editors argue that these actions were upheld with the sole
intention of raising attention to the issue at a moment were the United Nations is about to
make a report on colonial territories. They argue that anti-American-communist countries
advance this position and that they do not influence Puerto Rican voters. In fact, they say,
"it is doubtless frustration at their inability to persuade fellow Puerto Ricans in open
debate at home that provokes extremist groups to resort to such tactics as bombings and
carefully-stacked independence rallies in New York" (The New York Times, 10/28/1974,
p. 30, section L+).
Apparently these views reflect a consensus among the editors of the two
newspapers studied in this research. The editors of The Chicago Tribune a year after the
Times editorial exposed their opinions. They attack the F ALN, their cause, the United
Nations and the Puerto Rican independence movement.
Puerto Rican nationalists, linked to the recent bombings here and in New York
City and Washington, are few in number. Their cause, independence from the
United States, has so little appeal in Puerto Rico itself that in a 1967 referendum
their option attracted 4,205 votes, in contrast to 425,081 for commonwealth status
and 273,315 for statehood.
About the only place where Puerto Rican nationalists can muster much
support is in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which in December,
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1973, passed one of its inconsequential resolutions affirming the island's right to
be independent. With the Cuban ambassador leading the chorus, a majority of
U.N. voters demonstrated that they would rather be against the United States than
for what most Puerto Ricans want (The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p. 2,
section 2).
The attack on the cause for independence is consistent in the media accounts. One
of the interesting things of The Chicago Tribune piece is that it presents a position that is
not against a so-called terrorist group that has acted against US properties, but it is
actually against the independence of Puerto Rico altogether. Independence is a legitimate
status alternative that goes to the polls at every election and that is a valid political
aspiration with a long history. The editors assume a position in opposition to the
independence formula and to anyone that supports it, this including the United Nations.
In a very irritated tone the editors described the United Nations resolutions as
"inconsequential.''
Besides these strong pieces where the editors of leading newspapers express
freely their position regarding FALN and its cause, most reporters reflected their position
in a subtler manner. Beyond the indirect criticisms, the most common way of expressing
opposition was attacking the cause for independence by arguing that it was an
unsupported political alternative. For example, in The New York Times the following
remark appeared: "Despite the rhetorical fervor of the FALN demands for independence,
the cause has drawn dwindling support in Puerto Rico over the last 20 years, with parties
favoring independence never able to gain as much as 10 percent of the popular vote" (The

New York Times, 08/04/1977, p. B6).
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5.3.4 Comparison with Other Groups
Finally, the last aspect considered in this chapter about political motivation, is the
comparison of FALN with other political groups or movements. The idea is to identify
FALN's political motivations by the association of them with other known political
actors. Political rather than criminal motivations are presented in an indirect fashion by
comparing the groups with other political movements.
Question number 15 of the protocol reads:

Are there any comparisons with other political groups or movements?
a. Yes.
b.No.

Out of 59 documents analyzed, 47 (79.6%) did not include any comparison to
other political groups, and 12 (20.3%) did include a comparison. These comparisons were
sometimes in a direct manner and others were indirect references, some to other Puerto
Rican organizations, and some to other known political movements.

In an article about FALN's first public action on October of 1974, when the
reporter is trying to identify the FALN, the group is related to other Puerto Rican
organization called M.I.R.A.: ''The previous terrorist organization that said it was
involved in bombings here was a group that called itselfM.I.R.A., whose letters stood for
revolutionary independence movement" (The New York Times, 10/30/1974, p. 28). There
is no additional information on this group, however this sentence offers the necessary
information to understand the message that FALN is a terrorist organization as this
M.I.R.A. was.
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Another direct comparison found in the media accounts was one to the
Symbionese Liberation Army. The argument is clear in the sense of applying to FALN
the same negative public opinion that this organization had at the moment. As it is shown
in the following quote, the reporter presents both groups as small and its members as
having psychological problems.
But FALN is an army only in the sense that the "Symbionese Liberation Army" of
Patty Hearst days was an army. It is a tiny group of characters with abnormal
psychologies. FALN has almost nothing in common with liberation fighters with
a constituency (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, p. 2 section 2).

In a more indirect manner, FALN was also related to the Black Panthers. It is

indirect since the relation is established by the intermediate relation of a third
organization. In an article reporting the arrests of one Puerto Rican suspected ofbeing
member or having information of FALN, the arrested individual is supposedly a former
leader of a Puerto Rican organization known as the Young Lords. This organization is
then compared to the Black Panthers. "The group, called the Young Lords, considered
themselves a sort of Puerto Rican equivalent of the Black Panthers, and they adopted a
paramilitary style of dress, a leftist philosophy and strident ethnic pride" (The New York
Times, 08/05/1977, p. Al 1).
By direct and indirect comparisons with other political groups an assumption of
political activity is presented rather than a criminal intention. This is very important since
it is contradictory with the criminalization process. It is contradictory in theory, but in
practice it works towards the same effect of creating a negative and reproachable image
deserving of control and punishment.
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5 .4 Some Concluding Remarks
This chapter studied FALN's political motivations. As we discussed in Chapter II,
the literature on the topic suggests that for a group organized for political reasons, the
most important aspect for them is their political motivations. The F ALN made public
their commitment to the independence of Puerto Rico every chance they got, particularly
in their public statement -communiques.
The law and the media approached the issue ofFALN's political motivations in
different ways but with a common characteristic. This is, even when FALN's political
motivations were more present in the media than in the legal documents analyzed, in both
cases, F ALN's political motivation were presented in such a way that it lost absolute
legitimacy.
The law, through its actors, did not present FALN's motivations in the majority of
the cases. Only 35.13% of the documents contained reference to FALN's political
motivations, and 86.5% of the documents made no reference to the political, economic,
or social situation of Puerto Rico. The legal documents that did contain a reference to
FALN's motivations or the situation of Puerto Rico did so in a way that it de-legitimized
those political motivations. In this chapter four main ways in which de-legitimization was
accomplished were identified: vilifying the motives by emphasizing tactics; vilifying
motives by stigmatizing the subjects; imposing guilt by association; and, disclosing
political motivations as an unwanted aftereffect.
The media documents reflected a significantly higher number of documents with
mentions ofFALN's political motivations. That is, 57.6% of the documents did contain
mention to F ALN' s motivations. On the other hand, for the broader question about the
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general situation of Puerto Rico, 84.7% reflected no mention of the situation of Puerto
Rico. When these two results are considered together, we have the effect of lessening the
importance of those motivations by not presenting necessary information to understand
the political issues presented by the FALN. This is, if the reader does not know that
Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States, it will make no sense for him/her to
mention that the FALN wants the independence for Puerto Rico.
Moreover, there were other ways in which the presentation ofmotivations acted
against the FALN in terms of being presented in such a way that those motivations
seemed invalid. Often their political motivations were accompanied in the media with
negative and judgmental statements. These negative statements attacked everything from
the main motive -independence for Puerto Rico-- to the grammatical errors in the
communiques or heavy accents. In some other occasions the media assumed a very active
role in the critique to F ALN's motivations, when it engaged in a discussion about those
motivations in editorial sections.
This chapter showed the contradictory importance of political motivations for the
groups involved in this issue. For the FALN political motivations are vital. For the law
and for the media, political motivations were pieces of information that either did not
needed to be disclosed or when disclosed had to be qualified.
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CHAPTER 6: THE FEAR FACTOR

One of the first reactions to news about terrorists and terrorism is fear. The notion
of terrorism brings about images of death and destruction, thus logically fear is a certain
response. The literature on media and political movements41 suggests that often media
provoke sentiments of fear of political actors and activities that in turn affects social
reaction to them.
Media characterizations have important effects in how the public is going to react
to such political groups and their activities. Altheide argues that not only the media has
the power to define what and ''who is to be feared", but also that these are elements that
could make people react with fear and pressure agents of social control to react toughly
(Altheide, 1997, pp. 665). The way in which groups are defined and interpreted
determines the way in which these are going to be handled. While freedom fighters are
seen with respect and approval, terrorists are feared and condemned. This in turn justifies
or, according to Altheide, even compels harsh treatment.

41

See Chapter II.
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In this chapter we will have the opportunity to explore the way in which media
and the law play with the fear factor. It will be interesting to observe the way in which
media exhorts sentiments of fear by suggesting imminent or possible danger to the public,
or perhaps by recalling dangerous events. Since the data on media includes events
previous to the arrests and following, it will be possible to discover any changes or
tendencies. Moreover, it will be possible to explore the possibilities of media influence
on legal treatment.
On the introductory chapters it was discussed how the legal treatment to FALN

members was extremely hard in comparison to individuals accused of similar offenses42 •
Through the study of the legal documents included in this research it will be possible to
observe if fear was an element utilized by the legal actors in the process against the
FALN. If it was an important element, it will be possible to draw inferences about
justification of severe treatment.
On the contrary, the political prisoners will argue that their acts were aimed to the
government of the United States as a legitimate response to the illegal, colonial,
subjugation of Puerto Rico. They would present themselves as freedom fighters whose
only target was the government and not the public, for that reason they were not to be
feared but respected and supported.
The protocol contains two questions that address the issue of fear in different
ways. The first question, question number 16, directly attacks the issue and it reads as
follows:

42

See comparison in sentences on Chapter II.
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Is there any mention ofpossible danger to the public?
a. Yes
b. No
Any reference to previous or possible future activities that could cause injuries, death, or
property damage was counted as a Yes in this question. It was also counted as a Yes, any
recollection or mention of dangerous tactics that could generate emotions of fear in the
reader.
As it was argued before, fear of danger to the public could justify harder treatment
by the state. Question number 17 approaches this topic:

Are there any policy or handling suggestions?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f
g.
h.

jail time
psychological treatment
death penalty
stricter surveillance to other groups or individuals
stricter immigration laws
stricter surveillance to FALN
other
none

6.1 FALN's Side: Did They Intend to Create Fear?

The FALN presented itself as a political organization whose aim was to liberate
Puerto Rico from its colonial domination. They presented themselves as a group working
towards its people, and their struggle as part of their work for the betterment of Puerto
Rican's social conditions. They never presented their organization or their work as a
menace to society at large, but as part of that legitimate political work.
During the 1970's and the beginning of the '80s, the prisoners were involved in
community, union, student and political struggles in Puerto Rico and one in the
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United States. They fought for the people's right to high quality and free
education. They worked to create community institutions such as alternative
education programs, child-care centers, health centers, housing cooperatives,
recreational facilities and political organizations...ln summary they challenged the
U.S. political system in many ways (Arm the Spirit, 1995).

The targets for their actions were not regular people or civilians, but major

corporations and the government. Their actions were regularly planned as symbolic
actions targeting buildings and government sites at time when no people could be injured.
This was so, that in over 100 bombings, that the FALN took responsibility for, only 5
people died. At least this is the argument of Oscar Lopez as cited by Ronald Fernandez:
"'The evidence will show you that we have a deep respect for human life, that we care for
human life.' To Oscar the proofwas in the result of the bombings: How could the FALN
violence be characterized as 'indiscriminate' if, in 120 bombings, 'very few people have
died.' Obviously, when it attacked banks, could have slaughtered people if it chose to do
so" (Fernandez, 1994, p. 207).
The argument is that if in so many actions only five people died, in fact four died
in just one action -Fraunces Tavern--, then it is clear that the FALN did not intend to
represent a danger to people in general. The FALN has always sustained that they did not
intentionally target civilians only corporations and government sites. In that sense, people
should not feel fear because they were not in danger. About their targets, F ALN states:
Invoking the right under international law to use all means available does not
mean we used them with no respect for human life, even when colonialism is a
disrespect (sic) for the human life of a nation, a crime perpetrated against all
citizens, regardless. It has always been the practice and purpose of groups
participating in the independence struggle to take all possible measures to ensure
that innocent people are not harmed. Our actions, for the most part symbolic, have
had the objective of focusing the attention of the U.S. government on the colonial
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conditions of Puerto Rico, and not of causing terror to the citizens of the U.S. or
Puerto Rico (Torres, 1996, p. 2).
Thus, the FALN insists that their struggle is against the U.S. government and U.S.
corporations and not against the people of the United States. Moreover, they sustain that
their actions were designed not to harm people and not to cause terror. In that sense,
people should not fear them. Yet, people did die as a result of their actions. About this
result, FALN says:
However, that is not to deny that in all liberation processes, there are always
innocent victims on all sides. In the case of Puerto Rico, there are fewer caused by
those who struggle for independence in comparison with other liberation
movements, taking into consideration as well the disproportionate size of
contenders. In our case, as with all those who seek justice, errors are committed.
We learn from those errors with a sense of self-criticism, always in the context of
our just cause, seeking to end colonialism, a crime against humanity (Torres, id.,
p. 2).

Victims are evaluated by the FALN as errors in their struggle and not as the
purpose of their actions. FALN was, as it was exposed in previous chapters, defined and
labeled as a terrorist organization, and presented as an organization that designed actions
in order "to kill people". Here, the FALN is arguing that they were not terrorist, but
fighters for the independence of Puerto Rico who did not intend to cause any deaths, on
the contrary that self-criticize because of those deaths. Deaths are, then, understood by
them as errors and not as purpose. This is what they think differentiate them from
terrorists. They regret committing those errors, they regret causing terror:
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we -like all genuine freedom
fighters and revolutionaries -do regret any loss of life on all sides of the conflict,
especially of any innocent civilian, but also on those engaged in belligerence. We
do regret loss of life, because we prize human life very highly (Torres, id., p. 3).
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It is because they do not aim civilians, and do regret any deaths, that they call
themselves freedom fighters and reject those who call them terrorists. To cal them
terrorists is seen by them as an strategy of the state to infringe fear on people and it is
only the result of them being the opposition and not a reflection of what FALN really is.
Alejandrina Torres on 1985 told the court: "The U.S. government labels me a terrorist
because I am willing to engage in armed struggle to free my nation. Yet, if I were a
mercenary who fought with the contras in Nicaragua, President Reagan would call me a
freedom fighter. Clearly the issue is not how I am fighting but what I am fighting or and
who I am fighting against" (cited in Fernandez, 1994, p. 203).
Contrary to what the FALN thought of themselves and their actions, the law and
the media portrayed an image of danger to society at large.

6.2 Law: Did it Play the Fear Game?
On previous chapters it has been shown how the law named or labeled the FALN

and its members prior, during and after the trial. Words as terrorists and cold-blooded
criminals were used to describe and define FALN members. Words like secret and
clandestine were used to describe and define FALN as an organization. These words have
the effect of creating an image of the subjects as being dangerous and evil people. This
image often provokes sentiments of fear amongst the audience. This chapter will further
explore this topic of fear and how the legal actors used this technique -infringement of
fear.
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The protocol contained one question that directly addresses the issue of fear. For
question 16 ("Is there any mention of possible danger to the public?") nine documents
were found containing direct mentions of possible danger43 • This is 24% of the legal
documents.
The second question included in the protocol regarding this topic responds to
Altheide's proposition that fear could influence agents of social control toward harsher
treatment. With this question any suggestion of social control policy or handling was
counted. Out of the 37 legal documents studied, only three (.08%) directly suggested any
policy or handling alternative. Specifically, one suggested long jail time and two
suggested stricter methods of surveillance to FALN member and followers.
In spite of these apparent low numbers Altheide's proposition cannot be discarded

yet. The documents studied in this part come precisely from those that Altheide suggests
would be influenced. The legal actors -prosecutors, judges, law enforcement agents-are
those that, according to Altheide, would be influenced and not the ones doing the
influencing. For that reason, theoretically this question when applied to legal actors may
not provide any useful information.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how the legal actors use the fear factor when
targeting their audience --jurors, judges, legal decision's readers. In these cases, the legal
actors used fear as a mechanism to support their specific argument. To better see this use,

43

As it was explained before, this question includes direct suggestions of danger as well as accounts of
previous dangerous acts.
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each quote will be preceded by an explanation of the source, the speaker and the possible
audience.
One of the documents that initiated the criminal procedures against F ALN is the
sworn affidavit by FBI Agent Hahn, Unit# 005. As it was mentioned before, Agent Hahn
I

is a self- proclaimed expert on FALN and other Puerto Rican independence movements.
Hahn in this affidavit introduces FALN and explains in detail FALN's history and modus
operandi. The information provided by Agent Hahn was constantly used and quoted on
latter documents.
This affidavit was initially filed in support of a request for authorization for the
use of special methods of surveillance. Thus, the document was directed to a judge as a
support document for the prosecutor's request.
This is how Hahn introduces F ALN in his statement:
The FALN publicly emerged on October 26, 1974 when the group claimed credit
for five bombings that occurred downtown New York City. Although these initial
attacks were symbolic in nature and seemingly not designed to injured people,
such was not the case in the F ALN next attack which occurred on December 11,
1974. In this instance the group used a false report of a dead body in an apartment
building to induce police into a "booby trap" explosive device that detonated
leaving a young policeman, Angel Poggi, maimed and permanently disabled. The
group's next action occurring on January 24, 1975, was even more ruthless and
resulted in four deaths, over 60 injuries, and extensive property damage. (Unit #
005, page 3).

Hahn presents the organization by stating their previous acts. The usage of positive and
sympathetic language when he makes references to the policeman, "a young policeman,
Angel Poggi" versus the negative and judging language that he uses to describe F ALN
actions, presents an image of good versus evil. The victim even has a name, so the reader
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can identify and suffer his loss. FALN on the other hand is a faceless group, whose
actions are "ruthless".
Thus, Hahn clearly is trying to present the worst possible image for the judge to
grant the petition for stricter methods of surveillance44 • The technique he uses is to
present a fearful group capable of ruthless acts that deserve to be treated roughly. The last
quote shows how Hahn defines the organization by stating FALN's previous acts. The
basis he uses to argue that those acts were committed by FALN is precisely that the group
had assumed responsibility for their acts. This was FALN's practice, they would send an
anonymous communique to the media assuming responsibility for the action and
explaining its motivation45 • But Hahn did not expose FALN's political motivation, he
only states the facts, the acts.
Hahn not only used FALN's assumption of responsibility on communiques, but
also adjudicates responsibility to other acts. Following the same pattern, Hahn presents to
the judge some ofFALN's acts:
The FALN made its presence known in Chicago, Illinois, on June 15, 1975 when
they claimed credit for the two powerful bombs that detonated in the downtown
Loop area. In October, 1975, the FALN attempted to display their strength by
simultaneously exploding bombs in New York City, Washington, D.C., and
Chicago. During the following year, the FALN detonated several more devices in
New York and Chicago, causing property damage and injuring innocent
bystanders. For some unexplained reason, however, they did not claim credit for
these incidents (Unit #002, page 4).
According to Hahn, we have to assume that FALN claimed credit for some of their acts
and not for others, the rationale for this is unknown though. In spite of that, the method is

44

The prosecution was requesting permission to use video equipment to record the interior of a suspected
safe house.
45 For more on this practice see previous chapter.
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the same, to define F ALN by their fearful actions and to feel sympathy for the victims,
which is accomplished by the use of terms like "innocent bystanders" to refer to those
victims.
This tactic of introducing FALN with somewhat detailed statements of their
actions and its effects, was repeated by most of the latter legal actors. Prosecutors and
appellate court judges presented the organization by emphasizing the action and its
effects, in this manner creating an image of frightful actors. Several of the appellate court
decisions included this kind of statement as the base or introduction for damaging
decisions for the defendants (FALN's members and affiliates).
Judge Posner on United States of America vs. Alejandrina Torres, et. al., 751 F.2d
875, introduces FALN in this way:
The FALN is a secret organization of Puerto Rican separatists that has been trying
to win independence for Puerto Rico by tactics that include bombing buildings in
New York City, and Washington. The bombs are assembled and shared, and
members of the organization meet in safe houses rented under false names. The
bombings have killed several people, injured many others, and caused millions of
dollars ofproperty damage (Unit# 031, paragraph 13).

The initial phrases on this quote and those on Hahn's statements are almost identical. The
construction of the sentences are very similar, the presentation of the name (FALN) and
then an account of actions and damage or victims.
The argument is then built upon the base of an image of dangerous individuals.
Hahn was pursuing to convince a judge to authorize special surveillance, and Judge
Posner is trying to justify that same type of treatment. In this case, Judge Posner is faced
with an appeal from an order of an inferior judge to suppress the videotapes of the safe
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houses obtained with the methods authorized after Hahn's affidavit. Judge Posner then,
builds on Hahn's strategy and constructs an image of evil that he then uses to justify the
use of those videotapes. The following excerpt shows how Posner uses that evil image for
that purpose.
But we do not think there can never be a case where secretly televising people in
private places is reasonable. The facts of the present case argue against so
absolute an approach. The FALN has the plans, the materials, and the know-how
to kill in mass. A sophisticated as well as lethal practitioner or urban terrorism, it
meets to plan its operations and assemble bombs in safe houses leased under false
names. Alert to the possibility that its safe houses might be bugged by the FBI, it
takes effective steps to defeat this form of electronic surveillance, making it
highly resistant to conventional methods oflaw enforcement even as enhanced by
modem techniques of overhearing conversations. We do not think that the Fourth
Amendment prevents the government from coping with the menace of this
organization by installing and operating secret television cameras in the
organization's safe houses (Unit# 031, paragraph 32).

Clearly Judge Posner creates an image of evil individuals and organization to
justify the use of special surveillance even in possible violation of constitutional rights.
The rationale seems to be that the evil nature of this people, their ability to avoid
conventional modes of surveillance and their potentiality to damage others, justifies the
use of the most invasive mechanisms. The strategy seems to be to create an image of
frightful individuals to then justify severe treatment, which tends to support Altheide's
proposition.
The same type of structure was used in most of the appellate cases. The judge
introduces the organization and its members as fearful actors that have committed several
acts causing several damages or injuries, establishing the base over which a decision was
made. It happens in United States of America vs. Jose Rodriguez, 803 F .2d 318, in Matter
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of Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F. 2d 407, and in USA vs. Alejandrina Torres,
et. al., 751 F.2d 875. It also happens in Matter of Archuleta, 561 F. 2d 1059, where Judge
Meskill says:
On January 24, 1975, a bomb exploded in Fraunces tavern, a restaurant in New
York City. Four people were killed, and fifty-three were injured. A group known
as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, or "FALN", which seeks
independence for Puerto Rico, claimed responsibility for this act of terrorism.

Finding then against the defendants.
The justification for severe treatment based on an image of danger and sentiments
of fear was also found in more direct and overt manners. Some documents show
specifically the way in which fear was used as the determining argument in favor of such
treatment. Particularly Hahn's affidavit in support of a request for the use of special
surveillance technology shows how this element was used. Hahn builds upon a detailed
and morbid depiction of cold-blooded, well organized, fearless individuals:
That individuals engaged in violent criminal activity in furtherance of the goals of
the FALN would continue that conduct long after the arrest and incarceration of
Mendez46 and his co-defendants was made clear by many of the defendants ... As
defendant Luis Rosa said "there will be many more Fraunces Taverns and many
more Sabana Secas" [where a bus loaded with unarmed navy personnel were
ambushed by machine guns killing two and wounding nine]47 • As Carmen
Valentin said " ...we are confident that all those that have partaken in this illegal
and vicious trial will not be exempted for the righteous and just revolutionary
procedure. There will soon be judges, marshals, members of the jury, prosecutors,
agents, all of you -some of you will be walking on canes and wheelchairs.
Revolutionary justice can be fierce. Mark my words (Unit #005, page 11).

46 Freddie Mendez is an ex FALN member who cooperated with the state and became their most important
informant.
47 FALN did not take credit for this action. This action took place in Puerto Rico and the island-based
organization Los Macheteros took credit of this action.
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Hahn is using menacing statements, supposedly coming from the defendants (he makes
no reference as to when or where these statements were made), to support the
authorization of invasive surveillance methodologies. Without entering into the justness
or not of the request, which is not the purpose of this research, what it is pointed out here
is the use of fear as the justification for harder treatment.
Fear was constructed, in some occasions, by labeling the actors, creating a stigma
based on the recollection of previous acts, modus operandi, associations, or sometimes on
some kind of"criminal nature". The base is presented and the conclusion is insinuated.
For example, on his opening statement, State Attorney Michael Ficaro presents to the
jury an image, a picture of ruthless terrorists upon which he concludes that these people
are "capable of anything".
Your Honor, Judge Mahon, Mr. Shabat, ladies and gentlemen. FALN, Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Puertorriquefta, The Armed Forces for the
National Liberation of Puerto Rico. Whether you use the anachronism (sic),
Spanish, English, it means the same thing. Terrorist and terrorism. It means
people who will do anything, including the spilling ofblood, for the cause they
want. (Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et.al., Trial Transcript, June
29, 1980).

The logic is simple, these people are terrorists and that means they will do anything for
their cause (cause that is not presented). The stigma is imposed and conclusions are
drawn.
These conclusions are strong and extremely damaging. They go from indirect
insinuations of hazard to concluding statements of imminent danger and deadly purpose.
Like when Hahn comments on one of the attacks and concludes intentions based on the
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act itself: "It was clear that this bombing was designed to kill people and was anything
but 'symbolic' in nature" (Unit #005, page 3).
The bases for these conclusions are, as it was suggested before, previous acts,
"criminal nature", associations, and modus operandi. The following quote demonstrates
how operates the relying on modus operandi. On an affidavit in support of application for
interception of oral communication, Special FBI Agent Jeffrey C. Hayes develops his
argument for the need of this surveillance based on FALN practices.
As Freddie Mendez has advised, FALN members routinely study photographs
they have obtained of agents, police officers and of a prosecutor in order to know
their enemies. They are heavily armed and weapons trained. They talk regularly
about killing law enforcement officers and their bombs have maimed many. They
have spoken of automatic death to police undercover agents. (Unit #002, page
11).

These images of fear are also constructed on the basis of association. In the last
chapter it was discussed how the law used the association with other political actors as a
way of attributing negative evaluation to the FALN and its political goals (see Chapter
V). This "guilty by association" type of argument was also used to generate images of
fear. In a quote examined before48 , it is shown how these images were constructed based
on associations, in this case on association with the content of some books found in a safe
house allegedly in control ofFALN members.
Among the items discovered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin was a page from a book.
The book is called the Anarchist Cook Book. It is a book which contains recipes
for making a bomb, incinerary devices for altering weapons. It is a book designed
to tell people how to kill. And from this book was found among other papers of
the FALN this last page. It is this last page, ladies and gentlemen, that best
describes the people that are here on trial.
48

See Chapter IV.
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The page reads: Allow the fear and loneliness and hatred to build inside you,
rather than diminish in time. Allow your patience to torture material file the seeds
of constructive revolution (sic). Allow your love of freedom to overcome the false
values placed on human life, for the only method to communicate with the enemy
is to speak on his own level, using his own terms. Freedom is based on respect,
and respect must be earned by the spilling of blood. (Unit #006, State of Illinois
vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June 29, 1980).

This quote comes from the opening statement of the state trial. The prosecutor is alleging
that this excerpt of this unknown book should be used as a description of the defendants'
state of mind and beliefs. Apparently the logic here is that if they owned this book, they
must believe what it says. It would be interesting to know if this was the only book found
at this safe house or if there were others, if all said the same thing, otherwise how this
could be argued.
Finally, Mr. Shabat, Assistant State Attorney, in his closing statement sums up
perfectly the way in which the labeling and creation of an image of fear can develop on
conclusions ofpurpose and future actions. Addressing the jury, Mr. Shabat rounds up the
prosecution's case in the following manner:
Do not forget that one who conspires to commit robbery with others, as well as
those others, and those who would in furtherance of their conspiracy arm
themselves, as they have done, are always potential murderers in every step they
take during the planning and commission of that conspiracy in pursuance of their
objectives. Because when they arm themselves with these angles of death, and
that's exactly what they are, they are fully capable of not only fulfilling the
promise of their conspiracy but other unlawful acts as well. (Unit #030, page
241).

Apparently the argument is if they were capable of X, they should be capable of Y, and
for that reason they should be controlled.
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6.3 Fear in the Making: Media's Use of the Fear Factor
In the introduction to this chapter it was argued that the media plays an important
role on the creation of sentiments of fear in relation to subjects of their reports. According
to the literature studied and to our theoretical propositions49 the media acts as a generator
of cultural images and understandings of reality. Included in these social understandings
would be the understandings of criminal or political actors. The cardinal distinction
between those two groups may have an impact on the way in which social actors react to
them. In other words, social reaction and consequently social control regarding a specific
group is affected by the way that group is constructed (Altheide, 1997).
In this section we are going to explore if the media utilizes a technique of fear to
approach the subjects of this research. Moreover, we will examine the proposition that
there is a relationship between the use of fear and the toughening of social control
measures against those constructed as to be feared (Altheide, 1997). The focus on
damages and injuries as well as discussions of''what could have happened?" are
approaches that will be closely attended in order to uncover tendencies of treatment
and/or intentions of influencing or inciting fear among audiences.
There are two questions included in the protocol that target the topic of this
chapter. Question number 16 directly explores the presence of comments or arguments of
possible danger to the public. This includes direct remarks of danger as well as indirect
approaches like detailed descriptions of damages and injuries or coverage focused on the
victims. And question number 17 targets the other proposition of influence on social
control. This question concretizes the possible direct influences in handling alternatives
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like jail or stricter surveillance. It is important to stress that theoretically this influence
does not have to be so direct as to specifically suggest how to handle them or to argue in
favor of stricter control measures. The indirect aspect could be analyzed by a close
reading of the actual articles. For that reason specific quotes are included in this section.
To question number 16 the results were quite different from those found for the
legal documents. Contrary to the 24% of direct mentions of danger for the public found in
the legal documents, out of the 59 media documents included in this research 27
contained mentions of danger. That is 45. 7% of the documents included a direct mention
of danger.
The results for question number 17 also reflect a difference from those on the
legal documents. In contrast to an astoundingly low .08% of legal documents including
direct policy or handling suggestions, the media documents contained a variety of
suggestions in 20% of the news stories. The media documents contained a total of 13
documents making any kind ofpolicy or handling suggestions. Included in these are four
(4) documents suggesting incarceration Gail time), seven (7) suggesting strict
surveillance, and two (2) actually suggesting the imposition of the death penalty.
Besides the specificities of the answers to the protocol's questions, the way in
which the media in their coverage of the FALN and their actions used elements of fear,
could be approached as a whole. In other words, if we take the actual words and phrases
used to talk about this issue, we can discover tendencies or patterns that could be lost
otherwise. In this process I have identified four different ways in which the media incites
feelings of fear among the readers. These ways or tendencies are a focus on damages and
49

See Chapter II.
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negative effects, a discussion of what could have happened, the construction of
conspiracy theories, and finally the suggestion of handling or control mechanisms.

6.3.1 Focusing on Damages
The way in which the issue of the F ALN actions is approached could influence
the way in which the readers feel about the group. For example, if the focus is on the
political motivations of the group or even on their identification, the reader could feel
assured to try to understand the group or their claims. On the other hand, if the article
focuses on the extent of the damages or the negative effects that the actions had, the
reader may feel apprehension and be less willing to understand the issues at hand in a
political fashion. For example, when an article commences by stating: "Four persons
were killed and at least 40 injured", the message is affected by this initial shocking
statement the rest of the article is affected or even tainted from the starting point. Of
course, this is probably the effect that the reporter is going after, after all, that is the news
that is going to attract readers.
The way in which a topic is approached could affect the way in which information
is received. There is a tendency in the documents of the media to present the topic with a
focus on damages and negative effects. In 1975, when The New York Times reported the
action against Fraunces Tavern in New York they published a very long article full with
pictures of the injured victims and property damages. The frightening descriptions and
details of the damages were presented like a horror short story. The article starts this way:
A thundering explosion believed by the police to have been detonated by Puerto
Rican nationalists ripped through a 10th-century annex to historic Fraunces Tavern
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in lower Manhattan yesterday afternoon, killing four people and injuring at least
44 others" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 1).
This tragic tone of the lead paragraph is followed by four paragraphs of horrifying
descriptions of the impact, the damages and the victims. The article includes a list of the
names of the four persons killed and stories of the injured. The article also contained a
discussion of the identity of the FALN and the content of the communique. Nevertheless,
this occupies just two paragraphs within a long article full of tragic descriptions.
Perhaps because the attack on Fraunces Tavern resulted in four deaths and several
injuries, or perhaps for a sincere feeling of vulnerability, after this action the coverage
made a shift toward emphasizing danger and fear. The tone in the articles following the
event on Fraunces Tavern (as will be shown later on this chapter) is tragic, resentful and
fearful. The article discussed before is exemplary of the type of media articles during this
time.
On January 26t\ 1975, The New York Times published an article about the
developments on the police investigation of the Fraunces Tavern incident. Under the
headline "Police Seeking 2 in Tavern Blast", an initial report on this investigation is
offered. Nevertheless, the focus rapidly changes and contrary to what the headline would
suggest, the focus moves from the actual investigation to an update on victims'
conditions and a wide array of opinions about the dangerousness of this organization. The
elements of this article on the discussion of possible future events are discussed in the
next section. Here, it is important to analyze the way in which the article emphasizes the
damages in their coverage of any FALN related topic, in this case the developments of
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the investigation. The following quote shows how the emphasis is on the effects rather
than on the causes, the quote exemplifies the tone of the whole article.
Ten of the injured remained hospitalized yesterday, three in critical condition. The
casualty toll in the lower Manhattan explosion was the highest of any political
bombings here in recent years (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 1).

It is relevant to add that the coverage of the developments of the investigation
took about two paragraphs of the 25-paragraphs article. The rest was dedicated to a report
on the victims and opinions from law enforcement agents in regard to the future of the
organization and the possibilities of more actions. In this context, the message tends to be
in terms of the damages that the F ALN caused, which resulted in the highest casualty toll
in recent years. Thus, the organization's image is presented as a menace to society at
large.
This general tone of exposure to danger continues as a constant in most of the
media articles studied in this research. As was suggested before this could have been a
consequence of the effects of the Fraunces tavern attack. The apparent consensus was that
this event demonstrated the FALN's fatal intentions and capabilities. A law enforcement
agent reflects on the bombings and concludes: "Some of the others, like the Fraunces
Tavern one, were designed to kill" (The New York Times, 10/28/1975, p.l) while others
were intended to promulgate a message.
Probably because of the actual effects or perhaps because of the target of this
action, the Fraunces Tavern incident was perceived by many as proof of the FALN's
criminal nature and their ruthless approach to their struggle. This event was used by
many, the media included, to show the dangerousness of the organization:
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It was the tavern blast that dramatically underscored the group's potential for
mayhem. Diners in the crowded restaurant, a historic landmark, where George
Washington bade farewell to his officers, were buried from their tables. One man
was decapitated, and other victims staggered bleeding into the streets (The New
York Times, 08/04/1977, p. B6).
The subject matter of media accounts was not only about what actually happened,
but about could have happened.

6.3.2 Only Imagine What Could Have Happened!
Another way in which fear could be induced on audiences is by suggesting what
could have happened. A reflection upon what actually happened and a suggestion of
further or future effects characterize this method. In this sense the organization is judged
by their actions and its effects and by some imaginary-possible effects. The logic seems
to be that if they were capable ofX and X caused Y, then they are capable of A which
could cause B, for which we should act in order to prevent B and fear that B could
happen.
An article published in The New York Times just after FALN's first public action
gives the perfect example of this approach. The article starts by explaining the events, the
time of the explosions and the locations. The next step is to report the effects. And so
they do, not without suggesting what could have happened: "No one was injured,
although passers-by and night shift workers were nearby" (The New York Times,
10/27/1974, p.1). So, there were no injuries, but there could have been.
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The organization is judged by what they actually caused and what they could have
caused. As if giving warning of possible danger, the media engaged in a speculatory
frenzy against the F ALN. These processes, especially after the Fraunces Tavern event,
were characterized by indirect suggestions of possible future actions. As in the quote
above, the media would express the possible dangers that the organization could have
caused, and also it would reproduce what others thought the organization was capable 0£
The following quote shows how the media builds an argument of character upon
speculations of danger.
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, or F.A.L.N., the latest terrorist group
arising from the Puerto Rican independence liberation movement, departs from
the style of earlier Puerto Rican political organizations in a macabre way,
according to police. As one official said yesterday: "They seem to want to kill
people" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 10).

The F ALN then, is a terrorist organization that ''wants to kill people." This
conclusion of character is based on the fact of the event itself (the event of Fraunces
Tavern) and its effects. These conclusions were attained with disregard of what the
organization was saying in their communiques, contrary to presenting an image of
political actors engaged on calculated action for political reasons, the media was
presenting an image of dangerous terrorists with murderous intentions. And without any
considerations for human life, as shown in the following statement from a law
enforcement officer which was reported and not contested by The New York Times:
"Anybody who would put this quantity of dynamite where people were dining didn't care
if they killed people" (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 1).
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The media reproduced these statements without contesting the information or the
judgements. That alone would be enough to argue that the media was joining in the
process of criminalizing these subjects by presenting images of dangerousness and
creating sentiments of fear. Yet the media did not just quote others making these types of
arguments, but in occasions made the conclusions itself. In an editorial piece The

Chicago Tribune's editorial group offered the public the following:
The worldwide epidemic of terrorism exploded in Chicago Monday morning, a
startling reminder that our position far from any international border or from any
spectacularly sore spot gives us no immunity from bombings. This assault was on
Chicago's nerves rather than on its blood, though even the most restrained
terrorist cannot be sure that the bomb he set will injure only property and not
people, as was fortunately true here this time. As ofthis writing, these bombers,
who claim to be members of a Puerto Rican nationalist group, are still at large
(The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p.2).

The image presented by the editorial board of The Chicago Tribune is one of
imminent danger for the people of the United States. They argue that these events had
showed that the United States is vulnerable to terrorist actions. Moreover, although this
time there were no casualties, there is no way that they could be safe if terrorist actions
are to happen since no terrorist can guarantee the target of its actions. Even worse, the
bombers are still free, the danger is out there. It is this kind of argument that will develop
into a direct suggestion of how to control the threat (Altheide, 1997). This topic will be
discussed in the next section.
Speculations about the nature, character and disregard for human life were
supported by so-called experts on terrorism that were being cited during that time. In a
long article about terrorist psychology entitled "Inside the terrorist mind" an expert
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elaborates on the nature of terrorists. His arguments confirm what the editorial group of

The Chicago Tribune had maintained and what that law enforcement agent had stated:
terrorists target people not just property. About why they target people, the expert states:
Innocents are assaulted for many reasons. No target is easier to hit and incurs in
less cost. Nothing attracts more attention. Panic spreads most rapidly when
random murders occurs because one who imagines himself a possible victim
knows that no action he takes, no status he assumes can provide security (The
Chicago Tribune, 11/02/1975, p.l section 2).
The assertion that "panic spreads most rapidly" when people feel they are possible
victims can have a self-fulfilling effect. And this is precisely the reaction that could be
provoked ifpeople believe they could be in direct danger, and they are most likely to feel
that way if law enforcement agents and the media are telling them they are. If they tell
people that "Despite 'wide investigations' into F.A.L.N., Chief Cottell warned that there
'might be more bombings"' (10/28/1975, p.l), people will react accordingly.
The image of danger presented in the media during this time had two possible
effects. On the one hand, a creation of hysteria characterized by suggestions of
conspiracy theories and a call for harsh prosecution and severe sentencing. Although here
I can do no more than reveal patterns, the prosecution statements after the sentencing
hearing on 1980 surely suggests that fear and an image of danger helped in the process:
"Deputy State's Attorney Michael Picaro said Tuesday the 11 were 'the heart of the
organization' and presented 'the most clear and present danger to the people of this
county, this state, and this country"' (The Chicago Tribune, 08/27/1980, p. 8, section 2).
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6.3.3 About Conspiracy Theories and a General Sense of Hysteria
The general atmosphere after the first year of actions claimed by the F ALN was
one that could be called of hysteria, ifwe understand the term as defined by the
Merridian-Webster Dictionary-"behavior exhibiting overwhelming or unmanageable
fear or emotional excess." Media coverage was characterized by numerous references to
the possible dangers and the creation of elaborated conspiracy theories that did nothing
but demonstrate ignorance about the organization and a profound fear ofwhat it was
capable of. This atmosphere could create an interest in swift action, including
persecution, surveillance, prosecution and sentencing. The actual call for increasing the
intensity of security and particular handling approaches is going to be discussed in the
next section. However, as a logical extension of the sense of hysteria, several elements
point to the possible effects of this generalized feeling of fear.
Since 1975, just a year after FALN's first action, the media started to elaborate
theories of the origin and plans of the FALN and their members. The theories about the
future plans of the organization were mostly related to the identification of possible
targets, like known politicians or personalities. The ones about origins often linked the
F ALN and its members to unpopular people or countries like Cuba.
The following quote shows how the media supported by state authorities created
relationships between the F ALN and the Cuban government.
In recent months, Latin-American intelligence experts in Washington have
disclosed a close alliance between the Puerto Rican terrorists, who seek
independence for the island commonwealth, and the Cuban government. Senate
investigators have obtained evidence that 135 Puerto Ricans from the United
States have being trained in Cuba in guerilla warfare, sabotage, and the use of
explosives (The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p. 23).
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The selection of Cuba as an ally in the middle of the Cold War reinforces the sense of
fear toward the organization. It also works as a way to impose new and additional sources
of antipathy toward the F ALN by transferring generalized feelings of hatred against Cuba
totheFALN.
This association of the F ALN with Cuba was a strong theme in media stories. The
sources for this alleged alliance were diverse. The last quote states that the source for this
information was an unidentified group of"Latin-American intelligence experts", and
another unidentified source, some "senate investigators." The New York Times also
makes this association in an article published on October 28, 1975. The source here is
different from the ones cited on The Chicago Tribune: "An investigation last January and
February by The New York Times discovered that the roots of the terrorist group go back
to 1966, when it was organized in Cuba and that it operated under different names here
and in Puerto Rico until last year" (The New York Times, 10/28/1975, p. 1). Now the
source is allegedly the newspaper itself.
The generation of theories about the origin of the organization seems to develop
into theories ofpossible new actions and target/victims during the period of the arrests
and trials (1980). During this time the media presented several theories about other
unclaimed actions, about why the members of the organization were in Evanston when
they were arrested and about what was their next action. For example The Chicago

Tribune presents a theory about some "terrorist" threats that were not claimed as the work
of any known group, but that apparently the F.B.I. had related to the F ALN in some
unknown way. "The Federal Bureau of Investigations has said that the organization's
members were behind several threats to Pope John Paul II during his visit to the US last
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fall" (The Chicago Tribune, 04/05/1980, p. 5). This in spite of the strong catholic roots of
the Puerto Rican nationalist movement and that the FALN had never identified the
church or any religion as a possible target.
Besides threatening the Pope's life, the FALN was also accused of having bomb
factories in Milwaukee (The Chicago Tribune, 04/07/1980, p. 1) and Chicago (The

Chicago Tribune, 04/10/1980, p. 1). There were also rumors of a plan to attack the
Democratic or Republican Convention, one or both. In spite of admitting to have no
evidence to support these allegations, the law enforcement agents used as sources of the
information did not abandon the conspiracy theories around the organization.
He said [FBI agent], however, that this did not mean the FALN would not try
such scheme to get nationwide publicity. He suggested that such a plan might have been
behind FALN invasion of the Carter-Mondale headquarters here. The invaders apparently
wanted a list of Democratic Convention delegates (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, p.

3).
The argument seems to be that even if there is no information or specific evidence
to relate the FALN with these acts, they are capable of anything, and since they are
capable of anything they should be investigated in relation to any imaginable outrageous
act. The list ofpotential actions was long and despite the FBI admission of having no
evidence, the media continue to report this possible action in relation to F ALN. In this
indirect way, the media was blaming the organization for all those actions mentioned.

The Chicago Tribune summarized what they called "later developments":
•

It was learned that the Secret Service is working with the FBI to determine
whether the terrorist group poses any threat to President Carter or Vice-President
Mondale. So far no direct danger to either man has been uncovered.
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•

Documents found in the Jersey City bomb factory mentioned New York City's
Madison Square Garden and the date August 11. The Democratic National
Convention opens there that day. The Jersey City apartment is only 20-minute
drive from Madison Square Garden. However, nothing found in the apartment
outlined a plot against the convention (The Chicago Tribune, 04/10/1980, p. 1).

Thus, although there is no evidence the reader gets the message that the organization is
being investigated in relation to a possible danger to the most important political figure of
the country -the President-and the Democratic Convention. Despite the official
information that there is no evidence linking the FALN to these allegations, the media
still reports it as a real possibility. Moreover the media sometimes justifies the absence of
evidence in order to support the unsubstantiated allegations: ''Nothing was found in the
apartment that outlined a plot against the convention, but investigators said any plot
would not be committed to paper this far in advance" (The Chicago Tribune, 04/11/1980,

p. 1).
Not only the FALN seemed to have being blamed for any possible terrorist action
during their time, but also there were theories about why they were in Evanston at the
time they were arrested. On April 3rd 1980, eleven individuals were arrested in Evanston
Chicago. These people were later identified by the police as members of the FALN. At
the time of their arrest several weapons were confiscated from the van they were found.
The authorities did not have information about the reason they were there or what were
they about to do. The speculations were numerous. The most common one was that they
were in a secret meeting -The Chicago Tribune called it "an unprecedented FALN
meeting"-- planning a major crime.
Authorities believe the Evanston meeting was called to prepare for a major crime,
such as a robbery of a bank or armored car to replenish the group's treasury, or a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188
raid on an armory or police station to obtain weapons (The Chicago Tribune,
04/11/1980, p. 1).

In other words, they did not have the vaguest idea why they were there so they stated any
possibility they could imagine.
The intensity of the hysteria and the fear-inflicting coverage-could have had
detrimental effects for the FALN and for many other Puerto Ricans that were ethnically
or politically associated with the group. It has been shown before how ethnicity became
one of the most important elements of identification for the FALN. For that reason, many
Puerto Ricans, especially those associated with the independence movement could have
been related to the organization's activities and been targeted for undeserved persecution.
The media reported during this time several indicators of possible pernicious
effects. For example, The Chicago Tribune reported as early as 1975, that the police was
investigating a group of Puerto Ricans that had visited Cuba during that time: "Chicago
police seeking leads to the person who bombed three downtown buildings were
attempting Tuesday to trace the movements of a dozen Puerto Rican activists here who
have made a series of clandestine trips to Cuba in recent months" (The Chicago Tribune,
10/29/1975, p. 23). It is interesting how the phrase used is "trace the movements",
because it would indicate intense surveillance and persecution. Another interesting aspect
of the last quote is that the people the police are following are "Puerto Rican activists".
This category is sufficiently broad as to include any Puerto Rican that supports the
independence movement.
The broader the categories of people investigated the more possibilities of
inclusion ofpeople as possible suspects based on discriminatory criteria. Ethnicity and
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political idiosyncrasies could have been the main elements of inclusion. The following
quote shows how many of the witnesses could have been influenced by these
discriminatory elements in their identification of the subjects. Here, it is reported that a
witness who identified two of the suspects as having participated in a raid were not the
persons he had identified in some photographs, or something to that effect (the article is
very confusing to this aspect).
An earlier identification of Torres and another of the arrested persons as having
taken part in that raid was made in error by a campaign worker who viewed pictures of
the suspects, according to police. After viewing the suspects in person in a lineup, the
worker decided that Pagan and two others were participant in the raid, not the persons in
the photographs he had viewed (The Chicago Tribune, 04/07/1980, p. 1).
Hence, media's frenzied coverage could have led to many errors that were
ethnically driven. There are several examples of this possible consequence, but they are
difficult to establish because the evidence is indirect. However, the evidence is stronger
with regard to the role of the effect of fear and hysteria influencing the severity of the
prosecution and following sentencing. About this, the construction of the articles mostly
suggests the relationship of fear with the severity of treatment.

The Chicago Tribune reports the result of the state trial against FALN members.
The main source for this article is the prosecutor of this case. After quoting him saying
that the prosecuted FALN members presented danger to the citizens of the United States,
they move to report further state actions against the subjects-"federal prosecutors also
are considering taking the unusual step of charging them with sedition" (The Chicago

Tribune, 08/27/1980, p. 8, section 2).
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In a report on the sentencing for the federal trial, The Chicago Tribune reproduces
several statements from prosecutors and the judge that suggest that the trial was far from
a neutral process, but one that was influenced by fear and anger. On February 1981, the
eleven FALN defendants were sentenced to "prison terms ranging from 55 to 90 years"

(The Chicago Tribune, 02/19/1981, p. 1). The prosecutors had solicited the imposition of
the maximum sentences based on the dangerousness of the defendants/FALN. "Margolis
and W. Jones, assistant U.S. Attorneys, had urged McMillen [the judge] to impose the
maximum sentences under the law, charging that the defendants were guilty of 'savage
acts' and an 'insane wave of violence"' (The Chicago Tribune, 02/19/1981, p. 1). The
argument apparently convinced the judge whom during the trial and sentencing hearing
made several statements that showed a strong sentiment of anger against the defendants:

In his statements to the judge, [Elizam] Escobar linked the FALN cause to the
American Revolution and said George Washington was a conspirator in the eyes
of the British. To which McMillen replied: "If George Washington had been
captured by the British, he would have been executed. That, in fact, is the penalty
that should be imposed on you (The Chicago Tribune, 02/19/1981, p. 1).

The suggestion of more severe sentences seems unreasonable given the fact that
they were receiving such lengthy sentences. The effect of fear seemed to influence the
severity of the treatment and social control. The previous quotes suggest this influence
but in an indirect manner. There were, however, instances in which the media reported
direct suggestions of stringent treatment/social control.
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6.3.4 "Hunt Them Down and Lock Them Up": On Influencing Social Control
It was reported earlier in this chapter that approximately 20% of the media

documents included a direct suggestion of handling methods. These data by itself do not
necessarily support the theoretical proposition of an influence on handling methods, at
least not as direct suggestions. The advantage of a qualitative approach to content
analysis is that it allows for a deeper study of the data. The numbers do not demonstrate
the extent to which the suggestions of control found could have affected social reaction.
Nevertheless, the sources and the context bring additional elements to the analysis, for
example, the person expressing the suggestion or the moment in which it was made could
make a difference in terms of the influence a specific suggestion may have. In this section
we discuss the strength of these social control suggestions as to propose influence and/or
pressure to state agents in terms of social/state control.
Since the first action in 1974, media reported requests for an increase in vigilance
and security measures. The New York Times informs: ''meanwhile the Police Department
broadcast appeals for increased vigilance, urging officers on patrol to give special
attention to buildings that might be targeted for further attacks that a Puerto Rican
nationalist group said it had made" (The New York Times, 10/28/1974, p. 35, section L+).
This call for intensification of surveillance came from different sources. The last
quote presents the police itself for this initiative. But in addition to the police, other actors
were insisting in control mechanisms. A very vocal actor in this process was New York
City's Mayor at the moment, Mayor Beame. On the occasion of one of FALN' s actions,
Mayor Beame calls for an increase in vigilance but also suggests punishment. Mayor
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Beame "issued a statement expressing his outrage over 'this senseless act of terror' and

pledging relentless police action 'to hunt down the killers and bring them to justice"'

(The New York Times, 01/25/1975). This was in 1975, and two years later Mayor Beame
had extended his views:
At City Hall, Mayor Beame announced he was sending a telegram to Governor
Casey and to legislative leaders asking that the Legislature be called back into
session to enact a law providing the death penalty for terrorists (The New York
Times, 08/05/1977, p. 1).

The request for increase in control was based on the actions themselves, like the
ones we quoted before, and on the fear of future actions. The rationale seems to be that
since we fear this will happen again we should intensify control in order to avoid that
possibility. Like the following: " 'We are concerned that this might happen again,' Chief
Sullivan said. That is why we have assigned so many men to solve this case as soon as
possible"' (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 1).
The fear of possible future actions was the root or base for the suggestion of an
increase in control, even when that control implied the limitation of civil liberties. Fear is
so strong of an argument that it even superseded the importance of the protection of
political rights. Consider the following media report ofremarks by Mayor Daley
(Chicago's mayor). Mayor Daley had promoted the use of what was called "police spies"
to infiltrate political organizations in order to control the F ALN. In response to criticism
received, Mayor Daley used the fear factor as the argument in support. Although the
media was apparently involved among those criticizing the Mayor, here The Chicago
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Tribune presents Mayor Daley's response and his supporters. Since it does not present the
critic's side, the article is one-sided and in apparent support.
Mayor Daley, speaking in regards to the bombings of three downtown buildings
Monday, said that efforts to contain violence by radical groups have been shifted
by a campaign of criticism and charges against police.
"You need security, surveillance, and infiltration to stop them [violent
radicals]" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 11).

And the FBI supported the Mayor by arguing:
"People have to decide what they want", one agent said. "If people don't want
dissident groups infiltrated, then they have to realize it will be tougher to catch the
bombers" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 11).

So, if you fear FALN, and you should, then you have to agree to this extreme measure, or
you will have more bombings.
The previous quotes are statements reproduced in the media but originated from
other sources. The argument here is that the media present these statements as truthful
statements because they are reported in an uncontested manner. The media then indirectly
echoes those arguments. Yet, that is not the only way in which media reproduces calls for
an increase and intensification in control mechanisms. On some other occasions, the
media itself produces those arguments. For example, the editorial board of The Chicago

Tribune, goes overboard to get involved in those suggestions of control.
Foremost is the need to be resolute in condemnation, and determined in efforts to
arrest, prosecute, convict, and sentence its perpetrators. Law enforcement, which
cannot always be everywhere, should and will give high priority to solving
terrorist incidents. They deserve this priority. Of all criminals, terrorists are
among the most dangerous. Their crimes are premeditated and their victims may
be and sometimes are killed, often by chance (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975,
p.2, section 3).
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This time, the editors of The Chicago Tribune participate directly into the process of
suggesting methods of social control. The calling for police action and prosecution
demonstrate the way in which the media could have made an influence in the way in
which the FALN was treated or handled by the state.

6.4 Some Concluding Remarks

The FALN presented itself as a political organization whose struggle was
supported by the inalienable human right of self-determination. They presented
themselves as freedom fighters in a legitimate struggle for the independence of Puerto
Rico. In their struggle they chose and designed their actions as to aim the government and
not civilians. Their actions were political and not criminal. For those reasons, they were
not to be feared but respected as the founding fathers of the United States are.
The law, through its actors, on the contrary presented an image of ruthless and
dangerous terrorists that needed to be controlled in order to maintain national security.
Statements that focused on the negative effects of their actions (i.e. property damages,
deaths and personal injuries) accompanied the presentation of the organization.
Moreover, the FALN was stigmatized as terrorists who are capable of anything possible.
These images of danger were used as the basis for finding against the defendants in their
trials, and as a justification for severe treatment.
The media reflected a more extensive use of elements that could infringe fear
upon the audience. In fact, contrary to what was found in the law documents, 45. 7% of
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the media documents analyzed reflected a direct mention of danger to the public.
However, the best way to understand the use of the fear factor by the media is by the
identification of trends or patterns. In this chapter four tendencies were identified in
which the media used fear. One of these tendencies was the focus on damages in media's
coverage. Here, the media would report the specific news by focusing on the negative
aspects of the story instead of focusing on motivations or other angles. Other way in
which the media would fear, is by engaging in speculation about what could have
happened and did not. Here, the media would suggest every possible terrible thing that
could have happened, in this sense suggesting fear amongst the readers. This elaborated
in practice in the creation of complicated conspiracy theories and speculations about
possible future targets, generating a general sense of fear and hysteria. Finally, the media
would construct arguments based on that fear and conclude the need for specific methods
of social control. In this sense directly participating in the process of criminalizing the
FALN.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

196

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Between 1980 and 1985 more than a dozen Puerto Ricans were prosecuted and
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 50 to 90 years. They were accused of being part
of an armed pro-Puerto Rican independence organization called Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberaci6n Nacional or F.A.L.N. FALN had been claiming credit for a series of actions
against U.S. government agencies and corporations since 1974.
FALN claimed to be working towards the independence of Puerto Rico. This
political goal had been shared by many Puerto Ricans since the beginning of the U.S.
presence in the island, and before that, during the Spanish domination. As many had
shared the goal of independence, many also supported FALN and its members when they
were arrested, during the trials, and after being imprisoned. The support was manifested
in different ways, such as an extensive campaign to liberate them from prison. This
campaign finally succeeded when in September of 1999 eleven50 of those imprisoned for
seditious conspiracy were released under a conditional clemency by President Clinton.
The support for the FALN members imprisoned was manifested in yet another
manner. Several activists, lawyers and scholars assumed the responsibility of denouncing

°Four remain in prison.

5
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the injustice of their imprisonment, the political repression against independence
movements and the unjust conditions of incarceration for the Puerto Ricans. Arising from
within these efforts was the argument that inspired this dissertation-that the FALN as
well as other Puerto Rican independence activists were subjected to a process of
criminalization by the state.
Previous studies present a view of the criminalization ofpolitical dissident groups
as a unilateral and straightforward process by which the state repress political opposition
as an attempt to maintain itself. This research proposes that the process of criminalization
is a complex process that is carried out by two main institutions: the law and the media.
The study of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, FALN, revealed that the
process of criminalization is complex and consist of three main components and that the
law and the media participate actively in that process.
The three elements of criminalization are the following. First, the characterization
or stigmatization of political dissident groups as criminals and terrorist-the law and the
media present images of the political groups and its members as criminal and terrorists.
Second, the law and the media in its treatment to the dissident groups de-politicize their
activities by negating their importance or criticizing their political motivations or goals.
The third element is the use of fear to justify social control, in other words the law and
the media present images ofpossible danger to the public in order to justify mechanisms
of social control.
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7.1 The Stigmatization of Political Actors and Their Activities
The FALN had presented their organization and themselves, through their
communications before and after their imprisonment and through the words of their
supporters, very differently than what the law and the media presented. They presented
themselves primarily as Puerto Ricans committed to the betterment of the life conditions
of the Latino community in the United States and to the solution of the colonial
subjugation of Puerto Rico. The main identity indicator, as they present themselves, is
their ethnic identity. It is this identity that they and their supporters identify as the main
motivation for their work. Their work towards the independence of Puerto Rico
constitutes the principal item on their political agenda, and it is their conviction that
because they are fighters for the independence of colonized people they were entitled to a
prisoners of war status. Their actions were a legitimate part of their struggle for self
determination, and far from being terrorist actions. In sum, they conceive themselves as
Puerto Ricans freedom fighters.

In contrast, the law and the media called them terrorists and their actions
abominable acts of terror. The main descriptive category found in the legal document was
that of terrorists. In other words, when the law named the F ALN it was mainly as
terrorists. Even on the two occasions when the phrase "independent activists" was used to
name the F ALN this was modified by a label of terrorism.
The label of terrorism was consistent throughout most of the legal documents.
The term ''terrorist" was used as an adjective modifying the name of the group or as a
substitute to the actual name. The most common way to introduce the organization found
in the legal documents that were analyzed was by describing the organization as terrorist
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and then presenting its name. The reader receives the message of the terrorist, violent and
criminal nature of this organization even before knowing its name.

It was found that the demonization of the actors is further elaborated by adding
negative elements to their already bad position. Stigmatization and labeling in the process
of criminalization works as follows: the law calls them terrorists and presents them in
such a way to the audience that justifies treating them as terrorist and criminals. If they
are criminals, they should be treated as criminals.
Seven different ways of naming the FALN members were found in the media
accounts studied in this research. Those names or categories are freedom fighters,
dissenters, communists or reds, maniacs or lunatics, extremists, independence activists or
nationalists, and terrorists. The first three categories were found in one document. Two
documents contained the category "maniacs or lunatics" and five contained the category
extremists. But the most frequently used category was that of ''terrorists", with 69% of
the categories so identified. The second most found category was "independence activists
or nationalists."
During the initial phases of the FALN's history in the media (1974-1975) the
most common way in which the group was identified was as a nationalist group. In this
way, the organization was presented as a group with a specific, defined political
standpoint. At this point the FALN was mainly called "a Puerto Rican nationalist
organization." However, as time passed and the once unknown group surfaced more and
more, the naming of the group moved from a rather neutral and informing way to a more
judgmental and accusing one. The once "nationalist group" became the Puerto Rican
terrorist organization. The style of naming and calling the organization as terrorists
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became almost standard. Different nouns followed the term "terrorist", but the prefix was
consistent.
Yet, the most common way of identifying the FALN besides mentioning the name
(FALN) and then describing the organization as terrorists, was to substitute the name for
a noun phrase -"a Puerto Rican terrorist group"-this is, a phrase that included an ethnic
referent besides the stigma. At the more advanced phases of the coverage ofFALN,
terrorist became the first name of the FALN and the main description was as Puerto
Ricans.

7.2 De-politicization: Denying Legitimate Political Motivations
Based mainly on devotion to their national origin, FALN members assert that it
was their nationalist sentiment what ultimately motivated them to engage in a struggle for
the independence of Puerto Rico. The political status of Puerto Rico, the tradition of
independence movements and the repression suffered by these groups are pointed out by
the FALN and its supporters as part of that motivation. And these political motivations
are essential for the definition of their work and their struggle.
In spite of the importance that the FALN put on their political stands, the law and
the media either dismissed or misrepresented those political motivations. Most of the
legal documents (64.9%) did not contain any reference to FALN's political goals. And
the rest of the documents that did contain references approached the issue in such a way
that resulted in a misrepresentation of those goals.
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It was found that the vast majority of the legal documents (86.5%) contained no
discussion of the political, historical or economic situation of Puerto Rico. The results of
the media analysis reveal very similar numbers, with 84.7% of the media accounts
containing no discussion of the general situation of the island.
Besides the very limited amount of information regarding FALN' s political
motivations, it was found that the media engaged in a process of de-legitimization of
political motivations by failing to report FALN's support, by accompanying reports of
political motivations with negative statements, or by presenting opposition. The use of
direct criticism and attacks on their political motivations by the media was mostly
expressed as opposition to the cause of independence, which was invalidated by arguing
that it was not a political status supported by most of the Puerto Rican voters.

7.3 Fear and Social Control
The FALN presents itself as a group of Puerto Ricans legitimately fighting for the
independence of Puerto Rico. Accordingly, they understand their actions within the
context of a valid struggle for self-determination. They maintain that the targets of their
actions were not civilians but major corporations and the government. They state that
their actions were designed not to harm people or to cause terror. Therefore, they
conceive themselves as freedom fighters and not terrorists, their actions as political and
not criminal. Thus, they are not to be feared but respected.
In contrast, it was found that the law and the media present an image of dangerous
actors capable of anything, actors that need to be controlled ifpeace and security are to
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be achieved. The analysis of the legal documents revealed that there were some
tendencies identified regarding the use of fear. One of these tendencies was the use of
fear to justify specific arguments, especially arguments about social control alternatives.
Specific arguments about social control are then built upon the base of an image of
dangerous individuals that need to be controlled. The rationale seemed to be that the evil
nature of the actors, in this case the FALN, and their potential to damage others justified
intense methods of control.
The image of fear was created by labeling the actors or creating a stigma based on
a recollection of previous acts, by defining a modus operandi, or by suggesting some kind
of criminal nature. These approaches produced damaging images of the FALN and
pointed to possible danger. It is the possibility of danger that justifies the application of
severe methods of control.
It was found that the media also presented images of fear and danger, and it did so
in three different ways: a focus on damages and negative effects, a discussion of what
could have happened, and the construction of conspiracy theories. In these ways the
media created sentiments of fear that ultimately could justify severe mechanisms of social
control. Yet, there were also found in the media direct suggestions of social control. In
these cases the attempt to influence social control decisions was clear and direct
The study of the media accounts of FALN also revealed the production of
conspiracy theories and a general sense of hysteria. Many theories appeared in the media
accounts regarding FALN's origin and associations as well as any number of possible
actions. The most common origin and association of the organization presented in the
media was with the Cuban government. Several articles suggested that FALN's members
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were trained in Cuba and that the Cuban government and Fidel Castro supported the
organization. In terms of the speculations about future actions, the sky was the limit.
From supposed plots to attack the Pope John Paul II to the existence of bomb factories all
over the mid-west, every imaginable evil action was attributed to the F ALN.

It was found that the media reproduced calls for intensification of methods of
social control in an uncontested manner. The call for the intensification of control and
surveillance came from different sources. One of the most vocal actors in this process
was New York City Mayor Beame, who calls for increase in vigilance but goes further
and requests a very specific type of punishment -the death penalty.
But the media did not restrict their contribution to the criminalization of the
FALN to the uncontested publication of statements in which the speakers were requesting
toughening of control; the media participated in a more direct manner. On some
occasions the media itself directly contributed to the process by generating those
arguments itself. For example The Chicago Tribune's editorial boards cried for action
and states its absolute condemnation of the FALN and requested that the authorities
should give top priority to the arrest and prosecution of this group. They based this
request for action on statements about the dangerousness of terrorists.

7.4 Conclusions
It was the purpose of this study to examine the treatment given to the Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, F ALN, by the United States. Supporters of the Puerto
Rican independence movement had claimed that these independence activists had been
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the subject of a particular form ofpolitical repression that they called criminalization.
Based upon this proposition and on the works of other studies in the area of political
movements, a detailed theoretical model of criminalization was developed for this
project. Our proposition is that the criminalization of political opposing groups is a
complex process in which several institutions participate. In particular, it is argued here
that the law and the media actively participate in that process.
The study of the treatment received by the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n
Nacional, FALN, from the law and the media reveals that both, the law and the media,
acted in similar ways to criminalize this political opposing group. From this study we
conclude that the process of criminalization ofpolitical dissenting groups is
accomplished by three main elements. First by characterizing the actors as common
criminals and terrorists, and their activities as crimes and acts of terrorism. Second, by
de-politicizing their actions in the form of dismissing or invalidating political
motivations. And, finally by creating sentiments of fear that are used to justify or promote
specific approaches to social control.
The law and the media contribute to the process of criminalization of political
opposition. The law treats political dissident's activities as criminal and terrorist acts
deserving to be punished. Furthermore, the law does not treat these activities as political
actions. The media utilize terms with strong negative connotations to describe political
activities to the public. Terms like "terrorist attack" and "bombing", like the ones used in
the case of the FALN, present an image of criminal actions and places an emphasis on
effects rather than on causes. This sets the stage and affects the public's interpretation
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and evaluation of the acts described. The media then, contributes to the criminalization of
the political opposing groups by presenting their actions as terrorist and criminal acts.
The way in which the media refers to the actors presents a pre-established
interpretation to the reader, influencing the way in which the public will react and
understand political activists. The specific terms used to characterize the group influence
its social interpretation. For example, to refer to a political organization as "independence
activists or nationalists" is to recognize to some extent a political standpoint in a neutral
and purely informative manner. The category does not present by itself a negative or
positive evaluation of the organization. The category "terrorists", on the contrary, is
judgmental and it presents a very negative image of those called as such. It does not even
present a political stand but merely an accusation. Thus, when the law and the media
characterize political actors as terrorists, as it did with the FALN, it imposes on the
audience(s) negative judgments that influences social interpretation of those actors.
The media accounts studied here showed a pattern of treatment and naming that
changed with time. When an unknown organization claims responsibility of an event so
important that it deserves front-page coverage, the media usually does not have many
sources to choose from regarding the identity of the organization. At these initial phases
neither the police nor the media have prior knowledge of the group. In this circumstance,
the principal or the only source of information is the actual group's communication. That
being the case, these initial accounts of political groups are mostly based on the group's
communication and for that reason, the result usually reflects to a larger extent, the
group's version of their identity and purpose. This initial treatment quickly changes in
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order to accommodate the presentation of these actors with more newsworthy scandalous
images of senseless terrorists.
The rather neutral coverage of the actors at initial phases changes as the
organizations become known and there are diverse sources of information. The
characterization of the actors in the advanced phases of coverage tends to be more similar
to the law's characterization. In this phase, the law and the media both coincide in
naming the groups as terrorists and criminals.
Once past the initial phases, the media tends to focus on a more standard
characterization ofpolitical groups and looks for ways to consistently identify them. This
naming is usually composed of a negative adjective, like terrorist, and by other forms of
identification. In the case of foreign individuals or members of an ethnic group or race,
the main form of identification is that otherness. In the case of the FALN we found that
the terrorist label was mostly accompanied by a reference to the Puerto Rican identity.
The Puerto Rican identification was the only part of FALN's own definition of
their organization that was adopted by the media. Despite the fact that the Puerto Rican
identity was important for the FALN' s own description of themselves, the extensive use
of the ethnic referent was accompanied by the terrorist label. This makes the
identification prejudicial and discriminatory as it makes accusations and imparts negative
associations for the people sharing that ethnic background. Thus, the combination of
identification referents -ethnicity, race, or nationality plus the negative stigma-affects
the evaluation of the groups as it relates the stigma with the other identification.
By characterizing and naming political activists as terrorists the law and the media
present an image of criminality that helps the process of criminalizing the acts and the
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actors. A consistent denial and misrepresentation ofpolitical motivations complement
this process of naming and stigmatizing political actors. In this way, political actors are
not only presented as criminals but also detached from their political goals.
The de-politicization of opposing groups, then, is achieved by the silence
regarding their political motivations and by invalidating those motives in its presentation.
There are several ways in which the invalidation of political motivations within the legal
documents is accomplished. One of those patterns identified in this research was called
"vilifying the motives by emphasizing tactics." The patterns or tactics of de-politicization
occurs when the organization's motives are presented accompanied by a negative
statement about the group's tactics. When negative statements regarding the political
actors accompany the presentation ofpolitical motivations, another pattern occurs ''vilification of motives by stigmatizing the subjects." In general, these techniques
diminish or invalidate the opposing group's political motivations because either their
practices are presented as reproachable or because the actors are.
The presentation ofpolitical motivations is not a simple task when dealing with
unfamiliar topics for the general public. For example, the particular political status of
Puerto Rico is not information that the majority of the population of the United States
necessarily has. For that reason, when isolated accounts of the FALN's political
motivations are presented without an explanation of the situation behind those claims, the
result is that the political motivations are not understood and become meaningless.
Insufficient information regarding political motivations of the group is another way in
which the law and the media de-politicize political organizations, especially those that are
not known to the public. Thus, when the political motivations of groups are not explained
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or accompanied with information that put into perspective the situation motivating the
actions, the political motivations lose validity as they are not understood by the audience.
This is especially serious for ethnically based groups.
This research revealed that the media covered FALN's political motivations to a
greater extent than did the legal documents. This finding departs from the literature on
the topic that suggests that there would be little media coverage regarding political
motivations of dissident groups. However, how effective is media's presentation of
FALN's motivations ifit is not complemented by necessary information regarding those
motivations? We conclude that the validity of a political motivation of a group is
diminished if the audience does not understand that claim. It is inconsequential for a
reader that a group committed an act in favor of the independence of Puerto Rico, if the
reader does not know that Puerto Rico is not an independent nation. Therefore, the fact
that the law or the media do not provide necessary information for the understanding of a
political claim facilitates the process of de-politicization ofpolitical dissident groups.
The law and the media de-politicize political opposing groups by dismissing and
misrepresenting political motivations in different ways. Also, political motivations are
often silenced. Furthermore, when political goals are covered the approach results in
prejudice of the group's image. The group's motivations are often followed by negative
statements that diminish its validity. In these ways the law and the media eliminate or
lessen the validity of the political motivations of dissident groups. The combination of the
two elements discussed -stigmatization and de-politicization-creates an image of a
subject that is a terrorist and that has no legitimate cause.
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The criminalization of political actors is completed with the production of images
of fear and dangerousness. The law and the media both create images and generate
feelings of fear by contributing to a sense of danger and alarm. Both actors (the media
and the law) use these images and feelings of fear in support of their arguments and to
promote ideas for social control. The request for increase in control is based upon
stigmatization of the actors who are portrayed as cold-blooded killers and terrorists. It is
also based on assumptions of future danger and suggestions of vulnerability of the
general public. The rationale seems to be that since they are dangerous and we fear them
we should intensify control in order to protect our security.
It is our conclusion that the FALN was in fact subjected to a process of
criminalization that led to their incarceration and the application of extremely severe
sentences and pernicious conditions of incarceration. This research expands the
proposition of the criminalization of the Puerto Rican independentistas and presents a
complete model of criminalization of political dissident groups that encompasses three
essential components. The three components -stigmatization, de-politicization, and use of
fear-are present in the case of the FALN and the law and the media actively contribute
to each of those components.
We conclude that political opposition groups become criminalized by the law and
the media through the three elements of the process of criminalization. Each element is
essential in that process and without any of them a political actor may not be treated as a
criminal. This is, a political actor is detached from what defines him/her as political and
becomes a criminal or terrorist actor by the stigmatization as criminal, by the de
politicization of their actions, and by his/her presentation as dangerous.
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The theoretical understanding of the process of criminalization proposed in this
research points to the evaluation of the law and the media as actors or agents that act on a
cultural basis, or cultural hegemony. Both institutions act in accordance with that cultural
conjuncture and are not understood as working in favor of specific interests. On the
contrary, they are understood as acting within a cultural framework of social relations
that are in turn produced and reproduced by its institutions. For that reason, it is not
concluded that the law and the media acted jointly or intentionally, just that acted in
certain ways that resulted in the criminalization of a political dissenting group. For that
reason, this conclusion separates this research from previous studies that present an
instrumentalist view of the state, in which the state represses political movements in its
intent to maintain control.
This research is based on the case of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n
N acional, FALN. In spite of this specificity, the conclusions drawn by this research could
be applied to the understanding of other political dissident groups as they are processed
by the law and covered in the media. The process of criminalization as presented here
could be useful in the understanding of the treatment to dissident political groups and
their actions, in particular groups treated as terrorists. As it was shown here for the case
of the FALN, many other groups labeled as ''terrorists" may be denied fair coverage and
treatment by the law. The stigmatization of actors as terrorists, the invalidation of
political motivations and the creation of a general sentiment of fear and danger, may
prevent a fair understanding of political actors and promote unfairly severe legal
treatment. This is specially serious when the actors appear surrounded by generalized
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sentiments of fear and anger, that are both produced and sustained by the law and the
media.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF DOCUMENTS ANALYZED

Unit# 001

"Application for an order authorizing the continued
interception of oral communication" (Motion)

May 5, 1983

Unit# 002

"Affidavit in support of application for interception
of oral communication" (Affidavit)

May4, 1983

Unit# 003

"Application for order for interception of wire and
oral communications" (Motion)

Jan., 1983

Unit# 004

"Order authorizing interception of wire and oral
communications" (Court Order)

Jan. 18, 1983

Unit# 005

"Affidavit in support for application" (Affidavit)

Jan., 1983

Unit# 006

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; Opening Statement

July 29, I 980

Unit# 007

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 1st witness, Thomas C. Dean (FBI
Agent)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 008

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 2 nd witness, Dennis Wolter (Assistant
State Attorney)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 009

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 3rd witness, Timothy McMahon
(Assistant State Attorney)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 010

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 4 th witness, Charles Burns (Law Clerk)

July 29, 1980
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Unit#0ll

Unit# 012

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 5th witness, Robert Tolzien (Manager of
Budeget Rent-A-Car)
State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 6th witness, George Shands
(Northwestern University Department of Public
Safety)

July 29, 1980

July 29, 1980

July 29, 1980

Unit# 013

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; ih witness, Sergeant Gerald Brandt
(Evanston Police Department)

Unit# 014

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
July 29, 1980
Transcript; 8th witness, Michael Gresham (Evanston
Police Officer)

Unit# 015

State of Illinois vs. Carlos T01Tes, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 9th witness, Michael Dubin (victim)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 016

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 10th witness, Patricia Solomon (victim)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 017

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Tones, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 11 th witness, Torben Nielsen (Evanston
Police Officer)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 018

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 1zth witness, Douglas Glonz (Evanston
Police Officer)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 019

State of Illinois vs. Carlos To1Tes, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 13 th witness, Mike Gillespie (Evanston
Police Officer)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 020

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 14th witness, Patrick Sennart (Evanston
Police Officer)

July 29, 1980

Unit# 021

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 15th witness, David Pennock (Service
Agent National Car Rental)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 022

State of Illinois vs. Carlos TmTes, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 16th witness, Michael Foley (Evanston
Police Officer)

July 30, 1980
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Unit# 023

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 1?1h witness, Robert McCarthy
(Evanston Police Officer)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 024

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 18th witness, Danny A. Defendough
(FBI Special Agent)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 025

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 19th witness, Jennings (FBI Agent)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 026

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 20th witness, Edgar Corley (Fingerprints
specialist FBI)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 027

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 21 st witness, Robert S. Witt
(Fingerprints specialist FBI)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 028

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 22nd witness, Thomas Deans (FBI
Agent)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 029

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et. al.; Trial
Transcript; 23rd witness, William Albrecht {Special
FBI Agent)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 030

State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et. al.; Trial
Transcript; Closing Statement, Mr. Shabat
(Assistant State Attorney)

July 30, 1980

Unit# 031

United States vs. Alejandrina Torres. et. al., 751
F.2d 875

Dec. 19, 1984

Unit# 032

United States vs. Jose Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318

Oct. 9, 1986

Unit# 033

United States vs. Julio Rosado, et. al., 728 F.2d 89

Feb. 10, 1984

Unit# 034

Matter of Archuleta, 561 F.2d 1059

Aug. 19, 1977

Unit# 035

Matter of S12ecial Febru~ 1975 Grand Jury. 565
F.2d407

Sept. 12, 1977

Unit# 036

In Re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857

Jan.23, 1978
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Unit# 037

USA vs. Alejandrina Torres. et. al., 583 F. Supp. 86

Jan. 16, 1984

Unit# 038

"5 Bombings in New York"; Chicago Tribune; p. 1

Oct. 27, 1974

Unit# 039

''Puerto Rico rally aide backs bombs"; Chicago
Tribune; p. 5

Oct. 28, 1974

Unit#040

"Blame Bombings on Reds"; Chicago Tribune; p. 5

Oct. 28, 1974

Unit# 041

"Terrorist Here Set Off 5 Bombs at Business Sites"; Oct. 28, 1974
The New York Times; p. 1

Unit# 042

"Puerto Rican Freedom"; The New York Times; p.
30, sec. L(+)

Oct. 28, 1974

Unit# 043

"20,000 Rally Here for Puerto Rican
Independence"; The New York Times; p. 35, sec.
{L+)

Oct. 28, 1974

Unit# 044

"Police Force Up in Bombing Alert"; The New
York Times; p. 35, sec. (L+)

Oct. 28, 1974

Unit# 045

"Seekers of Puerto Rican Independence Expect
Hearing UN Unit Today"; The New York Times; p.
28, sec. (L+)

Oct. 30, 1974

Unit# 046

"Detectives Investigating Bombings"; The New
York Times; p. 28, sec. (L)

Oct. 30, 1974

Unit# 047

"A Puerto Rican Sees 'Genocide"'; The New York
Times; p. 8, sec. {L+)

Oct. 31, 1974

Unit# 048

"Historic Tavern Rocked by Bomb"; Chicago
Tribune; p. 3

Jan.25, 1975

Unit# 049

"4 Killed, 44 Injured in Fraunces Tavern Blast";
The New York Times; p. 1

Jan.25, 1975

Unit# 050

"Bombers Called Intent on Killing"; The New York Jan.25, 1975
Times; p. 10

Unit# 051

"A Bomb, Then Sirens Echo in Canyons"; The
New York Times; p. 10

Jan.25, 1975
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Unit# 052

"Text of Notes Found Near the Blast"; The New
York Times; p. 10

Jan.25, 1975

Unit# 053

"Police Seeking 2 in Tavern Blast"; The New York
Times; p.l

Jan.26, 1975

Unit# 054

"Terror in Manhattan"; The New York Times; p.
16, sec. E

Jan.26, 1975

Unit# 055

"Public Responding on Tavern Blast"; The New
York Times; p. 20

Jan.28, 1975

Unit# 056

"Rose Bouquet Key to Loop Bombings"; Chicago
Tribune; p. l

Oct. 28, 1975

Unit# 057

"Police Spies Necessary: Daley''; Chicago Tribune;
p. 11

Oct. 28, 1975

Unit# 058

" ...and in Chicago"; Chicago Tribune; p. 2, sec. 3

Oct. 28, 1975

Unit# 059

"Police Suspect Cuban Link to Loop Bombings";
Chicago Tribune; p. 23

Oct. 29, 1975

Unit# 060

"Unpersuasive Puerto Ricans"; Chicago Tribune; p.
2,sec.2

Oct. 29, 1975

Unit# 061

"Inside the Terrorist Mind"; Chicago Tribune; p. 1,
sec. 2

Nov. 2, 1975

Unit# 062

"Puerto Rican Unit Says It Set Bombs"; The New
York Times; p.1

Oct. 28, 1975

Unit# 063

"Bombs Rip Manhattan"; Chicago Tribune; p. 1

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 064

"Sweney Finds a Bomb; becomes reluctant hero";
Chicago Tribune; p. 12

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 065

"Evacuation in New York 'mostly nuisance"';
Chicago Tribune; p. 2

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 066

"Crank Bomb Threats Flood New York; one
suspect charged"; Chicago Tribune; p. 8

Aug. 5, 1977

Unit# 067

''New York Bomb Defused; cite FALN"; Chicago
Tribune; p. 5

Aug. 9, 1977
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Unit# 068

"Bombings in Manhattan"; The New York Times;
p. 1

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 069

"Elusive FALN Terrorists, Believed 12 in Number
Have Bombed Scores of Buildings in Recent
Years"; The New York Times; p. B6

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 070

"How Reluctant Hero Saved Eight From Death or
Serious Injury''; The New York Times; p. B6

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 071

"The Family Mourns Lone Fatality in Two
Midtown Terrorist Blasts"; The New York Times;
p.B6

Aug. 4, 1977

Unit# 072

"Puerto Rican Arrested After Tip, but no charge in
bombings in filed"; The New York Times; p. 1

Aug. 5, 1977

Unit# 073

"On top ofit all, more bombings"; The New York
Times; p. 1, sec. 4

Aug. 7, 1977

Unit# 074

"Dud Bomb Discovered in Midtown in Building
Targeted by FALN"; The New York Times; p. 1

Aug. 9, 1977

Unit# 075

"FALN Terror Suspects Seized with Arsenal Here";
Chicago Tribune; p. 1

April 5, 1980

Unit# 076

"A Hundred Laid to FALN"; Chicago Tribune; p. 5

April 5, 1980

Unit# 077

"$22 Million F ALN Terror Case Bail Set"; Chicago
Tribune; p. 1

April 6, 1980

Unit# 078

"Arrests End 'Life on the Run"'; Chicago Tribune;
p. 11

April 6, 1980

Unit# 079

"FALN Linked ~o Milwaukee Probed"; Chicago
Tribune; p.5

April 7, 1980

Unit# 080

"Evanston police share limelight with residents";
Chicago Tribune; p. 5

April 7, 1980

Unit# 081

"Shouting, kicking FALN suspects dragged into
court"; Chicago Tribune; p. 3

April 8, 1980

Unit# 082

"Excellent Arrests in Evanston"; Chicago Tribune;

April 8, 1980
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p. 2, sec. 2
Unit# 083

"FALN Raided"; Chicago Tribune; p. 1

April 9, 1980

Unit# 084

"Cops Hunt FALN Bomb Factory Here"; Chicago
Tribune; p. 1

April 10, 1980

Unit# 085

"FALN Explosives Traced"; Chicago Tribune; p. l

April 11, 1980

Unit# 086

"Ex Chicago Teacher Called Godmother ofFALN
Here"; Chicago Tribune, p. 4, sec. 2

April 11, 1980

Unit# 087

"Suspect in Bombings by FALN is Seized"; The
New York Times; p. 1

April 5, 1980

Unit# 088

''New York Police Take Warrants for FALN
Suspects to Illinois"; The New York Times; p. 1

April 6, 1980

Unit# 089

"Eleven FALN Suspects Carried into Court"; The
New York Times; p. A12

April 8, 1980

Unit# 090

"Possible FALN Lair Raided in Milwaukee; FBI
traces a license"; The New York Times; p. A22

April 9, 1980

Unit# 091

"Eight Defendants Disrupt Start ofFALN Trial";
Chicago Tribune, p. 3

July 29, 1980

Unit# 092

"Eight FALN Terrorists Guilty of All Charges";
Chicago Tribune; p. 3

Aug. 31, 1980

Unit# 093

"Eight FALN Terrorists Face Federal Charges";
Chicago Tribune; p. 1, sec. 2

Aug. 1, 1980

Unit# 094

"'End ofFALN Seen'; 8 get jail"; Chicago
Tribune; p. 8, sec. 2

Aug. 27, 1980

Unit# 095

"FALN Terrorists Yell Defiance; Judge gives them
55 to 90 years"; Chicago Tribune; p. 1

Feb. 19, 1981

Unit# 096

"Prison Sentences Imposed on Ten in Chicago
Case"; The New York Times; p. A20

Feb. 19, 1981
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VITA

Y~Ol

Sumrnaryof
qualifications

Doctorate in the area of Sociology, major in Law and Society and a
second area of specialization in Family, Sex and Gender. Attorney at
Law admitted to the profession in 1996. Professional experience in
the academic and legal areas.

Education

1996-2002
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN
PhD. in Sociology
• Doctoral dissertation entitled "Law, Media and Political Dissent:
The case ofthe FALN'.

1992-1996
JmisDoctor

Universidad de Puerto Rico Rio Piedras, PR

1988- 1992
Universidad de Puerto Rico Rio Piedras, PR
BA in Psychology
• Magna Cum Laude
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Professional
experience

West
Purdue University
2001-2002
Lafayette, IN
Graduate Fellow
• Research: Criminalization of dissident political activities in the
United States.
Feb/2001-August/2001 Legal Services of Puerto Rico
Bayam6n,PR
Attorney at Law
• Civil law, Family law and Juvenile Practice for indigent clientele.
•

Active Research and Litigation.

1999-2000
Attorney at Law

Celina Romany Law Offices

Hato Rey, PR

•

Labor, Civil Rights, and Family Law Practice

•

Administrative and Judicial Litigation

•

Federal and Local legal research.

•

Preparation oflegal documents and professional seminars.

Sept/99-Dec/2000
Ford Foundation
Researcher- Independent Contractor
•

Translation, editing and writing of research material about
women, race, ethnicity and human rights for publication in
English, Spanish and Portuguese.

Jan-May 1999
Purdue University
Sociology ofLaw course, Teaching Assistant
•

Research and lecture on specific topics.

•

Preparation ofassignments and exams.

•

Grading

Aug.-Dec./1999
Purdue University
Criminology course, Teaching Assistant
•
•
•

NewYork,NY

West Lafayette, IN

West Lafayette, IN

Research and lecture on specific topics.
Preparation of assignments and exams.
Grading

1997-1998
Purdue University
Spanish course, Instructor

West Lafayette, IN
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•

Preparation of Spanish course for English speaking college
students.
• Daily lectures and activities.
•
Preparation of assignments and exams.
• Grading
1995-1996
Universidad de Puerto Rico Rio Piedras, PR
Clinica de Asistencia Legal (Practicum)
• Environmental law, family and juvenile practice.

Professional
Activities

•

"Criminalization of the Preganant Body'', paper presented at
University of Wisconsin at Green Bay; April 17, 2002.

•

"Criminalization of Political Dissent" paper presented at
conference: Crime, Criminality and Criminals in the Post
Colonial Puerto Rico, University of Puerto Rico-Cayey; May 3,
2001.

•

Participant, Professional Seminar: Defending a Victim of
Domestic Violence; Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico,
March 15, 2001.

•

Participant, Professional Seminar: Litigation Skills; Isabela,
Puerto Rico, April 23-27, 2001.

•

Participant, Professional Seminar: Advanced Topics on
Evidence Law; Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, June 6
and June 13, 2001.

•

"Women and Law: A Survey of Feminist Legal Theories"
Invited Lecture:; University of Puerto Rico-Cayey; March 20,
2001.

•

Book Review, Latin Looks; published on SSSP Newsletter
Fall 1999.

•

"Puerto Ricans in the United States, political struggles";
Purdue University Invited Lecture; April, 1999.

•

Preparation and design of professional seminar: Sexual
Harassment; Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, April
18, 2000.
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■

Fields of
Specialization

Research Interests

Wolk in Progress

Professional
memberships

Preparation and design ofprofessional seminar: Effective oral
communication in Alternate Dispute Resolutions Mechanisms;
Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, February 11, 2000.

Sociology of Law; Criminology; Contemporary and Classical Theory;
Political Dissent; Political Crimes; State Theories; Feminist Legal
Studies; Family Law; Law and Media; Terrorism; Juvenile
Delinquency; Race And Ethnic Relations in Puerto Rico and
United States; Research Methods; Critical Legal Studies.
Immigration status and citizenship rights within marginalized
communities, including but not limited to Latinos in the United States.
This includes competing conceptions ofrights held by immigrants and
applied by the legal system.
■ Prison populations and confinement. Identities and justice in penal
institutions: Latinos and women.
■
Law and the Media. The role of the media in law creation and
social control.
■
Terrorism and International Law. Self-Determination Struggles of
Colonized Populations.
■
Social Construction ofCrime
■

The Legitimacy of the U.S. System: A Panel Study of Political
Attitudes, By Yanira Reyes-Gil and Angel Rodriguez-Rivera

■

Society for the Study of Social Problems

■

American Sociological Association

■

Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico

Languages

Proficiency in English and Spanish

References

Prof. Robert Perrucci, Ph.D., Co-Editor Contemporary Sociology,
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Purdue University,
Indiana 47907; perrucci@sri.soc.purdue.edu: (765)494-4714.
Prof. JoAnn Miller, Ph.D., Co-Editor Contemporary Sociology,
Department of Sociology and Anthropology,,Purdue University,
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Indiana 47907; miller@sri.soc.purdue.edu; (765)494-4699.
Pro£ Jerry V anHoy, Ph.D., Department of Sociology, University
of Toledo,Ohio; jvh@myrealbox.com; (419)530-2791.
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